ATIS 1000007-2006 Generic Signaling and Control Plane Security Requirements for Evolving Networks.pdf

1、 AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS ATIS-1000007.2006(R2011) Generic Signaling and Control Plane Security Requirements for Evolving Networks ATIS is the leading technical planning and standards development organization committed to the rapid development of global, market-driven standa

2、rds for the information, entertainment and communications industry. More than 250 companies actively formulate standards in ATIS 18 Committees, covering issues including: IPTV, Service Oriented Networks, Energy Efficiency, IP-Based and Wireless Technologies, Quality of Service, and Billing and Opera

3、tional Support. In addition, numerous Incubators, Focus and Exploratory Groups address emerging industry priorities including “Green”, IP Downloadable Security, Next Generation Carrier Interconnect, IPv6 and Convergence. ATIS is the North American Organizational Partner for the 3rd Generation Partne

4、rship Project (3GPP), a member and major U.S. contributor to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Radio and Telecommunications Sectors, and a member of the Inter-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL). For more information, please visit . AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD Approval of an A

5、merican National Standard requires review by ANSI that the requirements for due process, consensus, and other criteria for approval have been met by the standards developer. Consensus is established when, in the judgment of the ANSI Board of Standards Review, substantial agreement has been reached b

6、y directly and materially affected interests. Substantial agreement means much more than a simple majority, but not necessarily unanimity. Consensus requires that all views and objections be considered, and that a concerted effort be made towards their resolution. The use of American National Standa

7、rds is completely voluntary; their existence does not in any respect preclude anyone, whether he has approved the standards or not, from manufacturing, marketing, purchasing, or using products, processes, or procedures not conforming to the standards. The American National Standards Institute does n

8、ot develop standards and will in no circumstances give an interpretation of any American National Standard. Moreover, no person shall have the right or authority to issue an interpretation of an American National Standard in the name of the American National Standards Institute. Requests for interpr

9、etations should be addressed to the secretariat or sponsor whose name appears on the title page of this standard. CAUTION NOTICE: This American National Standard may be revised or withdrawn at any time. The procedures of the American National Standards Institute require that action be taken periodic

10、ally to reaffirm, revise, or withdraw this standard. Purchasers of American National Standards may receive current information on all standards by calling or writing the American National Standards Institute. Notice of Disclaimer http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2401.txt?number=2401RFC 2406 IETF RFC 2406,

11、IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2406.txt?number=2406RFC 2410 IETF RFC 2410, The Null Encryption Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2410.txt?number=2410RFC 2451 IETF RFC 2451, The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc245

12、1.txtRFC 3602 IETF RFC 3602, The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec, http:/www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-cbc-04.txtRFC 2404 IETF RFC 2404, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2404.txt?number=2404RFC 3566 IETF RFC 3566, The AES-X

13、CBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3566.txt?number=3566RFC 2409 IETF RFC 2409, Internet Key Exchange, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2409.txt?number=2409RFC 3526 IETF RFC 3526, More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). http:

14、/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2409.txt?number=2409RFC 2246 IETF RFC 2246, The TLS Protocol, Version 1.0, ftp:/ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2246.txtRFC 3268 IETF RFC 3268, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3268.txt?number=3268RFC 354

15、6 IETF RFC 3546, Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions, ftp:/ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3546.txt3DES Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 46-3, Data Encryption Standard, National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 1999. http:/csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips

16、/ fips46-3/fips46-3.pdfFIPS-197 FIPS Publication 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 2001. http:/csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdfFIPS-180-2 FIPS Publication 180-2, Secure Hash Standard, National Institute of Standards

17、and Technology. http:/csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdfRFC 1321 IETF RFC 1321, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2409.txt?number=2409ITU X.800 ITU-T Recommendation X.800, Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT

18、applications. ITU X.805 ITU-T Recommendation X.805, Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications. 3 DEFINITIONS The following definitions apply: 3.1 Access Control - The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource in an unautho

19、rized manner. 3.2 Access Control List - A list of entities, together with their access rights, which are authorized to have access to a resource. 3.3 Access Control Policy - The set of rules that define the conditions under which access to a particular resource may take place. ATIS-1000007.2006 4 3.

20、4 Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithm - An algorithm for performing encryption or the corresponding decryption where the keys used for encryption and decryption differ. 3.5 Authentication - The process of verifying the claimed identity of an entity to another entity or corroboration that the source o

21、f data received is as claimed. NOTE - The authenticated entity may belong either to the Application Security Layer or to the Network Services Security Layer of the Security Architectural Model. In general cases, authentication at one layer does not follow from authentication at the other layer. Auth

22、entication spans peer entity and data origin authentication where only data origin authentication provides an integrity mechanism. 3.6 Authorization - The act of giving access rights to a service, device, or resource by an entity with authority to grant this permission. 3.7 Availability - The proper

23、ty of being accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized entity. 3.8 Certificate - A set of security-relevant data issued by a security authority or trusted third party, together with security information which is used to provide the integrity and data origin authentication services for the d

24、ata. The security information includes subject attributes and an indication of a time period of validity. 3.9 Communication party - The participator or process communicating with another counterpart(s) at the Application Security Layer of the Security Architectural Model by means of application laye

25、r protocols using the network element platform. 3.10 Confidentiality - The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. 3.11 Cryptographic Algorithm - A mathematical function that is used in cryptography. 3.12 Cryptography - The di

