ETSI TR 133 937-2018 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) LTE Study of mechanisms for Protection against Unsolicited Communication for IMS (PUCI) (V15 0 0 3GPP TR 33 9_1.pdf

1、 ETSI TR 133 937 V15.0.0 (2018-07) Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Study of mechanisms for Protection against Unsolicited Communication for IMS (PUCI) (3GPP TR 33.937 version 15.0.0 Release 15) TECHNICAL REPORT ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V15.0.0 (2018-07)13GPP TR 33.937 version 15.

2、0.0 Release 15Reference RTR/TSGS-0333937vf00 Keywords LTE,SECURITY,UMTS ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N

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9、 (2018-07)23GPP TR 33.937 version 15.0.0 Release 15Intellectual Property Rights Essential patents IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and n

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13、radename. Mention of those trademarks in the present document does not constitute an endorsement by ETSI of products, services or organizations associated with those trademarks. Foreword This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The present docum

14、ent may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables. The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http:/webapp

15、.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp. Modal verbs terminology In the present document “should“, “should not“, “may“, “need not“, “will“, “will not“, “can“ and “cannot“ are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions). “must“ and “must

16、 not“ are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation. ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V15.0.0 (2018-07)33GPP TR 33.937 version 15.0.0 Release 15Contents Intellectual Property Rights 2g3Foreword . 2g3Modal verbs terminology 2g3Foreword . 7g31 Scope 8g32 References 8g33 Definitions, Sym

17、bols and Abbreviations 9g33.1 Definitions . 9g33.2 Symbols . 9g33.3 Abbreviations 9g34 System Environment for PUCI . 10g34.1 Architectural Issues . 10g34.1.1 Introduction 10g34.1.2 Originating/Terminating UC Identification and Scoring . 11g34.1.3 Central/Distributed UC Identification and Scoring 12g

18、34.1.3.1 Distributed UC Identification and Distributed UC Scoring . 12g34.1.3.2 Distributed UC Identification and Central UC Scoring 14g34.1.4 Standardized/Vendor-Specific UC Scoring Algorithms 14g34.2 Non-Technical Conditions. 15g34.2.1 Prevention of Unsolicited Communication in an Operator Control

19、led Environment 15g34.2.1.1 Introduction 15g34.2.1.2 Current SPIT/UC Prevention Measures . 16g34.3 Technical versus Legal Issues . 17g34.3.1 Introduction 17g34.3.2 UC Legislation . 18g34.3.2.1 Definition of UC 18g34.3.2.2 Definition of UC Communication Services . 19g34.3.2.3 Consent Achievement abou

20、t UC Communication . 19g34.3.3 Liability . 20g34.3.4 Privacy . 21g34.3.5 Conclusion . 22g34.4 Coexistence with Single Radio-VCC, ICS, and SC 22g35. PUCI Risk Analysis . 23g35.1 General 23g35.2 UC Threats 2 presented to TSG for approval; 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change contr

21、ol. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V15.0.0 (2018-07)83GPP TR 33.937 version 15.0.0 Releas

22、e 151 Scope The scope of this report is to highlight alternative solutions that could be used to protect mobile subscribers from receiving unsolicited communication over IMS and to analyze these solutions in respect of their requirements and impacts on standardized interfaces. This activity took int

23、o account the study done in TISPAN TR 187 009 on “Feasibility study of prevention of unsolicited communications in the NGN”. 2 References The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. References are either specific (i

24、dentified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific ref

25、erence implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. 1 ETSI TR 187 009: “Feasibility study of prevention of unsolicited communications in the NGN”. 2 3GPP TR 21.905: “Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications”. 3 3GPP TS 22.228: “Service requirements

26、for the Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia core network subsystem (IMS); Stage 1”. 4 Internationales Anti-SPAM-Recht from Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, page 42 to 45, http:/www.bsi.de/literat/forumkes/kes0508.pdf 5 Spam Regulation Overview from Caslon Analytics, http:/.au/spamno

27、te.htm 6 Combating SPAM Through Legislation A Comparative Analysis of US and European Approaches from E. Moustakas, Prof. C. Ranganathan, Dr. P. Duquenoy, http:/www.ceas.cc/papers-2005/146.pdf 7 Stemming The International Tide Of SPAM Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2006 from John G. Palfrey, Jr.

