IEEE 802.1AE-2006 - IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks Media Access Control (MAC) Security .pdf

1、IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006I E E E Standard forLocal and metropolitan area networks Media Access Control (MAC) SecurityI E E E3 Park Avenue New York, NY 10016-5997, USA18 August 2006IEEE Computer SocietySponsored by theLAN/MAN Standards CommitteeIEEE Std 802.1AE-2006IEEE Standard forLocal and metropolitan

2、 area networks:Media Access Control (MAC) SecuritySponsor LAN/MAN Standards Committee of theIEEE Computer SocietyApproved 8 June 2006IEEE-SA Standards BoardThe Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.3 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5997, USACopyright 2006 by the Institute of Electri

3、cal and Electronics Engineers, Inc.All rights reserved. Published 18 August 2006. Printed in the United States of America.IEEE and 802 are both registered trademarks in the U.S. Patent +1 978 750 8400. Permission to photocopy portions ofany individual standard for educational classroom use can also

4、be obtained through the Copyright ClearanceCenter.IntroductionThis is the first edition of this standard.Relationship between IEEE Std 802.1AE and other IEEE 802 standardsAnother IEEE standard, IEEE Std 802.1X-2004, specifies Port-based Network Access Control, andprovides a means of authenticating a

5、nd authorizing devices attached to a LAN. Use of this standard inconjunction with architecture and protocols of IEEE Std 802.1X-2004 extends the applicability of the latterto publicly accessible LAN/MAN media for which security has not already been defined. A proposedamendment, IEEE P802.1af, to IEE

6、E Std 802.1X-2004 is being developed to specify the additionalprotocols and interfaces necessary.This standard is not intended for use with IEEE Std 802.11, Wireless LAN Medium Access Control. Anamendment to that standard, IEEE Std 802.11i-2004, also makes use of IEEE Std 802.1X-2004, thusfacilitati

7、ng the use of a common authentication and authorization framework for LAN media to which thisstandard applies and for Wireless LANs.A previous security standard, IEEE Std 802.10, IEEE Standard for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security, hasbeen withdrawn.Notice to usersErrataErrata, if any, for this and all

8、 other standards can be accessed at the following URL: http:/standards.ieee.org/reading/ieee/updates/errata/index.html. Users are encouraged to check this URL forerrata periodically.InterpretationsCurrent interpretations can be accessed at the following URL: http:/standards.ieee.org/reading/ieee/int

9、erp/index.html.PatentsAttention is called to the possibility that implementation of this standard may require use of subject mattercovered by patent rights. By publication of this standard, no position is taken with respect to the existence orvalidity of any patent rights in connection therewith. Th

10、e IEEE shall not be responsible for identifyingpatents or patent applications for which a license may be required to implement an IEEE standard or forconducting inquiries into the legal validity or scope of those patents that are brought to its attention.This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 802

11、.1AE-2006, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Net-works: Media Access Control (MAC) Security.iv Copyright 2006 IEEE. All rights reserved.ParticipantsAt the time this standard was completed, the working group had the following membership: Tony Jeffree, ChairMick Seaman, Interworking and Se

12、curity Task Group ChairAllyn Romanow, EditorFrank Chao, MIB EditorThe following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this standard. Balloters may havevoted for approval, disapproval, or abstention. Brandon BarryLes BellMike BorzaPaul BottorffJim BurnsDirceu CavendishPaul CongdonSha

13、ram DavariArjan de HeerCraig EasleyAnush ElangovanHesham ElbakouryDavid Elie-Dit-CosaqueNorm FinnDavid FratturaAnoop GhanwaniKen GrewalSteve HaddockRan Ish-ShalomTony JeffreeHal KeenYongbum KimLoren LarsenYannick Le GoffDavid MelmanJohn MessengerDinesh MohanBob MoskowitzDon OConnorGlenn ParsonsKen P

14、attonKaren T. RandallAllyn RomanowDan RomascanuJessy V. RouyerAli SajassiDolors SalaSam SambasivanJohn SauerMick SeamanKoichiro SetoMuneyoshi SuzukiGeoff ThompsonJohn ViegaDennis VolpanoKarl WeberLudwig WinkelMichael D. WrightEng Ahmed Abdelhalim Butch Anton Pierrejean Arcos Chris B. Bagge John B. B

15、arnettMark A. Beadles Michael A. Beck Rahul B. Bhushan Gennaro Boggia James T. Carlo Juan C. Carreon Jon S. ChambersDanila Chernetsov Keith Chow John L. Cole Paul Congdon Tommy P. Cooper Russell S. Dietz Thomas J. Dineen Sean Dougherty Alistair P. Duffy Sourav K. Dutta David Elie-Dit-Cosaque Michael

16、 A. Fischer Yukihiro Fujimoto James P. Gilb Nikhil Goel Sergiu R. Goma Patrick S. Gonia Karanvir Grewal Randall C. Groves C. G. Guy Ronald D. Hochnadel Andreas J. Holtmann Dennis Horwitz Russell D. Housley David Hunter C. R. Huntley Atsushi Ito Raj Jain David V. James Tony Jeffree Peter G. Johansson

