ImageVerifierCode 换一换
格式:PDF , 页数:2 ,大小:87.16KB ,
资源ID:1019429      下载积分:10000 积分
快捷下载
登录下载
邮箱/手机:
温馨提示:
如需开发票,请勿充值!快捷下载时,用户名和密码都是您填写的邮箱或者手机号,方便查询和重复下载(系统自动生成)。
如填写123,账号就是123,密码也是123。
特别说明:
请自助下载,系统不会自动发送文件的哦; 如果您已付费,想二次下载,请登录后访问:我的下载记录
支付方式: 支付宝扫码支付 微信扫码支付   
注意:如需开发票,请勿充值!
验证码:   换一换

加入VIP,免费下载
 

温馨提示:由于个人手机设置不同,如果发现不能下载,请复制以下地址【http://www.mydoc123.com/d-1019429.html】到电脑端继续下载(重复下载不扣费)。

已注册用户请登录:
账号:
密码:
验证码:   换一换
  忘记密码?
三方登录: 微信登录  

下载须知

1: 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。
2: 试题试卷类文档,如果标题没有明确说明有答案则都视为没有答案,请知晓。
3: 文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
5. 本站仅提供交流平台,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。

版权提示 | 免责声明

本文(REG NASA-LLIS-3636-2012 Lessons Learned Different Groups in Different Locations Working On the Same System but Under Different Contracts.pdf)为本站会员(hopesteam270)主动上传,麦多课文库仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对上载内容本身不做任何修改或编辑。 若此文所含内容侵犯了您的版权或隐私,请立即通知麦多课文库(发送邮件至master@mydoc123.com或直接QQ联系客服),我们立即给予删除!

REG NASA-LLIS-3636-2012 Lessons Learned Different Groups in Different Locations Working On the Same System but Under Different Contracts.pdf

1、Public Lessons Learned Entry: 3636 Lesson Info: Lesson Number: 3636 Lesson Date: 2010-08-26 Submitting Organization: KSC Submitted by: Annette Pitt Subject: Different Groups in Different Locations Working On the Same System but Under Different Contracts Abstract: The Microwave Scanning Beam Landing

2、System (MSBLS) contract, originally controlled by Johnson Space Center (JSC), was split across NASA centers. The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has operation and maintenance (O therefore, the DFRC and WSTF contractor teams are required to report any anomalies and resolve technical issues with the collab

3、oration of the KSC team. Since the groups were not managed under the same contract, responsibilities were not clearly identified, which resulted in miscommunication and possible detrimental consequences. Description of Driving Event: Prior to the STS-124 launch, several issues with the MSBLS 60Hz Po

4、wer cables at DFRC Runway 22R caused a smoldering fire and smoke at the MSBLS primary and backup shelters resulting in part failure and equipment damage, as well as loss of power to one of the MSBLS JR System. The failure resulted in smoke in the shelter, florescent light flickering and melting of t

5、he thermal breaker monitor panel. Per Safety Assurance Analysis document SAA-00199, subsequent failure of the other system could result in possible loss of life and/or vehicle At the time of the failure, KSC placed several phone calls to different personnel and received slightly different versions o

6、f events; however, it was clear the primary cause (as understood at KSC) was maintenance of MSBLS power cable. Although the Operations and Maintenance responsibility is split between KSC and JSC, sustaining engineering for all equipment, regardless of location is done at KSC. KSC is required to repo

7、rt any MSBLS issues to the Launch Readiness Director (LRD), who is at KSC. Both DFRC and WSTF had subcontracts with other companies to perform maintenance and operation. On numerous occasions, when the teams in charge of O&M had issues, not enough information about system problems was provided in or

8、der for KSC to report the issue to the LRD or to provide a solution. The Risk Review Board concluded that during STS-124, a failure to maintain configuration control, follow engineering Work Authorization Documents (WADS), and provide proper problem reporting resulted in the miscommunication. Please

9、 see attached presentation from the Risk Review Board. Lesson(s) Learned: One group is in charge of O&M and another group is in charge of sustaining engineering of the same system can cause problems. There are different contract rules and policies. More importantly, there are many misunderstandings

10、in the interpretation of the O&M responsibilities and the sustaining engineering responsibilities. As a result of being on separate contracts, the KSC NASA NavAids engineers did not sign off on the Certificate of Flight Readiness stating that WSSH or DFRC were in compliance and ready for shuttle lau

11、nch/landing activities, since they did not witness the maintenance of the system, due to a lack of communication between the locations. Recommendation(s): Clearly define the roles and responsibilities during the planning phase. Identify one contractor to perform both O&M and sustaining engineering f

12、or similar systems at various locations. Ensure processes and reporting methods are in place to account for complex contracting relationships. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/A Documents

13、 Related to Lesson: N/A Mission Directorate(s): Space Operations Additional Key Phrase(s): Cross Agency coordination 1.Acquisition / procurement strategy and planning 0.Vehicle concepts 1.Engineering design and project processes and standards 1.Launch Systems 1.Ground Operations 1.Ground Equipment 1

14、Ground support systems Center distribution of programs and management activities Additional Info: Project: Space Shuttle Program Approval Info: Approval Date: 2012-01-04 Approval Name: mbell Approval Organization: HQ Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-

copyright@ 2008-2019 麦多课文库(www.mydoc123.com)网站版权所有
备案/许可证编号:苏ICP备17064731号-1