AIR FORCE MIL-STD-1822 A-2013 NUCLEAR COMPATIBILITY CERTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS SUBSYSTEMS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT.pdf

1、 NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE MIL-STD-1822A(USAF) 1 February 2013 SUPERSEDING MIL-STD-1822 (USAF) 30 September 1994 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STANDARD PRACTICE NUCLEAR COMPATIBILITY CERTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS, SUBSYSTEMS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AMSC: 9317 FSG 11GP DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Appro

2、ved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-1822A(USAF) ii FOREWORD 1. This standard is approved for use by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), Department of the Air Force and i

3、s available for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department of Defense. 2. The purpose of this standard is to provide specific requirements for nuclear compatibility certification and information on the nuclear compatibility certification process. 3. This standard is structured and formatt

4、ed to facilitate tailoring requirements to the specific system needs. Each system program office is encouraged to selectively apply and tailor these requirements during the acquisition process. 4. Comments, suggestions, or questions on this document should be addressed to AFNWC/EN, 1551 Wyoming Blvd

5、 SE, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117 or e-mailed to AFNWC.ENWorkflowkirtland.af.mil. Since contact information can change, you may want to verify the currency of this address information using the ASSIST Online database at https:/assist.dla.mil. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking perm

6、itted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-1822A(USAF) iii CONTENTS PARAGRAPH PAGE FOREWORD ii 1. SCOPE. 1 1.1 General. 1 1.2 Purpose. 2 1.3 Applicability. 2 2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS. 2 2.1 General. 2 2.2 Government documents 3 2.3 Order of precedence. 4 3. DEFINITIONS. 5 3.1 Aircraft Monitor and Con

7、trol (AMAC). 5 3.2 Aircraft Compatibility Control Drawing (ACCD). 5 3.3 Arming . 5 3.4 Basic Certification Requirements Plan (BCRP). 5 3.5 Certification Requirements Plan (CRP). 5 3.6 Combat Delivery vehicle. 5 3.7 Compatibility Test Units (CTUs). 5 3.8 Critical Nuclear Weapon/Weapon System Function

8、s. 5 3.9 Cruise-Combat Electrical Loads. 6 3.10 Data Item Description (DID). 6 3.11 Department of Defense (DoD) Standard. 6 3.12 Department of Energy (DoE). 6 3.13 Design Certification . 6 3.14 Electrical Interface Control Drawing (EICD). 6 3.15 Engineering Organization. 6 3.16 Final Design Approval

9、 Report (FDAR). 7 3.17 Hardware . 7 3.18 Independent Verification and Validation (IV (2) pre-arming; (3) arming; and (4) fuzing of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems. 3.2 Aircraft Compatibility Control Drawing (ACCD). A controlled drawing prepared and maintained by the National Nuclear Securi

10、ty Administrations Sandia National Laboratory (NNSA/SNL); SNL designs and integrates the nuclear weapons safety and security systems. The ACCD establishes the extent of compatibility and restrictions between a nuclear weapon and an aircraft. 3.3 Arming. Operations that configure a nuclear weapon or

11、nuclear weapon system so application of a single signal will start the action required for obtaining a nuclear detonation. Arming is a critical function. 3.4 Basic Certification Requirements Plan (BCRP). The BCRP is a preparatory Certification Requirements Plan document containing nuclear certificat

12、ion tasks (including compatibility certification tasks) and schedules prepared by the AFNWCs certification management organization. 3.5 Certification Requirements Plan (CRP). A document containing nuclear compatibility certification tasks and schedules submitted by the Single Manager to the AFNWCs n

13、uclear certification organization; the CRP also contains other certification tasks discussed in 1.1c. 3.6 Combat Delivery vehicle. In the context of this document, a combat delivery vehicle is a human or automated airborne controlled vehicle, with its installed equipment and components, used to deli

14、ver a nuclear weapon(s) on a target. 3.7 Compatibility Test Units (CTUs). CTUs are NNSA/SNL engineering tools that represent electrical and functional characteristics of a war reserve (WR) nuclear weapon. CTUs come in a variety of sizes, shapes, and quality of WR electrical/mechanical components (se

