ETSI TS 133 221-2017 Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM) Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) LTE Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) Sup.pdf

1、 ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05) Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Support for subscriber certificates (3GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0.0 Release 14) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ET

2、SI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)13GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0.0 Release 14Reference RTS/TSGS-0333221ve00 Keywords GSM,LTE,SECURITY,UMTS ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Associat

3、ion but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N 7803/88 Important notice The present document can be downloaded from: http:/www.etsi.org/standards-search The present document may be made available in electronic versions and/or in print. The content of any electronic and/or print v

4、ersions of the present document shall not be modified without the prior written authorization of ETSI. In case of any existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions and/or in print, the only prevailing document is the print of the Portable Document Format (PDF) version kept on a

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7、crofilm except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. The content of the PDF version shall not be modified without the written authorization of ETSI. The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2017. All right

8、s reserved. DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTMand the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM and LTE are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. oneM2M logo is protected for the benefit of its Member

9、s GSM and the GSM logo are Trade Marks registered and owned by the GSM Association. ETSI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)23GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0.0 Release 14Intellectual Property Rights IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The informat

10、ion pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards“, which is available from the ETS

11、I Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (https:/ipr.etsi.org/). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the up

12、dates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document. Foreword This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP

13、 identities, UMTS identities or GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables. The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http:/webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp. Modal verbs terminology In the present d

14、ocument “shall“, “shall not“, “should“, “should not“, “may“, “need not“, “will“, “will not“, “can“ and “cannot“ are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions). “must“ and “must not“ are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables exce

15、pt when used in direct citation. ETSI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)33GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0.0 Release 14Contents Intellectual Property Rights 2g3Foreword . 2g3Modal verbs terminology 2g3Foreword . 5g31 Scope 6g32 References 6g33 Definitions and abbreviations . 7g33.1 Definitions 7g33.2 Abbre

16、viations . 7g34 Support for Subscriber Certificates 8g34.1 Introduction 8g34.2 Reference model . 8g34.3 Network elements . 9g34.3.1 PKI Portal . 9g34.3.2 Bootstrapping Server Function . 9g34.3.3 User Equipment 9g34.4 Requirements and principles for issuing subscriber certificates . 9g34.4.1 Usage of

17、 Bootstrapping 9g34.4.2 Access independence 9g34.4.3 Roaming and service network support 9g34.4.4 Home operator control 10g34.4.5 Charging principles. 10g34.4.6 Subscriber Certificate Profile 10g34.4.7 Service Discovery . 10g34.4.8 Requirements on reference point Ua . 11g34.5 Certificate issuing arc

18、hitecture . 11g34.5.1 Reference point Ua . 11g34.5.1.1 General description . 11g34.5.1.2 Functionality and protocols . 12g34.5.1.2.1 PKCS#10 with HTTP Digest Authentication 12g34.5.1.2.2 Key Generation 12g34.6 Certificate issuing procedure 13g34.6.1 Certificate issuing . 13g34.6.2 CA Certificate del

19、ivery . 15g34.7 Functionality in presence of pre-certified key pair or pre-shared keys. 16g34.7.1 Presence of pre-certified key pair . 16g34.7.2 Presence of symmetric pre-shared key 17g3Annex A (informative): Key pair storage . 18g3A.1 Introduction 18g3A.2 Key pair storage use-cases . 18g3A.2.1 Key

20、pair storage on the ME 18g3A.2.2 Key pair storage on the UICC 18g3A.3 Threats associated with the key pair . 18g3A.3.1 Key pair generation 18g3A.3.2 Unauthorized usage of the private key . 18g3A.3.3 Portability . 19g3A.3.4 Environment . 19g3A.3.5 Threat to the required properties for digital signatu

21、res. 19g3A.4 Security risk analysis related to key pair storage . 20g3A.4.1 Subscriber certificate use-cases 20g3ETSI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)43GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0.0 Release 14A.4.1.1 Secure services 20g3A.4.1.2 Secure connectivity . 20g3A.4.2 Security risk analysis in some scenarios

22、 . 20g3A.4.2.1 Scenarios involving subscribers personal data . 21g3A.4.2.1.1 Self-service management 21g3A.4.2.1.2 Security Risk Analysis in this scenario . 21g3A.4.2.2 Scenarios involving payment and agreement between operator and service provider 22g3A.4.2.2.1 Notifications through cellular networ

23、k scenario . 22g3A.4.2.2.2 Small to medium payment through cellular operator scenario 22g3A.4.2.2.3 Security Risk Analysis in these scenarios . 23g3A.4.3 Summary of risk analysis . 24g3Annex B (informative): Change history . 25g3History 26g3ETSI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)53GPP TS 33.221 versi

24、on 14.0.0 Release 14Foreword This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rdGeneration Partnership Project (3GPP). The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the pres

25、ent document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: Version x.y.z where: x the first digit: 1 presented to TSG for information; 2 presented to TSG for approval; 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under cha

26、nge control. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. ETSI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)63GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0

27、.0 Release 141 Scope The present document describes subscriber certificate distribution by means of generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) TS 33.220 11. Subscriber certificates support services whose provision the mobile operator assists, as well as services that are offered by the mobile operator