26、scipline which embodies principles, means, and methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its information content, prevent its undetected modification and/or prevent its unauthorized use. NOTE - Cryptography determines the methods used in encipherment and decipherment. An attack on a cr

27、yptographic principle, means, or methods is cryptanalysis. ITU X.800 3.13 Data Integrity - The property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner. 3.14 Denial of Service (DoS) attack - Action that prevents authorized access to resources or that delays time-critical operat

28、ions. 3.15 Digital Signature - Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation (see cryptography) of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery - e.g., by the recipient. 3.16 Hash Function - A one way mathe

29、matical function which maps values from a large (possibly very large) domain into a smaller range. NOTE - A “good” hash function has the following properties: It is computationally hard, based on the given hash output, to find at least one input that results in the given output. It is computationall

30、y hard, based on the given hash input and output, to find yet another different input that results in the given output. It is computationally hard to find two different inputs that result in the same hash output. 3.17 Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) - The result of a hash function, as per

31、RFC 2104, that uses a secret key and provides data integrity and data origin authentication for data and messages. 3.18 Key - A sequence of symbols that controls the operations of encipherment and decipherment. 3.19 Key Management - The generation, storage, distribution, deletion, and archiving of k

32、eys in accordance with a security policy. ATIS-1000007.2006 5 3.20 Mutual Authentication - A category of authentication whereby each party authenticates itself to other parties. 3.21 Non-repudiation - Protection from denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in

33、 all or part of the communication. 3.22 Password - Confidential authentication information, usually composed of a string of characters. 3.23 Privacy - The right of individuals to control or influence what information related to them may be collected and stored, and by whom and to whom that informati

34、on may be disclosed. NOTE - Because this term relates to the right of individuals, it cannot be very precise and its use should be avoided except as a motivation for requiring security. 3.24 Proxy - An intermediary entity that acts as both a server and a client for the purpose of making requests on

35、behalf of other clients. 3.25 Repudiation - Denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication. 3.26 Secret Key - A key that is used in a symmetric cryptographic algorithm. NOTE - Possession of a secret key is restricted (usually to t

36、wo entities). 3.27 Security - The process of minimizing the vulnerabilities of assets and resources, or the result of this process. NOTE - An asset is anything of value. A vulnerability is any weakness that could be exploited to violate a system or the information it contains. A threat is a potentia

37、l violation of security. 3.28 Security Administrator - An authority (a person or a group of people) responsible for enforcing the security policy for a security domain. 3.29 Transport Mode A mode of operation of the IPsec protocol whereby the data packet IP header is used for routing. 3.30 Tunnel Mo

38、de - A mode of operation of the IPsec protocol whereby a new IP header is added to an original data packet and this new IP header is used for routing. 3.31 X.509 Certificate - A public key certificate specification developed as part of the ITU-T X.500 series. 4 ABBREVIATIONS (2) the Signaling and Co

39、ntrol Plane; and (3) the End-User Plane. These Security Planes address specific security needs associated with network management activities, network control or signaling activities, and end-user activities correspondingly. Networks should be designed in such a way that events on one Security Plane

40、are kept totally isolated from the other Security Planes. The concept of Security Planes allows the differentiation of the specific security concerns associated with those activities and the ability to address them independently. Consider, for example, a VoIP Service, which is addressed by the Servi

41、ces Security layer. Securing the management of the VoIP service (e.g., provisioning users) has to be independent of securing the control of the service (e.g., protocols such as SIP) and also has to be independent of securing the end-user data being transported by the service (e.g., the users voice).

42、 This standard focuses only on security of the Signaling and Control Plane. Requirements for security of the Management Plane and End User Plane are not within the scope of this standard. 5.2.1 End-User Security Plane The End-User Security Plane is concerned with security of the use of the Service P

43、roviders network by customers. This plane also represents actual end-user data flows. End-users may use a network that only provides connectivity, they may use it for value-added services, or they may use it to access network-based applications. 5.2.2 Signaling and Control Security Plane The Signali

44、ng and Control Security Plane is concerned with protection of the activities that enable the efficient delivery of information, services, and applications across the network. It typically involves machine-to-machine communications of information that allows the machines (e.g., switches or routers) t

45、o determine how to best route or switch traffic across the underlying transport network. This type of information is sometimes referred to as control or signaling information. The network carrying these types of messages may be in-band or out-of-band with respect to the Service Providers user traffi

46、c. For example, IP networks carry their control information in-band; whereas, the PSTN carries its control information in a separate out-of-band signaling network (the SS7 network). Example traffic of this type could include routing protocols, DNS, SIP, SS7, Megaco/H.248, LDP, RSVP, CR-LDP, RSVP-TE,

47、 BGP, OSPF, ISIS, DCC, DHCP, and ICMP. 5.2.3 Management Plane Security The Management Security Plane is concerned with the protection of OAM proof of data origin, proof of ownership, proof of resource use). It ensures the availability of evidence that can be presented to a third party and used to pr

48、ove that some kind of event or action has taken place. NOTE - Security audit logging functionality may be used to help address non-repudiation requirements. The purpose of security audit logs is to maintain an audit trail of activities generated by the devices and users. Audit logs are useful for re

49、construction of past events and for proving accountability for actions taken. 5.3.4 Data Confidentiality Security Dimension The Data Confidentiality Security Dimension ensures that data is protected against unauthorized viewing both in transit and in storage, and that data is not disclosed to unauthorized parties. The application of data confidentiality mechanisms such as encryption, access control lists, and file permissions ensure that data content cannot be understood by unauthorized