ETSI TR 135 909-2016 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) LTE 3G Security Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set an example algorithm set for the 3GPP authenticat.pdf

1、 ETSI TR 1Universal Mobile TelSpecification of the Malgorithm set fokey generation funDocument 5: Summary(3GPP TR 35.9TECHNICAL REPORT 135 909 V13.0.0 (2016elecommunications System (LTE; 3G Security; MILENAGE algorithm set: an for the 3GPP authentication aunctions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 anry and re

2、sults of design and e.909 version 13.0.0 Release 1316-01) (UMTS); n example and and f5*; d evaluation 13) ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V13.0.0 (2016-01)13GPP TR 35.909 version 13.0.0 Release 13Reference RTR/TSGS-0335909vd00 Keywords LTE,SECURITY,UMTS ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cede

3、x - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N 7803/88 Important notice The present document can be downloaded from: http:/www.etsi.org/standards-search The present document ma

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8、 to reproduction in all media. European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2016. All rights reserved. DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTMand the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM and LTE are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members a

9、nd of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. GSM and the GSM logo are Trade Marks registered and owned by the GSM Association. ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V13.0.0 (2016-01)23GPP TR 35.909 version 13.0.0 Release 13Intellectual Property Rights IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may ha

10、ve been declared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI stand

11、ards“, which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (https:/ipr.etsi.org/). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not re

12、ferenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document. Foreword This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The present document may refer to technical specificati

13、ons or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables. The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http:/webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp. Modal ver

14、bs terminology In the present document “shall“, “shall not“, “should“, “should not“, “may“, “need not“, “will“, “will not“, “can“ and “cannot“ are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions). “must“ and “must not“ are NOT al

15、lowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation. ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V13.0.0 (2016-01)33GPP TR 35.909 version 13.0.0 Release 13Contents Intellectual Property Rights 2g3Foreword . 2g3Modal verbs terminology 2g3Foreword . 5g3Introduction 5g31 Scope 6g32 References 6g33 Abbreviations .

16、7g34 Structure of this report 8g35 Background to the design and evaluation work . 8g36 Summary of algorithm requirements 9g36.1 General requirements for 3GPP cryptographic functions and algorithms 9g36.2 Authentication and key agreement functions . 9g36.2.1 Implementation and operational considerati

17、ons 9g36.2.2 Type of algorithm . 9g36.2.2.1 f1 . 9g36.2.2.2 f1* . 10g36.2.2.3 f2 . 10g36.2.2.4 f3 . 10g36.2.2.5 f4 . 10g36.2.2.6 f5 . 10g36.2.2.7 f5* . 10g37 Design criteria 11g37.1 Cryptographic Criteria 11g37.2 Implementation Criteria . 11g37.3 The need for an Operator Variant Algorithm Configurat

18、ion Field . 11g37.4 Criteria for the cryptographic kernel 11g37.4.1 Implementation and operational considerations 12g37.4.2 Functional requirements . 12g37.4.3 Types and parameters for the kernel . 12g38 The 3GPP MILENAGE algorithms . 13g39 Rationale for the chosen design 13g39.1 Block ciphers vs. h

19、ash functions 13g39.2 The choice of Rijndael . 14g39.3 The MILENAGE architecture 15g39.3.1 Use of OP 15g39.3.2 Rotations and constants 15g39.3.3 Protection against side-channel attacks . 15g39.3.4 The number of kernel operations 15g39.3.5 Mode of operation . 15g310 Evaluation . 16g310.1 Evaluation c

20、riteria 16g310.2 Operational Context . 17g310.3 Analysis 17g310.3.1 A formal proof of the soundness of the f2-f5* construction . 17g310.3.2 On the f1-f1* construction and its separation from f2-f5* 19g310.3.2.1 Soundness of the f1-f1* construction 19g310.3.2.2 Separation between f1-f1* and f2-f5* .

