REG NASA-LLIS-1496--2003 Lessons Learned - Orbital Space Plane Inter-Program Relationships and Dependencies.pdf

1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1496Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1496a71 Lesson Date: 2003-07-01a71 Submitting Organization: MSFCa71 Submitted by: Lisa CarrSubject: Orbital Space Plane Inter-Program Relationships and Dependencies Abstract: The Orbital Space Plane (OSP) Program did not have effective relati

2、onships with the related programs at all working levels. This could have been resolved by a Memorandum of Understanding between programs. Description of Driving Event: The OSP Program lacked a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between programs causing ineffective relationships and inability to resol

3、ve inter-program issues.Lesson(s) Learned: OSP did not have effective relationships with the Launch Services Program (LSP) or International Space Station Program (ISSP) at all working levels. The program partners did not create mutually-beneficial alliances and the agency did not delegate sufficient

4、 authority and allocate sufficient resources to the program partners to resolve inter-program issues or establish clear means to reconcile disputes. Additionally: a. “Top dog” - No sole source of authority formally directed all three programs to successfully achieve OSP requirements, and no one held

5、 them jointly accountable for creating and operating the caliber of relationship that would have been required for success. b. Memorandum of Understanding - The MOU is a tool for gaining agreement at the program level, yet it is too high of a level of agreement for adequate implementation and resour

6、ce commitment. c. Launch Services Program (LSP)- No OSP Program representation within LSP existed. OSP prime contractors were not limited by data requests/funding; therefore, they requested significant quantities of data. Validation of launch vehicle provider data was required by NASA-LSP prior to d

7、elivery of Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-data to OSP but LSP was not adequately staffed to provide throughout and was overburdened by maintaining multiple vehicles (dual compatibility) within the trade space. d. International Space

8、Station - The roles defined for ISS in OSP requirement development, validation and approval were limited (ISS did not sign OSP system requirements) and did not effectively position ISS with formative, substantive influence on the scope or direction of the OSP. e. Launch Services Program-Integration

9、- The most fundamental questions about who would be responsible for what integration work during Design, Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) loomed unresolved. Who would acquire launch services (OSP Prime Contractor? Government furnished services?). Who certified the performance of the integrat

10、ed ascent configurations design and readiness for flight, including the systems ability to assure crew survival? Who assured the capability to launch an OSP spacecraft on both Atlas and Delta launch vehicles? Recommendation(s): Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between programs should require commit

11、ment from above, provide clear authority for program- to- program issue resolution, and describe implementation below and across the affected parties. There needs to be a clearly established common authority that directs the major programs to forge and operate an appropriate alliance, resolves issue

12、s between them, and commits the resources needed to execute the programs. In both of these inter-program relationships, the lowest level of authority able to direct both programs was the NASA Administrator. MOUs require clear delegation of authority and commitment from above. In creating MOUs betwee

13、n programs implementation plans establishing the working relationships and defining the roles and responsibilities should likewise be created (on both sides). Thereafter, performance versus the implementation plan should be regularly assessed and corrective actions taken as appropriate. In this type

14、 of arrangement, LSP should be jointly accountable for overall program success and granted the resources to achieve success. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: TBDDocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Space Operationsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdd

15、itional Key Phrase(s): Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-a71 Communication Systemsa71 External Relationsa71 Financial Managementa71 Research & Developmenta71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Spacecrafta71 Standarda71 Test & Verificationa71 TransportationAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2005-04-01a71 Approval Name: Lisa Carra71 Approval Organization: MSFCa71 Approval Phone Number: 256-544-2544Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-