1、PAS 69:2006Guidance for the selection, installation and use of vehicle security barriersICS 93.080.30NO COPYING WITHOUT BSI PERMISSION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY COPYRIGHT LAWPUBLICLY AVAILABLE SPECIFICATIONLicensed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSIPublis
2、hing and copyright informationThe BSI copyright notice displayed in this document indicates when the document was last issued. BSI 2006ISBN 0-580-496-83XPublication historyFirst edition, December 2006Amendments issued since publicationAmd. no. Date Text affectedPAS 69:2006Licensed Copy: Wang Bin, na
3、, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI BSI 2006 iPAS 69:2006ContentsForeword iiiIntroduction iv1 Scope 12 Terms and definitions 13 Site assessment 14 Choice of barrier 55 Installation of vehicle security barriers 8AnnexesAnnex A (informative) Selection of barriers Decision
4、process 10Annex B (informative) Considerations for barrier selection 11Annex C (informative) Fixed bollards 15Annex D (informative) Rising bollards 16Annex E (informative) Road blockers 17Annex F (informative) Drop-arm barriers 18Annex G (informative) Sliding gate barriers 19Annex H (informative) Pl
5、anters 21Bibliography 23Summary of pagesThis document comprises a front cover, an inside front cover, pages i to iv, pages 1 to 23 and a back cover.Licensed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSIPAS 69:2006ii BSI 2006 This page deliberately left blankLicen
6、sed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI BSI 2006 iiiPAS 69:2006ForewordThis Publicly Available Specification has been developed for the UK Governments National Security Advice Centre (NSAC) by the Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) in collaboration wit
7、h the British Standards Institution (BSI). Acknowledgement is given to the following organizations that were involved in the development of this specification.Allen Fencing LtdAPT Army Headquarters Engineer in ChiefATG AccessD J Goode and AssociatesHome Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB)MF
8、D International LtdThe National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO)Security Services Group (SSG)This Publicly Available Specification has been prepared and published by BSI, which retains its ownership and copyright. BSI reserves the right to withdraw or amend this Publicly Available Specific
9、ation on receipt of authoritative advice that it is appropriate to do so. This Publicly Available Specification will be reviewed at intervals not exceeding two years, and any amendments arising from the review will be published as an amended Publicly Available Specification and publicized in Update
10、Standards.This Publicly Available Specification is not to be regarded as a British Standard.This Publicly Available Specification does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Users are responsible for its correct application.Compliance with this Publicly Available Specific
11、ation does not of itself confer immunity from legal obligations. Licensed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSIPAS 69:2006iv BSI 2006IntroductionThis Publicly Available Specification (PAS 69) provides guidance on the selection, installation and use of veh
12、icle security barriers to ensure that they are selected and placed as effectively as possible. This PAS is intended to be used by designers, planners, architects, security managers and facilities managers within the public and private sectors.PAS 69 complements PAS 68:2007, Specification for vehicle
13、 security barriers, which describes methods for the classification of various barrier types in terms of their ability to resist dynamic impacts by vehicles.PAS 69 highlights the issues to be addressed when considering the use of traffic calming and vehicle restraint systems as part of an overall sec
14、urity regime. The topics considered are by no means exhaustive, and the user is encouraged to consider additional questions and responses to cater for specific issues. If changes are subsequently proposed for the security package that has been designed, decisions based on this PAS should be used to
15、confirm why the original security decisions were made and how they will be affected by any changes. Decisions should be recorded and records retained for audit purposes and periodic review.Vehicle security barriers, by virtue of their basic design, may not be intended to provide any blast resistance
16、 but may be affected by any explosives that detonate following the impact or arrest of a threat vehicle. Vehicle security barriers might increase the level of hazard created by an explosion. Specifiers should confirm whether this risk is acceptable.Vehicle security barriers should not be considered
17、in isolation but as part of an integrated security solution which may include, adjacent perimeter protection, CCTV, alarm monitoring and guard force activity. Licensed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI BSI 2006 1PAS 69:20061 ScopeThis Publicly Availab
18、le Specification (PAS) provides guidance for the selection, installation and use of vehicle security barriers. General guidance is given in Annex A and Annex B.2 Terms and definitionsFor the purposes of this PAS, the terms and definitions in PAS 68:2007 and the following apply.2.1 operational requir
19、ement statement of needs based upon a thorough and systematic assessment of the problems to be solved and the desired solutions2.2 traffic managementsegregation, guidance and diversion of vehicles to mitigate potential hazards, marshal traffic and enhance the safety of road users and personnel worki