21、19g3ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V13.0.0 (2016-01)43GPP TR 35.909 version 13.0.0 Release 1310.3.3 Investigation of forgery or distinguishing attacks with 264queries . 20g310.3.3.1 An internal collision attack against f1 (or f1*) . 20g310.3.3.2 Forgery or distinguishing attacks against combinations of severa

22、l modes 20g310.3.3.2.1 Attacks against combinations of f2-f5 . 21g310.3.3.2.2 Attacks against combinations of f1-f1* and f2-f5* . 21g310.3.3.3 Conclusion about the identified forgery or distinguishing attacks 21g310.4 Statistical evaluation. 22g310.5 Published attacks on Rijndael . 22g310.6 Complexi

23、ty evaluation . 23g310.6.1 Complexity of draft Rijndael implementation 23g310.6.2 Estimate complexity of modes . 23g310.6.3 Estimate of total MILENAGE 23g310.6.4 SPA/DPA, Timing attack countermeasures 23g310.6.5 Conclusion on algorithm complexity 24g310.7 External complexity evaluations 24g310.8 Eva

24、luation of side channel attacks 25g310.8.1 Evaluation of the kernel algorithm . 25g310.8.1.1 Timing Attacks 25g310.8.1.2 Simple Power Analysis . 25g310.8.1.3 Differential Power Analysis 25g310.8.1.4 Other side channels . 26g310.8.2 Evaluation of the f1-f5 modes. 26g310.8.2.1 Operator Constants (OP o

25、r OPc) . 26g310.8.2.2 Rotations and constants . 26g310.8.3 Conclusion on side channel attacks 26g311 Conclusions 27g3Annex A (informative): Change history . 28g3History 29g3ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V13.0.0 (2016-01)53GPP TR 35.909 version 13.0.0 Release 13Foreword This Technical Report (TR) has been pro

26、duced by the 3rdGeneration Partnership Project (3GPP). The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying ch

27、ange of release date and an increase in version number as follows: Version x.y.z where: x the first digit: 1 presented to TSG for information; 2 presented to TSG for approval; 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of subs

28、tance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. Introduction This Report has been produced by ETSI SAGE Task Force 172 on the design of an example set for 3GPP Authentication and Key G

29、eneration Algorithms. The work described in this report was undertaken in response to a request made by 3GPP TSG SA. SAGE Version 1.0 of this report was submitted to the 3GPP SA WG3 group in December 2000. Version 1.1 (with updated C-code in Annex 4) was approved by TSG SA#10 in December 2000. ETSI

30、ETSI TR 135 909 V13.0.0 (2016-01)63GPP TR 35.909 version 13.0.0 Release 131 Scope This report contains a detailed summary of the work performed during the design and evaluation of the 3GPP Authentication Functions denoted as the MILENAGE algorithm set. It contains all results and findings from this

31、work and should be read as a supplement to the specifications of the algorithms in ref. 3 and the general project report, ref. 4. 2 References The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. References are either specif

32、ic (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specifi

33、c reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. 1 3G TS 33. 102 V 3.5.0 (2000-07) 3rdGeneration Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture. 2 3G TS 33. 105 V 3.4.

34、0 (2000-07) 3rdGeneration Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements. (Release 1999) 3 ETSI/SAGE Specification. Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: an Example Algorithm Set for the 3GPP Authentication and

35、 Key generation Functions, f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: Algorithm Specification. Version: 1.0; Date: 22ndNovember 2000. 4 ETSI/SAGE Report. Report on the Design and Evaluation of the 3GPP Authentication and Key generation Functions; Version: 1.0; Date: 22ndNovember 2000. 5 Wassenaar

36、Arrangement, December 1998. http:/www.wassenaar.org. 6 P. C. Kocher, Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems, CRYPTO96, LNCS 1109, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp. 104-113. 7 J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, C. Hall, Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers,

37、 ESORICS98, LNCS 1485, Springer-Verlag, 1998, pp. 97-110. 8 L. Goubin, J. Patarin, DES and differential power analysis, CHES99, LNCS 1717, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 158-172 9 P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun, Differential Power Analysis, CRYPTO99, LNCS 1666, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 388-397. 10 T. S.