15、e A.3.6). 3.8 Critical Nuclear Weapon/Weapon System Functions. The functions listed in the DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards are critical to nuclear weapon system safety. The functions which are explicitly stated are: (1) authorization, (2) pre-arming, (3) arming, Provided by IHSNot for Res

16、aleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-1822A(USAF) 6 (4) nuclear consent, (5) releasing, and/or (6) launching of a nuclear weapon. For missiles with self-contained guidance systems, “targeting” is also a critical function as it pertains to protection of frien

17、dly territory. 3.9 Cruise-Combat Electrical Loads. Cruise-combat is that condition during which the aircraft is performing its combat mission in a combat ready or actual combat condition. The cruise-combat electrical loads are determined by the sum of the power requirements of all electrical systems

18、, including weapons that may be used in this condition. MIL-E-7016 defines cruise-combat electrical loads and provides guidance for analyzing and testing aircraft power systems. 3.10 Data Item Description (DID). A DID is a standardization document that defines the data content, preparation instructi

19、ons, format, and intended use of data required of a contractor. DIDs are prepared in accordance with MIL-STD-963. 3.11 Department of Defense (DoD) Standard. A DoD Standard is used to satisfy primarily multiple, military unique applications. There are five types of DoD Standards: (1) interface standa

20、rds; (2) design criteria standards; (3) manufacturing process standards; (4) standard practices; and (5) test method standards. Standards are prepared in accordance with MIL-STD-962. 3.12 Department of Energy (DoE). An agency of the U.S. government created in October 1977 responsible for: (1) long-r

21、ange, high-risk research and development of energy technology; (2) power marketing at the federal level; (3) the promotion of energy conservation; (4) oversight of the nuclear weapons program; (5) regulatory programs; and (6) the collection and analysis of energy data. 3.13 Design Certification. Des

22、ign certification occurs when each of the four design certification components is accomplished for the weapon system. Design Certification components are: (1) Compatibility Certification; (2) Nuclear Safety Certification; (3) Weapon System Safety Rules (WSSRs) approval; and (4) Technical Orders Cert

23、ification. 3.14 Electrical Interface Control Drawing (EICD). The EICD documents the physical, electrical power and logical signal circuits in the delivery system between the avionics components at the NNSA/AF interfaces. The EICD includes all types of electrical interfaces in the monitor and control

24、 circuits of the nuclear gravity weapon(s) and nuclear weapon system, including man-machine, discrete lines and multiplex data buses. 3.15 Engineering Organization. The organization that has program management responsibilities for a systems acquisition, configuration, or modification is called the E

25、ngineering Organization. Depending on the scope/intent of the project and the phase of the system (development, acquisition, sustainment, etc.), the Engineering Organization may be a Program Office, the Air Force Life Cycle Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without

26、 license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-1822A(USAF) 7 Management Center, a specialized organization such as the AFNWC or numerous other agencies. 3.16 Final Design Approval Report (FDAR). The FDAR is a document prepared by the AMAC designer to demonstrate that the design of the AMAC system will meet the requi

27、rements of the nuclear weapon/nuclear weapon delivery vehicle interface specification. The FDAR may also contain a description of an aircrafts cockpit display, aircraft software logic, and the weapon release system. 3.17 Hardware. Hardware is a generic term dealing with physical items, as distinguis

28、hed from their capability or function, such as equipment, assemblies, subassemblies, components, and parts. In data automation, hardware is the physical equipment or devices forming a computer and peripheral components. 3.18 Independent Verification and Validation (IV SNL/NM supports LANL. The Nucle

29、ar Labs are structured under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the Department of Energy (DoE). 3.28 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The National Nuclear Security Administration is part of the United States Department of Energy. NNSA is the DoE agency respons

30、ible for improving national security through the military application of nuclear energy. The NNSA is also responsible for maintaining and improving the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear weapon stockpile, including the ability to design, produce, and test nuclear weapo