20、ng close to or on the highway2.3 traffic calminguse of self enforcing physical measures to produce road alignments that require a reduction in vehicle speed in order to be successfully negotiated 2.4 standoffdistance from threat vehicle, load or component, including any potential explosive effect th
21、at may be allowed to encroach upon an asset 2.5 vehicle airlock systemsystem created by using two active barriers of any type across the vehicle path of approach, with a secure sterile area between the barriers3 Site assessment3.1 Identify and quantify the threat3.1.1 Review any previous terrorist,
22、criminal or malicious incidents and consider their relevance regarding the target and attack methods used.NOTE Contact local police who will refer you to the appropriate adviser, such as Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs), Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) and Crime Prevention Design Advi
23、sers (CPDAs).3.1.2 If the perceived threat is expected to be vehicle borne and there is a need to mitigate that threat, it will be necessary to consider how such a vehicle might be used in terms of:a) whether it is parked outside or inside the security perimeter;b) whether it is driven towards a sec
24、urity perimeter;c) whether an explosive device is carried;d) the potential size of vehicle (both largest and smallest);e) whether it is articulated or rigid; f) its corresponding height, width, weight and possible cargo.Licensed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Co
25、py, (c) BSIPAS 69:20062 BSI 20063.1.3 Determine the required standoff from critical assets bearing in mind that the barrier could move or debris from the vehicle could be projected beyond the barriers final resting position.3.2 Identify the critical assets3.2.1 Identify the assets to be protected, i
26、.e. a building, group of buildings, an area, event, or personnel.3.2.2 Confirm whether there is a defensible security perimeter, either permanent or temporary, or whether one will need to be established.3.2.3 Identify the most critical buildings/assets (including neighbours). Consider their vulnerab
27、ilities. If more than one point is identified, they should be ranked in order of priority.3.2.4 Outline the consequences of a successful attack and estimate the likely disruption in terms of loss of life, damage, delays, perception and cost. 3.3 Consider collateral damage3.3.1 Identify locations whi
28、ch might suffer collateral damage from a successful attack, e.g.:a) areas where there are high concentrations of people;b) underground tunnels, basements and subways;c) vent shafts;d) bridges;e) major communication networks (above and below ground);f) electricity, water and gas lines (above and belo
29、w ground);g) control rooms.3.3.2 Identify other locations which might become alternative targets if the security strategy is effective.3.3.3 Assess the possibility of coordinating a physical vehicle security barrier strategy with adjacent interested parties.3.4 Consider the requirements for security
30、 measures3.4.1 Define the period for which security measures will be required.3.4.2 Assess whether the measures will be operational continually, occasionally or infrequently. Decide whether a permanent, semi-permanent or temporary installation is required. Identify the level of protection that the m
31、easure will be required to provide.NOTE A permanent installation is a physical measure, usually requiring significant civil engineering works that is intended to remain in-situ and operate extensively over a lengthy period of time.A temporary installation is the term given to physical measures that
32、are deployed on the basis that they will remain in-situ for a short period of time and the extent of the remedial measures required upon removal are kept to a minimum.A semi-permanent installation is typically a hybrid installation that incorporates some transitory elements that can be easily retrac
33、ted or removed leaving any permanent foundation or anchorage in-situ.Licensed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI BSI 2006 3PAS 69:20063.4.3 Assess whether the measures need to be adaptable to changing threats.3.4.4 The following should be determined.a)
34、 Whether the security need will be met if a single line of active barriers/bollards is provided to form a continuous perimeter.b) Whether an airlock system should be considered in order to form an effective access control system.Consider if advance traffic calming would reduce the approach speed of
35、vehicles to within the performance capability of the chosen access control system. Account should be taken of any need to provide early warning of an errant or hostile vehicle by the use of a “soft closure” (using signage, cones, etc.) ahead of the vehicle security perimeter.3.5 Survey the site3.5.1
36、 Identify all possible approach routes along which a hostile vehicle could challenge a vehicle security barrier or secure perimeter. Ensure that all footpaths, footways, cycle paths, open spaces, and gaps have been considered together with the likelihood of hostile vehicles travelling against the ex
37、pected direction of traffic.3.5.2 Identify existing features that could be integrated into the vehicle security barrier systems, such as resilient street furniture and traffic management measures. Consideration should be given to the effect on security of possible future changes to these features.3.