38、Messerges, Securing the AES finalists against Power Analysis Attacks, FSE00, LNCS, Springer-Verlag, to appear. 11 L. Goubin, J.-S. Coron, On boolean and arithmetic masking against differential power analysis, CHES00, LNCS, Springer-Verlag, to appear. 12 Nechvatal, Barker, Bassham, Burr, Dworkin, Fot

39、i and Roback, Report on the Development of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), NIST, October 2, 2000. 13 F. Sano, M. Koike, S. Kawamura and M. Shiba, Performance evaluation of AES Finalists on the High-End Smart Card, The Third AES Candidate Conference, New York, April 2000. ETSI ETSI TR 135 909

40、 V13.0.0 (2016-01)73GPP TR 35.909 version 13.0.0 Release 1314 M. Bellare, J. Kilian, P. Rogaway, The Security of Cipher Block Chaining, proceedings of Crypto94, Springer Verlag, pp341-358. 15 J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, AES Proposal: Rijndael, AES algorithm submission. September 3, 1999, available at h

41、ttp:/www.nist.gov/aes. 16 H. Gilbert and M. Minier, A collision attack on 7 rounds of Rijndael, in The Third AES Candidate Conference, printed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 13-14, 2000, pp. 230-241. 17 S. Lucks, Attacking Seven Rounds of Rijndael Under 192-bit and 256-

42、bit Keys, in The Third AES Candidate Conference, printed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 13-14, 2000, pp. 215-229. 18 N. Ferguson, et al., Improved Cryptanalysis of Rijndael, in the preproceedings of the Fast Software Encryption Workshop 2000, April 10-12, 2000. 3 Abbrev

43、iations For the purposes of the present report, the following abbreviations apply: AES Advanced Encryption Standard AMF Authentication Management Field AK Anonymity Key AuC Authentication Centre CBC Cipher Block Chaining CK Cipher Key DES Data Encryption Standard DPA Differential Power AnalysisEEPRO

44、M Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory GF(q) The finite field of q elements 3GPP 3rdGeneration Partnership Project IPA Inferential Power Analysis IK Integrity Key IV Initialisation Vector K Subscriber KeyMAC Message Authentication Code MAC-A Network Authentication CodeMAC-S Resynchr

45、onisation Authentication Code OFB Output feedback mode OP a 128-bit Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field that is a component of the functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5* OPC a 128-bit value derived from OP and K and used within the computations of the functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5

46、and f5*. RAM Random Access Memory RES Response to ChallengeRNC Radio Network Controller ROM Read Only Memory SAGE Security Algorithms Group of Experts SPA Simple Power Analysis SQN Sequence Number TA Timing Attack UE User EquipmentUMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System USIM User Services Id

47、entity Module XRAM Extended RAM XRES Expected User Response ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V13.0.0 (2016-01)83GPP TR 35.909 version 13.0.0 Release 134 Structure of this report The material presented in this report is organised in the subsequent clauses, as follows: - Clause 5 provides background information t

48、o the design work of the example set for 3GPP Authentication and Key generation Functions; - Clause 6 provides a summary of the algorithm requirements; - Clause 7 describes the design criteria used for the work; - Clause 8 consists of a brief presentation of the actual designs; - Clause 9 provides s

49、ome background information on the chosen design; - Clause 10 gives an overview of the evaluation work carried out by SAGE 3GPP TF and other parties; - Clause 11 contains the conclusions from the work. 5 Background to the design and evaluation work The 3rdGeneration Partnership Project (3GPP) is a global initiative dedicated to the development of specifications for the next generations of cellular mobile systems. Integration of strong security services is an important feature of this system and the general s