28、. The scope of this specification presents signalling procedures for support of issuing certificates to subscribers and the standard format of certificates and digital signatures. It is not intended to duplicate existing standards being developed by other groups on these topics, and will reference t

29、hese where appropriate. 2 References The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. - References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. - For a sp

30、ecific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the pres

31、ent document. 1 IETF RFC 2986 : “ PKCS#10 Certification Request Syntax Standard“ Version 1.7 (2000). 2 IETF RFC 2510: “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols“. 3 IETF RFC 2511: “Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format“. 4 IETF RFC 2527: “Internet X.509 Pu

32、blic Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework“. 5 Void. 6 IETF RFC 3280: “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile“. 7 OMA Security: “Certificate and CRL Profiles“, version 1.1 (2004). 8 OMA Security: “Wirel

33、ess Identity Module; Part: Security, version 1.2 (2005). 9 OMA Security: “Wireless Application Profile; Public Key Infrastructure Definition“, version 1.2 (2005). 10 ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:1997: “Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authe

34、ntication Framework“. 11 3GPP TS 33.220: “3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture“. 12 Void 13 Void. 14 OMA: “Crypto Object for the ECMAScript Mobile Profile“, version

35、 1.1 (2005). 15 IETF RFC 3546: “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions“. 16 Void. 17 IETF RFC 3039: “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile“. ETSI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)73GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0.0 Release 1418 ETSI TS 101 862: “Qualified certificate

36、profile“. 19 OMA: “Provisioning Content Version 1.1“ (2005). 20 3GPP TS 24.109: “Bootstrapping interface (Ub) and Network application function interface (Ua); Protocol details“. 21 Void 22 IETF RFC 2797: “Certificate Management Messages over CMS“. 23 3GPP TS 33.310: “ Network Domain Security (NDS);

37、Authentication Framework (AF)“. 3 Definitions and abbreviations 3.1 Definitions For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply. Subscriber certificate: a certificate issued to a subscriber. It contains the subscribers own public key and possibly other information

38、 such as the subscribers identity in some form. CA certificate: A Certificate Authority signs all certificates that it issues with its private key. The corresponding Certificate Authority public key is itself contained within a certificate, called a CA Certificate. 3.2 Abbreviations For the purposes

39、 of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AK Anonymity Key AKA Authentication and Key Agreement B-TID Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier blob Binary Large Object BSF Bootstrapping Server Function CA Certificate Authority CMC Certificate Management Messages over CMS CMP Certifica

40、te Management Protocols CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax GAA Generic Authentication Architecture GBA Generic Bootstrapping ArchitectureHSS Home Subscriber System IK Integrity Key MNO Mobile Network Operator NAF Network Application Function PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards PKI Public Key Infras

41、tructure UE User Equipment ETSI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)83GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0.0 Release 144 Support for Subscriber Certificates 4.1 Introduction Digital signatures can be used, for instance, to secure mobile commerce, service authorization and accounting. But digital signature by its

42、elf is not enough; there is need of a global support for authorization and charging. This TS specifies a global and secure authorization and charging infrastructure of mobile networks to support a local architecture for digital signatures. Subscriber certificates, issued using the mechanisms describ

43、ed in this TS, provide a migration path towards global Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). A local architecture for digital signatures can be deployed incrementally; one operator can choose to deploy independently of the others. On the other hand, the existence of subscribers and service providers that

44、 use digital signatures makes it easier to build a global PKI. 3GPP systems shall issue subscriber certificates in order to authorize and account for service usage both in home and in visited networks. This requires specification of: 1. procedures to issue temporary or long-term certificates to subs

45、cribers; 2. standard format of certificates and digital signatures, e.g. re-using OMA wireless PKI specifications. The mechanism shall allow a cost efficient implementation of the security support of the UE. It will also enable a users anonymity towards the service provider, whilst the user who invo

46、kes the service, can be identified by the network. Open Mobile Alliance offers an alternative solution for certificate enrolment (c.f. subclause 4.5) Subscriber certificates support services whose provision the mobile operator assists, as well as services that the mobile operator provides. There is

47、no need to standardize those services in this TS. Also, the communication between service provider and the operator (in the role of certificate issuer) need not be standardized in this TS. 4.2 Reference model Figure 1 shows a simple network model of the entities involved in the certificate issuing,

48、and the reference points used between the network entities. Figure 1: Simple network model for certificate issuing UE PKI Portal (NAF) BSF Ub Ua Zn ETSI ETSI TS 133 221 V14.0.0 (2017-05)93GPP TS 33.221 version 14.0.0 Release 144.3 Network elements 4.3.1 PKI Portal A PKI Portal shall issue a certific

49、ate for UE and deliver an operator CA certificate. In both cases, requests and responses are protected by shared key material that has been previously established between UE and a BSF. In PKI terms, the PKI portal is a Registration Authority (RA) who authenticates the certification request based on cellular subscription. PKI Portal may also function as a Certification Authority (CA) who issues certificates. However, this task may also be done in an existing PKI infrastructure towards which the PKI Portal would function as a