ETSI TR 133 937-2016 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) LTE Study of mechanisms for Protection against Unsolicited Communication for IMS (PUCI) (V13 0 0 3GPP TR 33 9.pdf

1、 ETSI TR 1Universal Mobile TelStudy of mechaUnsolicited Co(3GPP TR 33.9TECHNICAL REPORT 133 937 V13.0.0 (2016elecommunications System (LTE; h nisms for Protection againCommunication for IMS (PUCI.937 version 13.0.0 Release 1316-01) (UMTS); inst CI) 13) ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V13.0.0 (2016-01)13GPP TR

2、33.937 version 13.0.0 Release 13Reference RTR/TSGS-0333937vd00 Keywords LTE,SECURITY,UMTS ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture

3、 de Grasse (06) N 7803/88 Important notice The present document can be downloaded from: http:/www.etsi.org/standards-search The present document may be made available in electronic versions and/or in print. The content of any electronic and/or print versions of the present document shall not be modi

4、fied without the prior written authorization of ETSI. In case of any existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions and/or in print, the only prevailing document is the print of the Portable Document Format (PDF) version kept on a specific network drive within ETSI Secretariat. U

5、sers of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status. Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at http:/portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp If you find errors in the present document, please send your co

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7、 The content of the PDF version shall not be modified without the written authorization of ETSI. The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2016. All rights reserved. DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTMand the ETSI logo ar

8、e Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM and LTE are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. GSM and the GSM logo are Trade Marks registered and owned by the GSM Association. ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V13.0.0 (2

9、016-01)23GPP TR 33.937 version 13.0.0 Release 13Intellectual Property Rights IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be

10、found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards“, which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (https:/ipr.etsi.org/). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR

11、 Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document. Foreword This

12、 Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI

13、deliverables. The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http:/webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp. Modal verbs terminology In the present document “shall“, “shall not“, “should“, “should not“, “may“, “need not“, “will“, “will not“, “can“ and “cannot“ are to be

14、interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions). “must“ and “must not“ are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation. ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V13.0.0 (2016-01)33GPP TR 33.937 version 13.0.0 Release 13Contents I

15、ntellectual Property Rights 2g3Foreword . 2g3Modal verbs terminology 2g3Foreword . 7g31 Scope 8g32 References 8g33 Definitions, Symbols and Abbreviations 9g33.1 Definitions 9g33.2 Symbols 9g33.3 Abbreviations . 9g34 System Environment for PUCI . 11g34.1 Architectural Issues 11g34.1.1 Introduction. 1

16、1g34.1.2 Originating/Terminating UC Identification and Scoring 12g34.1.3 Central/Distributed UC Identification and Scoring . 13g34.1.3.1 Distributed UC Identification and Distributed UC Scoring 13g34.1.3.2 Distributed UC Identification and Central UC Scoring. 15g34.1.4 Standardized/Vendor-Specific U

17、C Scoring Algorithms . 16g34.2 Non-Technical Conditions 17g34.2.1 Prevention of Unsolicited Communication in an Operator Controlled Environment . 17g34.2.1.1 Introduction . 17g34.2.1.2 Current SPIT/UC Prevention Measures 17g34.3 Technical versus Legal Issues 19g34.3.1 Introduction. 19g34.3.2 UC Legi

18、slation 19g34.3.2.1 Definition of UC . 19g34.3.2.2 Definition of UC Communication Services 20g34.3.2.3 Consent Achievement about UC Communication 21g34.3.3 Liability 21g34.3.4 Privacy 22g34.3.5 Conclusion 23g34.4 Coexistence with Single Radio-VCC, ICS, and SC . 23g35. PUCI Risk Analysis . 25g35.1 Ge

19、neral . 25g35.2 UC Threats 2 presented to TSG for approval; 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented when editorial only

20、changes have been incorporated in the document. ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V13.0.0 (2016-01)83GPP TR 33.937 version 13.0.0 Release 131 Scope The scope of this report is to highlight alternative solutions that could be used to protect mobile subscribers from receiving unsolicited communication over IMS and

21、 to analyze these solutions in respect of their requirements and impacts on standardized interfaces. This activity took into account the study done in TISPAN TR 187 009 on Feasibility study of prevention of unsolicited communications in the NGN. 2 References The following documents contain provision

22、s which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. For a non-specific reference,

23、 the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. 1 ETSI TR 187 009: Feasibility study of prevention of unsolicited comm

24、unications in the NGN. 2 3GPP TR 21.905: Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications. 3 3GPP TS 22.228: Service requirements for the Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia core network subsystem (IMS); Stage 1. 4 Internationales Anti-SPAM-Recht from “Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik“, page 42 to

25、 45, http:/www.bsi.de/literat/forumkes/kes0508.pdf 5 Spam Regulation Overview from Caslon Analytics, http:/.au/spamnote.htm 6 Combating SPAM Through Legislation A Comparative Analysis of US and European Approaches from E. Moustakas, Prof. C. Ranganathan, Dr. P. Duquenoy, http:/www.ceas.cc/papers-200

26、5/146.pdf 7 Stemming The International Tide Of SPAM Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2006 from John G. Palfrey, Jr., http:/www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/Chap%207_Trends_2006_E.pdf 8 Report Of The OECD Task Force On SPAM: Anti-SPAM Toolkit of Recommended Policies And Measures, http:/www.oecd.

