ImageVerifierCode 换一换
格式:PDF , 页数:4 ,大小:17.28KB ,
资源ID:1019017      下载积分:10000 积分
快捷下载
登录下载
邮箱/手机:
温馨提示:
如需开发票,请勿充值!快捷下载时,用户名和密码都是您填写的邮箱或者手机号,方便查询和重复下载(系统自动生成)。
如填写123,账号就是123,密码也是123。
特别说明:
请自助下载,系统不会自动发送文件的哦; 如果您已付费,想二次下载,请登录后访问:我的下载记录
支付方式: 支付宝扫码支付 微信扫码支付   
注意:如需开发票,请勿充值!
验证码:   换一换

加入VIP,免费下载
 

温馨提示:由于个人手机设置不同,如果发现不能下载,请复制以下地址【http://www.mydoc123.com/d-1019017.html】到电脑端继续下载(重复下载不扣费)。

已注册用户请登录:
账号:
密码:
验证码:   换一换
  忘记密码?
三方登录: 微信登录  

下载须知

1: 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。
2: 试题试卷类文档,如果标题没有明确说明有答案则都视为没有答案,请知晓。
3: 文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
5. 本站仅提供交流平台,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。

版权提示 | 免责声明

本文(REG NASA-LLIS-1378--2002 Lessons Learned Implementation and Verification of Lockout Tagout Procedures.pdf)为本站会员(Iclinic170)主动上传,麦多课文库仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对上载内容本身不做任何修改或编辑。 若此文所含内容侵犯了您的版权或隐私,请立即通知麦多课文库(发送邮件至master@mydoc123.com或直接QQ联系客服),我们立即给予删除!

REG NASA-LLIS-1378--2002 Lessons Learned Implementation and Verification of Lockout Tagout Procedures.pdf

1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1378Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1378a71 Lesson Date: 2002-08-29a71 Submitting Organization: JSCa71 Submitted by: Ronald A. MontagueSubject: Implementation and Verification of Lockout/Tagout Procedures Abstract: The companys failure to implement and enforce their company saf

2、ety program, as defined in their Safety the employee subsequently died of the injury.Finding A: Employees must personally verify, prior to starting work on a potentially energized Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-system, that the syste

3、m is de-energized and their personal lock and tag are in place. Do not take the word of a co-worker or supervisor. If the employee leaves the work site for any reason, re-verify the system is still de-energized before resuming work. The following evidence supports this finding: 1. At the beginning o

4、f the day, the foreman improperly checked the voltage at the junction box where the mishap occurred. The improper check was a result of using a painted surface as a ground reference.2. After this initial check by the foreman, the circuit was not re-checked by any of the electricians working on the g

5、enerator circuits. All the electricians working at the site assumed the circuits were de-energized.3. The contractor did not pursue understanding of the circuits or request NASA assistance in identifying circuit breakers that would de-energize circuits.4. The NASA-delegated safety and quality inspec

6、tors on the site throughout the day did not question whether the circuits associated with the generator had been de-energized, locked, and tagged.Finding B: It is unacceptable to work on any energized system without proper permits and personal protective equipment (PPE). One of the causes of this mi

7、shap was a risk-taking decision based on past experience and the perception of a low risk situation. Managers should verify that their employees know and are implementing the applicable safety policies and procedures. The following evidence supports this finding: 5. It is a common practice for some

8、electricians to work on energized circuits without PPE and without the proper permits. Both NASA and the contractor have policies that prohibit work on energized circuits, except for a few circumstances that were not applicable in this case.6. Although the contractor has adequate policies and proced

9、ures, implementation is weak or lacking. For example, LO/TO training for contractor employees consisted of a contractor-provided “Electric” brochure handed out to each employee explaining the companys policy and procedure; the employee was expected to sign in the back of the brochure indicating that

10、 the employee had read the booklet.Lesson(s) Learned: Lockout/Tagout policies and procedures must be followed and systems verified to be de-energized before beginning work.Recommendation(s): 1. NASA should implement a rigorous random safety inspection process. NASA should institute Mandatory Safety

11、Inspection Points (MSIP), e.g., prior to work on electrical circuits and other energized systems. NASA should assess the on-site inspection responsibilities and determine if changes are necessary to make the process more robust. If changes are deemed necessary, Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reprod

12、uction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-augmented duties should be clarified to all safety and quality inspectors.2. 3. NASA should closely evaluate contractor safety and health plans relative to employee training and implementation of policies for equivalence with NASAs Safety a

13、nd Health Program. Continue to offer NASA in-house safety training as an option.4. NASA should require Pre-Project Safety Reviews prior to construction start. This should be more comprehensive than pre-construction meetings with a format analogous to an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI), Test R

14、eadiness Review (TRR), etc. As a pre-requisite for the pre-project safety review, NASA should strongly consider the need for safety and job hazard analyses to be performed and not allow work to start until these are submitted and reviewed.5. NASA should require that construction contractors conduct

15、daily planning meetings to review work to be performed during the continuous duty time or shift.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: PendingDocuments Related to Lesson: JPG 1700.1, “JSC Safety and Health Handbook,“ Chapter 8.1, Electrical Safety.Mission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Syste

16、msa71 Sciencea71 Space Operationsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Energya71 Facilitiesa71 Human Factorsa71 Human Resources & Educationa71 Independent Verification and Validationa71 Industrial Operationsa71 Personal Protective Equipmenta71 Policy & Planninga71 Procurement Small B

17、usiness & Industrial Relationsa71 Program and Project Managementa71 Risk Management/AssessmentProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-a71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 Test & VerificationAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2004-02-09a71 Approval Name: Ron Montaguea71 Approval Organization: JSCa71 Approval Phone Number: 281-483-8576Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-

copyright@ 2008-2019 麦多课文库(www.mydoc123.com)网站版权所有
备案/许可证编号:苏ICP备17064731号-1