CEPT T SF 51 E-1987 Use of Cards Which Require Identification in Telecommunication Services《使用需要进行电信业务鉴定的卡》.pdf

1、T/SF 51 E Page 1 Recommendation T/SF 51 (Copenhagen 1987) USE OF CARDS WHICH REQUIRE IDENTIFICATION IN TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES Recommendation proposed by Working Group T/WG 7 “Services and facilities“ (SF) Text of the Recommendation adopted by “Telecommuncatiois” Commission: “The European Confere

2、nce of Posts and Telecommunications Administrations, considering 1. Telecommunication credit cards are issued by Administration and/or RPOA for the purpose of payment for telecommunication services of those Administrations or RPOA, 2. Recommendation T/SF 39 concerns services and facilities aspects o

3、f telephone credit cards, 3. the services and facilities for telecommunication credit cards may at some future time evolve into a more general payments service for the use of telematic services, possibly including interworking with electronic payments service provided by financial institutions, 4. t

4、he existing widespread use of credit cards issued by the financial institutions for general commercial use, 5. cards issued by Administrations are currently limited to payment for payphone services, 6. there are many other cards which offer the possibilty of giving identification for the Administrat

5、ion to accept them, a satisfactory method of identification in the context of charging for telecommunication services, 7. as the cost of comprehensive telecommunication credit card security may be appreciable low value transactions could proceed after a simple check of card validity. A comprehensive

6、 security feature could be invoked at some predetermined cost threshold, 8. it is inconvenient for the users to have different cards for each application and to have different procedures, 9. that there is considerable interest in Multi-service cards across a broad range of card issuers (Administrati

7、ons, bank .), 10. Recommendations on T/SF 58 on Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) applications that may be relevant in the context of payment telecommunications services, secommends that 1. 2. cards issued by the Administration should be usable for the purpose of any telecommunication service provided

8、 by the Administration, the security principles of Recommendation T/SF 39 for the use of Payphone cards should be used in general telecommunication credit cards (cards and their owner identification, cards authentication, owner personal code, lists of invalid cards), Administrations should attempt t

9、o conclude the necessary agreements with financial institutions; and/or organizations acting on their behalf, in order that general credit and charge cards could be used for telecommuni- cation services, the objective being that of any credit or charge card which requires identification of the user

10、should be accepted for payment of or access to the telecommunications services provided by Administration.” 3. Items to be taken into account include the following: 1. The mechanism for the payment of the telecommunication charge and any additional charge levied by credit card companies, banks, etc.

11、 O Edition of January 15, 1988 CEPT T/SF*SL*E 87 = 2326434 0009434 O W T/SF51 E Page 2 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Possible service charges (commission) due to the credit card companies. Responsibility in the case of fraudulent use of cards. Exchange of information among Administration and credit card issued.

12、 Account should be taken of the Recommendation on CEPT (Recommendation T/SF 58) in so far as it is relevant to the introduction of payment for use of telephones by means of credit card issued by the Administrations, and to the Recommendation of ISO/T068 on Banking procedures and their telecommunicat

13、ions aspects, and to ISO/T097 in respect of intelligent cards and their telecommunication aspect. Operational guidance should be developed for harmonised procedures to deal with the situation where a telephone call, being paid by means of a telephone credit card, is prematurely curtailed because of insufficient credit in the account, or because of an inappropriate response to comprehensive security procedures. The Administrations may accept lower security levels when they consider that the risks are low and can accept them for that application. Edition of January 15, 1988