31、ns, in order to meet national security requirements. 3.29 Non-combat Delivery Vehicle. A vehicle and its installed equipment used to move, load, or ship nuclear weapons. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-1822A(USAF) 9 3.30 Nucle

32、ar Certification. The Air Force Nuclear Certification Program, defined in AFI 63-125, ensures all procedures, software, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations are certified before conducting nuclear operations with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems. Nuclear Certification occurs

33、when a determination is made by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Centers Commander that: (1) procedures, software, equipment, and facilities are sufficient to perform nuclear weapon functions (Design Certification); and (2) personnel and organizations are capable of performing assigned nuclear missions

34、 (Operational Certification). 3.31 Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (NCIS). The document issued by the Single Manager to initiate the nuclear certification process. This statement advises the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Centers Certification Manager and other certification process owners that a

35、new weapon system or a change to an existing weapon system, equipment item, software, or procedure needs to be evaluated. The process owners determine if this change impacts nuclear certification of the system. If nuclear certification is required, the AFNWCs Certification Engineer releases a Basic

36、Certification Requirements Plan. 3.32 Nuclear Certification Summary (NCS). A document issued by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Centers Certification Engineer to advise the Single Manager (SM) that all Design Certification and Operational Certification actions prescribed in the Certification Requireme

37、nts Plan are complete and nuclear certification is granted. 3.33 Nuclear Compatibility Certification. Nuclear Compatibility Certification is the process of verifying that the equipment item or weapon system meets design and evaluation requirements for the electrical, mechanical, and aerodynamic inte

38、rfaces between the delivery vehicle or equipment item and the nuclear weapon. Nuclear Compatibility Certification is a joint effort of DoE/NNSA and DoD to integrate a nuclear weapon into a weapon system. 3.34 Nuclear Compatibility Certification Statement (NCCS). A document issued by the Air Force Nu

39、clear Weapons Center/NCS when all aspects of compatibility certification have been completed. The NCCS documents the nuclear weapon system configuration, carriage/delivery parameters, test information and references pertaining to compatibility of the delivery system with the nuclear weapon(s). Relea

40、se of the NCCS constitutes nuclear compatibility certification of the delivery system with the specific weapon indicated. The NCCS is broken into seven (7) sections as follows: Section I: Aircraft System General Information Section II: Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) System Components Section II

41、I: Suspension and Release Equipment Section IV: Compatible Weapon/Equipment Configuration Section V: Carriage and Employment Limitations Section VI: AMAC Testers Section VII: Appendix (to include): Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-

42、STD-1822A(USAF) 10 Appendix A: Historical AMAC Testing/Aircraft Types, Locations, Dates Appendix B: Nuclear Certification Documents Reference (Safety and Compatibility) Appendix C: Nuclear Certified Technical Orders (TOs) Appendix D: Open Issues and Restrictions 3.35 Nuclear Safety Cross-Check Analy

43、sis (NSCCA). Nuclear critical software evaluation is accomplished by NSCCA or IV reactions may be either by fission, fusion, or both. 3.39 Nuclear Weapon System. A nuclear weapon system includes: (1) a nuclear weapon and a means for delivering it to the target, (2) associated support equipment, (3)

44、facilities, (4) procedures, (5) personnel, and (6) any vehicles peculiar to the system used for weapon transport. 3.40 Operational Certification. This occurs when the Lead Command/Using Command qualifies its personnel to perform the mission, certifies them in the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP),

45、 trains them in nuclear surety and assigns a Ready rating on an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) or a Satisfactory rating for a NSI. Notification of completion of all Operational Certification requirements identified in the Certification Requirements Plan is made to the AFNWCs Certification

46、Management Organization by the MAJCOM via the Operational Certification Letter (or by signing the CRP when no operational certification impacts exist). 3.41 Operational Plan Data Document (OPDD). The OPDD is a document that describes normal nuclear weapon system operations in the stockpile-to-target

47、 sequence. An OPDD is a source document, used to prepare a Technical Nuclear Safety Analysis (TNSA), which relays to the Nuclear Weapons Safety Study Group Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-1822A(USAF) 11 (NWSSG) how the operational command will operate and maintain the nuclear weapon system. The oper