REG NASA-LLIS-1015-1997 Lessons Learned International Space Station (ISS) Program Micrometeoroid Debris Protection Hazard Detection Assessment and Control.pdf

1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1015Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1015a71 Lesson Date: 1997-02-01a71 Submitting Organization: HQa71 Submitted by: David M. LengyelSubject: International Space Station (ISS) Program/Micrometeoroid Debris Protection/Hazard Detection, Assessment and Control Description of Drivin

2、g Event: Shift From Design Philosophy for Micrometeoroid Debris Penetration Scenarios to Flight Operations Strategies for Hazard Detection, Assessment, and ControlLesson(s) Learned: The overall design philosophy for meteoroid and orbital debris (M/OD) mitigation has been agreed to, in principle, by

3、the international partners. Much of the U.S. module shielding design is nearing completion. Nevertheless, there remains a finite probability that a penetrating collision will occur during the life of the ISS mission. The emphasis of the M/OD effort is therefore shifting to operations issues, such as

4、 caution and warning, damage control, and strategies for reaction to depressurization events.Recommendation(s): Agreement with the international partners should be completed. Operational strategies and procedures for handling M/OD events should be developed and incorporated into ISS plans and schedu

5、les. Crew training programs to accommodate these strategies and procedures should be established.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: The Common Depressurization Strategy (CDS) team was formed in May 1995 to coordinate the program approach for responding to a potential depressurization even

6、t. The teams charter is to address crew and vehicle operational strategies, immediately identify required hardware Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-modifications to make safe the vehicle and crew, and develop necessary plans for implem

7、entation of these items. Baseline crew procedures, repair requirements, assessment methodologies, and identified hardware modifications (to reduce risks of vehicle and crew loss in the event of a penetration) are documented in international protocol agreements. Plans for implementation are being dev

8、eloped. This approach has been independently reviewed and validated in a series of joint meetings led by Lt. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford (USAF, Ret.) of the NASA Advisory Council and Academician Vladimir F. Utkin of the Russia Space Agency Advisory Expert Council. Specific activities have been agreed to

9、 and will be completed by December 1997.Documents Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Space Operationsa71 Exploration SystemsAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panela71 Emergency Preparednessa71 Flight Operationsa71 Policy & Planninga71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 SpacecraftAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2001-11-20a71 Approval Name: Bill Loewya71 Approval Organization: QSa71 Approval Phone Number: 202-358-0528Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-