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本文(REG NASA-LLIS-1207--1999 Lessons Learned Capitalizing on Proven Processes.pdf)为本站会员(ownview251)主动上传,麦多课文库仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对上载内容本身不做任何修改或编辑。 若此文所含内容侵犯了您的版权或隐私,请立即通知麦多课文库(发送邮件至master@mydoc123.com或直接QQ联系客服),我们立即给予删除!

REG NASA-LLIS-1207--1999 Lessons Learned Capitalizing on Proven Processes.pdf

1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1207Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1207a71 Lesson Date: 1999-04-26a71 Submitting Organization: JSCa71 Submitted by: Robert R. Rice/ Ronald A. MontagueSubject: Capitalizing on Proven Processes Description of Driving Event: Prior to flight 1A/R and 2A the International Space Sta

2、tion Program (ISSP) and the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) was found to have two separate certification requirements that required the hardware providers to furnish a delta certification on operational hardware with flight heritage and a good pedigree of performance. It was found that this was causing

3、additional work, expense, and schedule problems as we got closer to flight time. This problem was identified in an EA presentation to the program on 10/29/98 and a process for resolution was formulated in a letter from Director Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) on

4、12-8-98 (REF NA-98-085). This letter formed a “Common Hardware Assessment Panel“ now known as the “Grandfather Board“ to define the process and provide the disposition for each hardware certification.Root cause: The root cause of the problem was that two independent programs established certificatio

5、n requirements for their vehicles. Since the vehicles serve different purposes and function differently it should have been expected that different certification requirements would be developed. Even with these differences it was found that the differences were minor and could be overcome with prope

6、r analysis and compromise. Lesson(s) Learned: Take advantage of similar work and processes performed on prior and existing programs whenever possible to minimize duplication and promote efficiencies in new programsRecommendation(s): Develop a JSC Generic Requirements document for space flight equipm

7、ent. This standard shall be applied for Criticality 3 (CRIT 3) hardware only and will be jointly approved by the ISSP and SSP. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-In addition to the JSC Generic Requirements Document, the following “common

8、 hardware“ certification policy will be used to certify previously flown hardware. 1. Any CRIT 3 hardware certified for use that has flown on the Space Shuttle or Mir Space Station and will be used for similar function on the ISS will be acceptable for the ISSP.2. No additional documentation is requ

9、ired except for the following:a. Hardware that will use Space Station power (United States on-orbit segment and /or international partner elements) will have a power quality, and a conducted and radiated emissions certification.b. Battery-operated hardware will be assessed using existing certificati

10、on data to assure that Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility are not issues with the ISSP.c. Hardware launched, used, or stowed in environments outside the experience base will be assessed against existing certification data to assure the difference is not a safety or mission as

11、surance issueEvidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: See Director Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) on 12-8-98 (REF NA-98-085). It was found that the differences in requirements between the ISS and Shuttle programs and between ISS partners were minor and coul

12、d be overcome with proper analysis and compromise. Documents Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Administration/Organizationa71 Configuration Managementa71 External Relationsa71 Flight Equipmenta71 Flight Operatio

13、nsa71 Ground Equipmenta71 Ground Operationsa71 HardwareProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-a71 Independent Verification and Validationa71 Launch Processa71 NASA Standardsa71 Payloadsa71 Policy & Planninga71 Procurement Small Business & In

14、dustrial Relationsa71 Range Operationsa71 Research & Developmenta71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 Softwarea71 Spacecrafta71 Standarda71 Test & VerificationAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2002-05-30a71 Approval Name: Ronald A. Montaguea71 Approval Organization: JSCa71 Approval Phone Number: 281-483-8576Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-

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