27、org/dataoecd/63/28/36494147.pdf 9 ITU Survey On Anti-SPAM Legislation Worldwide on WSIS Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity 2005, http:/www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/Background_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf 10 EU Symposium 2006: Countering SPAM In A Digital World from Cristina Bueti, http:/spamsym

28、posium.eu/files/Cristina%20Bueti.ppt 11 RFC 5039 “The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam 12 3GPP TS 29.328: IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Sh interface; Signalling flows and message contents. 13 3GPP TS 29.329: Sh interface based on the Diameter protocol; Protocol details. 14 3GPP TS 24.611:

29、Anonymous Communication Rejection (ACR) and Communication Barring (CB)using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem; Protocol specification. ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V13.0.0 (2016-01)93GPP TR 33.937 version 13.0.0 Release 1315 3GPP TS 29.228: IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx Interfaces; Sig

30、nalling flows and message contents. 16 3GPP TS 29.229: Cx and Dx interfaces based on the Diameter protocol; Protocol details. 17 Identity Verification on the Fraud Forum manual of the GSMA, FF.21 Ver 2.0. 18 “Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP

31、Identity)“, IETF RFC4474, 2006-08, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4474.txt 19 Microsoft Live Hotmail Under Attack by Streamlined Anti-CAPTCHA and Mass-mailing Operations, http:/ 20 Sender Policy Framework, IETF RFC4408, 2006-04, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4408.txt 21 Domain Keys Identified Mail, IETF RFC4

32、871, 2007-05, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4871.txt 22 Concerns around the applicability of RFC4474, IETF, 2008-02, http:/tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-concerns-00 23 A framework for consent base communication in SIP, draft IETF, 2007-11, http:/tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-sip-consent

33、-framework-03.txt 24 Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in SIP servers, draft IETF, 2009-02, http:/tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zourzouvillys-sip-via-cookie-00 25 3GPP TR 33.828 “IMS media plale security“ 26 Viruses and Mobile Phones http:/ 3 Definitions, Symbols and Abbreviations 3.1 Definition

34、s For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 2 and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 2. Unsolicited Communication 3: Unsolicited Communication (UC) denote

35、s bulk communication in IMS where the benefit is weighted in favour of the sender. In general the receiver(s) of UC do not wish to receive such communication. UC may comprise of, e.g., SPam over IP Telephony (SPIT)“ or “SPam over IP Messaging (SPIM). NOTE: In this TR we also look at communication th

36、at is not necessarily bulk communication. 3.2 Symbols For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: 3.3 Abbreviations For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 2 and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document tak

37、es precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 2. ACR Anonymous Call Rejection AS Application Server BL Black ListDSL Digital Subscriber Link ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V13.0.0 (2016-01)103GPP TR 33.937 version 13.0.0 Release 13PUCI Protection against Unsolicited Communic

38、ation in IMS SPIT Spam over IP Telephony UC Unsolicited CommunicationETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V13.0.0 (2016-01)113GPP TR 33.937 version 13.0.0 Release 134 System Environment for PUCI 4.1 Architectural Issues 4.1.1 Introduction This clause tries to give an overview about UC prevention techniques, tries t

39、o classify them and to discuss the architectural impacts on IMS. Figure 4.1-1 shows seven levels of UC prevention, ordered by complexity and impact on IMS from the base to the top of the pyramid. The lower five levels can be realized without any changes required for IMS interfaces and IMS protocols

40、(applies for level 5 only, if the UC feedback is not based on changes in SIP signaling). This means that level 1 to 5 can be made available relatively easily. The highest three levels provide on the one side enhanced UC prevention functionality, but require on the other side changes in IMS interface

41、s and/or IMS protocols. For level 5 this statement is only valid for a SIP-based UC user feedback. The pyramid is as well horizontally split into two parts: a part with non-technical UC protection measures, the basis of the pyramid, and a part with technical UC protection measures, building upon thi

42、s basis. Figure 4.1-1: UC Prevention ordered by complexity and impact on IMS It is important to mention that authenticated users with strong identities are the prerequisite for many UC prevention measures shown in the pyramid. The illustration of UC prevention in the form of a pyramid implies in no

43、way that all levels of the pyramid have to be realized in order to provide UC prevention. If for example UC related legislation does not exist in a certain country, then level 1 of the pyramid is not present. But if, however, UC related laws have been passed in another country, these laws have to be

44、 observed by all higher UC prevention layers. It is also possible that some intermediate or the top UC prevention layer may be omitted, e.g. - there may be networks that are not operator controlled (barb2right level 2 of UC pyramid is missing) - technical UC prevention could end at layer 5 or could

45、even start with layer 5. But according to the defense in depth principle it is likely that UC prevention relying on a number of synchronized prevention measures is less susceptible to circumvention attempts than a single UC prevention measure. automatedUC protectionnetwork-to-userideal state of UC p

46、reventionlegislation (different per country)statutorily regulation of UC definition, UC handlingoperator controlled environmentcontract conditions, policies, Service Level Agreements (SLAs)re-use of DoS protection mechanismse.g. limiting number of parallel callsnetwork supported user self protection

47、based on SS with e.g. black-/white listingUC feedback user-to-networkweb interface, DTMF/SIPUC score network-to-useridentifying, marking and handling of UCcomplexity,impactonIMSnon-technical UC protection measures technical UC protection measuresnochangesininterfacesorprotocolsrequiredchangesininter

48、facesorprotocolsrequired1234567ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V13.0.0 (2016-01)123GPP TR 33.937 version 13.0.0 Release 13The statement that level 1 to 5 of the UC prevention pyramid require no changes in interfaces and/or protocols and the fact that they can be made available relatively easily implies that no principal architectural issues are related to theses UC prevention measures. The most challenging impacts concerning network architecture generally and IMS architecture in particular are associated with level 6 of the UC prevention pyrami