38、5.3 Identify any open or secluded area that could allow access within the determined standoff distance from the protected asset.3.5.4 List any unfavourable environmental conditions that might arise throughout the year, such as flooding, leaf mulch, tree foliage, frost, snow or ice.3.5.5 Consider the
39、 existing road surface, kerbs and verges, gradients, camber or crossfall, at and in advance of, any proposed barrier location.3.5.6 Confirm through the local planning office and highways department if there are any existing, or proposed road improvements or other works in the immediate area.3.5.7 Co
40、nsider the need for a wider area traffic management plan. Consider what the impact of a security scheme will be on traffic locally and beyond.3.5.8 If the potential threat exceeds the barriers known capability, consider additional protective measures.3.6 Identify stakeholdersIdentify and obtain cont
41、act information for all stakeholders who may be affected by the proposed security measures. Include staff, deliveries, local authorities, public transport, emergency services, utility companies, neighbours and landlords.Licensed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Co
42、py, (c) BSIPAS 69:20064 BSI 20063.7 Survey traffic3.7.1 Commission traffic surveys to identify traffic patterns, vehicle types and their implications at all proposed entry and egress points over representative periods. Identify peak traffic times and rates and any special days/occasions which have r
43、adically different traffic flows requiring legitimate access.3.7.2 The survey should identify the various categories of vehicle types and occupants that need to enter the proposed security zone legitimately, including large goods vehicles, taxis, VIPs, employees and emergency services.3.7.3 Confirm
44、whether any of these vehicles can be excluded permanently or if the threat is raised and whether alternative arrangements should be made, e.g. off-site parking or drop-off areas.3.7.4 Consider which vehicles require access to the asset and how they could be identified and organized to manage their a
45、ttendance/arrival, and to segregate staff, VIPs and visitors.3.7.5 Consider the heightened vulnerabilities created by the security barrier, cordon and traffic management scheme, e.g. those with legitimate access becoming vulnerable if delayed at the perimeter.3.8 Plan traffic management methodologie
46、s and solutions3.8.1 Assess the requirements for vehicular access and egress through the security perimeter and review the options for access control management. The type and frequency of vehicles passing through the security perimeter will influence the choice of vehicle security barriers. The acce
47、ss control system should have the same level of protection as the barrier system.3.8.2 Consider the following traffic management issues.a) Is it possible to limit traffic to one entry and one exit point? b) Should the entry and exit points be in different locations? c) Is a vehicle holding and searc
48、hing area needed? d) Where would waiting vehicles be held? e) Could waiting vehicles be vulnerable to attack?f) What arrangements are needed for vehicles that will not be permitted entry? For example, are reject gaps or lanes required? g) What are the proposed access control measures and how might t
49、hey be compromised?h) Will traffic calming measures be needed? i) What warning signs/lights will be needed to indicate the presence and status of the vehicle security barrier? j) How much space is needed between warning signs and the barriers? k) Is sufficient reaction time available for the operation of the barrier? Licensed Copy: Wang Bin, na, Tue Mar 27 07:32:50 GMT+00:00 2007, Uncontrolled Copy, (c) BSI BSI 2006 5PAS 69:2006l) How is “tailgating” to be addressed? Are vehicle airlock systems required?m) Where possible, pedestrian and
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