17、 David Johnston Joe Natharoj Juisai Piotr Karocki Lior Khermosh Byoung-jo Kim Yongbum Kim Mark J. Knight Hermann Koch Thomas M. Kurihara David J. Law Shawn M. Leard Kang Lee Li Li William Lumpkins G. L. Luri Jonathon C. MclendonFrancisco J. Melendez George J. Miao Gary L. Michel Mike Moreton M. Nara

18、yanan Michael S. Newman Paul Nikolich Robert OharaGlenn W. Parsons Vikram Punj Jose P. Puthenkulam Karen T. RandallJohn J. Roese Allyn Romanow Jessy V. RouyerMichael Scholles Stephen C. Schwarm Mick Seaman William M. Shvodian Thomas M. Siep Manikantan SrinivasanThomas E. Starai Guenter Steindl Micha

19、el L. Takefman Joseph J. TardoMichael D. Johas TeenerThomas A. Tullia Mark-rene Uchida Timothy P. Walker Derek T. Woo Steven A. Wright TakahitoYoshizawa Oren Yuen Copyright 2006 IEEE. All rights reserved. vWhen the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 8 June 2006, it had the followingme

20、mbership:Steve M. Mills, ChairRichard H. Hulett, Vice ChairDon Wright, Past ChairJudith Gorman, Secretary*Member EmeritusAlso included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:Satish K. Aggarwal, NRC RepresentativeRichard DeBlasio, DOE RepresentativeAlan H. Cookson, NIST Represen

21、tativeDon MessinaIEEE Standards Program Manager, Document DevelopmentMichael KipnessIEEE Standards Program Manager, Technical Program DevelopmentMark D. BowmanDennis B. BrophyWilliam R. GoldbachArnold M. GreenspanRobert M. GrowJoanna N. GueninJulian Forster*Mark S. HalpinKenneth S. HanusWilliam B. H

22、opfJoseph L. Koepfinger*David J. LawDaleep C. MohlaT. W. OlsenGlenn ParsonsRonald C. PetersenTom A. PrevostGreg RattaRobby RobsonAnne-Marie SahazizianVirginia C. SulzbergerMalcolm V. ThadenRichard L. TownsendWalter WeigelHoward L. Wolfmanvi Copyright 2006 IEEE. All rights reserved.Contents1. Overvie

23、w 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Scope 22. Normative references. 33. Definitions . 54. Abbreviations and acronyms . 85. Conformance 105.1 Requirements terminology.105.2 Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) 105.3 Required capabilities 105.4 Optional capabilities 116. Secure provision of the M

24、AC Service . 136.1 MAC Service primitives and parameters. 136.2 MAC Service connectivity.156.3 Point-to-multipoint LANs 166.4 MAC status parameters 166.5 MAC point-to-point parameters. 166.6 Security threats 176.7 MACsec connectivity 186.8 MACsec guarantees . 196.9 Security services 196.10 Quality o

25、f service maintenance207. Principles of secure network operation 227.1 Support of the secure MAC Service by an individual LAN 227.2 Multiple instances of the secure MAC Service on a single LAN 277.3 Use of the secure MAC Service. 288. MAC Security Protocol (MACsec) 318.1 Protocol design requirements

26、.328.2 Protocol support requirements . 348.3 MACsec operation . 369. Encoding of MACsec protocol data units 389.1 Structure, representation, and encoding. 389.2 Major components . 389.3 Security TAG. 399.4 MACsec EtherType . 399.5 TAG Control Information (TCI) 409.6 Association Number (AN) . 419.7 S

27、hort Length (SL) 419.8 Packet Number (PN) 419.9 Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) 419.10 Secure Data 42Copyright 2006 IEEE. All rights reserved. vii9.11 Integrity Check Value (ICV) .429.12 PDU validation 4310. Principles of MAC Security Entity (SecY) operation . 4410.1 SecY overview. 4410.2 SecY funct

28、ions. 4610.3 Model of operation. 4710.4 SecY architecture. 4710.5 Secure frame generation 5010.6 Secure frame verification. 5110.7 SecY management . 5310.8 Addressing . 6310.9 Priority . 6310.10 SecY performance requirements 6311. MAC Security in Systems 6511.1 MAC Service interface stacks6511.2 MAC

29、sec in end stations . 6611.3 MACsec in MAC Bridges 6611.4 MACsec in VLAN-aware Bridges. 6711.5 MACsec and Link Aggregation. 6811.6 Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) 6911.7 MACsec in Provider Bridged Networks 7011.8 MACsec and multi-access LANs. 7212. MACsec and EPON . 7413. Management protocol 76

30、13.1 Introduction 7613.2 The Internet-Standard Management Framework. 7613.3 Relationship to other MIBs 7613.4 Security considerations 7813.5 Structure of the MIB 8013.6 Definitions for MAC Security MIB. 8414. Cipher Suites 12114.1 Cipher Suite use . 12114.2 Cipher Suite capabilities 12214.3 Cipher S