28、, http:/www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/publications/Chap%207_Trends_2006_E.pdf 8 Report Of The OECD Task Force On SPAM: Anti-SPAM Toolkit of Recommended Policies And Measures, http:/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/28/36494147.pdf 9 ITU Survey On Anti-SPAM Legislation Worldwide on WSIS Thematic Meeting on Cybersecu

29、rity 2005, http:/www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/Background_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf 10 EU Symposium 2006: Countering SPAM In A Digital World from Cristina Bueti, http:/spamsymposium.eu/files/Cristina%20Bueti.ppt 11 RFC 5039 “The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam” 12 3GPP TS 29.328:

30、“IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Sh interface; Signalling flows and message contents”. 13 3GPP TS 29.329: “Sh interface based on the Diameter protocol; Protocol details”. 14 3GPP TS 24.611: “Anonymous Communication Rejection (ACR) and Communication Barring (CB)using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN

31、) subsystem; Protocol specification”. 15 3GPP TS 29.228: “IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx Interfaces; Signalling flows and message contents”. ETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V15.0.0 (2018-07)93GPP TR 33.937 version 15.0.0 Release 1516 3GPP TS 29.229: “Cx and Dx interfaces based on the Diameter protocol;

32、 Protocol details”. 17 Identity Verification on the Fraud Forum manual of the GSMA, FF.21 Ver 2.0. 18 “Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP Identity)“, IETF RFC4474, 2006-08, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4474.txt 19 Microsoft Live Hotmail Under Atta

33、ck by Streamlined Anti-CAPTCHA and Mass-mailing Operations, http:/ 20 Sender Policy Framework, IETF RFC4408, 2006-04, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4408.txt 21 Domain Keys Identified Mail, IETF RFC4871, 2007-05, http:/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4871.txt 22 Concerns around the applicability of RFC4474, IETF, 20

34、08-02, http:/tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-concerns-00 23 A framework for consent base communication in SIP, draft IETF, 2007-11, http:/tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-sip-consent-framework-03.txt 24 Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in SIP servers, draft IETF, 2009-02, http:/

35、tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zourzouvillys-sip-via-cookie-00 25 3GPP TR 33.828 “IMS media plale security“ 26 Viruses and Mobile Phones http:/ 3 Definitions, Symbols and Abbreviations 3.1 Definitions For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TR 21.905 2 and the followi

36、ng apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 2. Unsolicited Communication 3: Unsolicited Communication (UC) denotes bulk communication in IMS where the benefit is weighted in favour of the sender. In general the receiver

37、(s) of UC do not wish to receive such communication. UC may comprise of, e.g., “SPam over IP Telephony (SPIT)“ or “SPam over IP Messaging (SPIM)”. NOTE: In this TR we also look at communication that is not necessarily bulk communication. 3.2 Symbols For the purposes of the present document, the foll

38、owing symbols apply: 3.3 Abbreviations For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 2 and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 2. ACR Anonymous Call R

39、ejection AS Application Server BL Black ListDSL Digital Subscriber Link PUCI Protection against Unsolicited Communication in IMS SPIT Spam over IP Telephony UC Unsolicited CommunicationETSI ETSI TR 133 937 V15.0.0 (2018-07)103GPP TR 33.937 version 15.0.0 Release 154 System Environment for PUCI 4.1 A

40、rchitectural Issues 4.1.1 Introduction This clause tries to give an overview about UC prevention techniques, tries to classify them and to discuss the architectural impacts on IMS. Figure 4.1-1 shows seven levels of UC prevention, ordered by complexity and impact on IMS from the base to the top of t

41、he pyramid. The lower five levels can be realized without any changes required for IMS interfaces and IMS protocols (applies for level 5 only, if the UC feedback is not based on changes in SIP signaling). This means that level 1 to 5 can be made available relatively easily. The highest three levels

42、provide on the one side enhanced UC prevention functionality, but require on the other side changes in IMS interfaces and/or IMS protocols. For level 5 this statement is only valid for a SIP-based UC user feedback. The pyramid is as well horizontally split into two parts: a part with non-technical U

43、C protection measures, the basis of the pyramid, and a part with technical UC protection measures, building upon this basis. Figure 4.1-1: UC Prevention ordered by complexity and impact on IMS It is important to mention that authenticated users with strong identities are the prerequisite for many UC

44、 prevention measures shown in the pyramid. The illustration of UC prevention in the form of a pyramid implies in no way that all levels of the pyramid have to be realized in order to provide UC prevention. If for example UC related legislation does not exist in a certain country, then level 1 of the

45、 pyramid is not present. But if, however, UC related laws have been passed in another country, these laws have to be observed by all higher UC prevention layers. It is also possible that some intermediate or the top UC prevention layer may be omitted, e.g. - there may be networks that are not operat

46、or controlled (g198 level 2 of UC pyramid is missing) - technical UC prevention could end at layer 5 or could even start with layer 5. But according to the defense in depth principle it is likely that UC prevention relying on a number of synchronized prevention measures is less susceptible to circum

47、vention attempts than a single UC prevention measure. The statement that level 1 to 5 of the UC prevention pyramid require no changes in interfaces and/or protocols and the fact that they can be made available relatively easily implies that no principal architectural issues are related to theses UC

48、prevention measures. The most challenging impacts concerning network architecture generally and IMS automatedUC protectionnetwork-to-userideal state of UC preventionlegislation (different per country)statutorily regulation of UC definition, UC handlingoperator controlled environmentcontract conditions, policies, Service Level Agreements (SLAs)re-use of DoS protection mechanismse.g. limiting number of parallel callsnetwork supported user self protectionbased on SS with e.g. black-/white listingUC feedback user-to-networkweb interface, DTMF/SIPUC score ne