31、uite specification 12314.4 Cipher Suite conformance . 12314.5 Default Cipher Suite (GCMAES128) 124Annex A (normative) PICS Proforma . 126A.1 Introduction 126A.2 Abbreviations and special symbols 126A.3 Instructions for completing the PICS proforma. 127A.4 PICS proforma for IEEE Std 802.1AE 129A.5 Ma

32、jor capabilities 130A.6 Support and use of Service Access Points . 131A.7 MAC status and point-to-point parameters 132A.8 Secure Frame Generation. 133viii Copyright 2006 IEEE. All rights reserved.A.9 Secure Frame Verification . 134A.10 MACsec PDU encoding and decoding 135A.11 Key Agreement Entity LM

33、I. 135A.12 Additional fully conformant Cipher Suite capabilities 139A.13 Additional variant Cipher Suite capabilities 140Annex B (informative) Bibliography. 142Copyright 2006 IEEE. All rights reserved. ixIEEE Standard forLocal and metropolitan area networks:Media Access Control (MAC) Security1. Over

34、view1.1 IntroductionIEEE 802Local Area Networks (LANs) are often deployed in networks that support mission-criticalapplications. These include corporate networks of considerable extent, and public networks that supportmany customers with different economic interests. The protocols that configure, ma

35、nage, and regulateaccess to these networks typically run over the networks themselves. Preventing disruption and data lossarising from transmission and reception by unauthorized parties is highly desirable, since it is not practicalto secure the entire network against physical access by determined a

36、ttackers.MAC Security (MACsec), as defined by this standard, allows authorized systems that attach to andinterconnect LANs in a network to maintain confidentiality of transmitted data and to take measures againstframes transmitted or modified by unauthorized devices.MACsec facilitatesa) Maintenance

37、of correct network connectivity and servicesb) Isolation of denial of service attacksc) Localization of any source of network communication to the LAN of origind) The construction of public networks, offering service to unrelated or possibly mutually suspiciouscustomers, using shared LAN infrastruct

38、urese) Secure communication between organizations, using a LAN for transmissionf) Incremental and non-disruptive deployment, protecting the most vulnerable network components.To deliver these benefits, MACsec has to be used in conjunction with appropriate policies for higher-levelprotocol operation

39、in networked systems, an authentication and authorization framework, and networkmanagement. IEEE P802.1afB21provides authentication and cryptographic key distribution.MACsec protects communication between trusted components of the network infrastructure, thus protectingthe network operation. MACsec

40、cannot protect against attacks facilitated by the trusted components1The numbers in brackets correspond to those of the bibliography in Annex B.Copyright 2006 IEEE. All rights reserved. 1IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006 LOCAL AND METROPOLITAN AREA NETWORKSthemselves, and is complementary to, rather than a repl

41、acement for, end-to-end application-to-applicationsecurity protocols. The latter can secure application data independent of network operation, but cannotnecessarily defend the operation of network components, or prevent attacks using unauthorizedcommunication from reaching the systems that operate t

42、he applications.1.2 ScopeThe scope of this standard is to specify provision of connectionless user data confidentiality, frame dataintegrity, and data origin authenticity by media access independent protocols and entities that operatetransparently to MAC Clients. NOTEThe MAC Clients are as specified

43、 in IEEE Std 802, IEEE Std 802.2, IEEE Std 802.1D, IEEE Std 802.1Q,and IEEE Std 802.1X.2To this end ita) Specifies the requirements to be satisfied by equipment claiming conformance to this standard.b) Specifies the requirements for MAC Security in terms of provision of the MAC Service and thepreser

44、vation of the semantics and parameters of service requests and indications.c) Describes the threats, both intentional and accidental, to correct provision of the service.d) Specifies security services that prevent, or restrict, the effect of attacks that exploit these threats.e) Examines the potenti

45、al impact of both the threats and the use of MAC Security on the Quality ofService (QoS), specifying constraints on the design and operation of MAC Security entities andprotocols.f) Models support of the secure MAC Service in terms of the operation of media access control methodindependent MAC Secur

46、ity Entities (SecYs) within the MAC Sublayer.g) Specifies the format of the MACsec Protocol Data Unit (MPDUs) used to provide secure service.h) Identifies the functions to be performed by each SecY, and provides an architectural model of itsinternal operation in terms of Processes and Entities that

47、provide those functions.i) Specifies the interface/exchanges between a SecY and its associated and collocated MAC SecurityKey Agreement Entity (KaY, IEEE P802.1af B2) that provides and updates cryptographic keys.j) Specifies performance requirements and recommends default values and applicable range

48、s for theoperational parameters of a SecY.k) Specifies how SecYs are incorporated within the architectural structure within end stations andbridges.l) Establishes the requirements for management of MAC Security, identifying the managed objectsand defining the management operations for SecYs.m) Speci

49、fies the Management Information Base (MIB) module for managing the operation of MACSecurity in TCP/IP networks.n) Specifies requirements, criteria and choices of Cipher Suites for use with this standard.This standard does noto) Specify how the relationships between MACsec protocol peers are discovered and authenticated, assupported by key management or key distribution protocols, but makes use of IEEE P802.1af KeyAgreement for MAC security to achieve these functions.2Notes in text, tables, and figures are given for information only, and do not contain re