ITU-T H 234-2002 Encrytion Key Management and Authentication System for Audiovisual Services Series H Audiovisual and Multimedia Systems Infrastructure of Audiovisual Services - Sy.pdf

1、INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UN ION ITU-T TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU H.234 (1 112002) SERIES H: AUDIOVISUAL AND MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS Infrastructure of audiovisual services - Systems aspects Encryption key management and authentication system for audiovisual services ITU-T Recom

2、mendation H.234 ITU-T H-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS AUDIOVISUAL AND MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS OF VISUAL TELEPHONE SYSTEMS INFRASTRUCTURE OF AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES Gen er a 1 Transmission multiplexing and synchronization Systems aspects Communication procedures Coding of moving video Related system

3、s aspects SYSTEMS AND TERMINAL EQUIPMENT FOR AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICES FOR MULTIMEDIA MOBILITY AND COLLABORATION PROCEDURES Overview of Mobility and Collaboration, definitions, protocols and procedures Mobility for H-Series multimedia systems and services Mobile multimedia collabor

4、ation applications and services Security for mobile multimedia systems and services Security for mobile multimedia collaboration applications and services Mobility intenvorking procedures Mobile multimedia collaboration inter-working procedures H. 100-H. 199 H.200-H.2 19 H.230-H.239 H.220-H.229 H.24

5、0-H.259 H.260-H.279 H.280-H.299 H.300-H.399 H.450-H.499 H. 5 00-H. 5 09 H.5 10-H.5 19 H.520-H.529 H .5 30-H. 53 9 H. 540-H.549 H. 5 5 0-H. 5 59 H. 5 60-H. 5 69 For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations. ITU-T Recommendation H.234 Encryption key management and authenticat

6、ion system for audiovisual services Su mm ary This Recommendation describes three methods of encryption key management, namely: - IS0 8732; - Diffie-Hellman; and - RSA. They are applicable to the encryption of audiovisual signals transmitted digitally using the H.22 1 frame structure. The management

7、 messages defined here are transmitted within the H.221 Encryption Control Signal (ECS) channel, whose structure and use are defined in ITU-T Rec. H.233. This revision of the Recommendation improves the overall readability of the text, removes ambiguities of certain aspects related to the exchange o

8、f asymmetric length of keys, and removes references to MLP encryption according to T. 120-series Recommendations, since this effort is for further study. References to ASN. 1 were also updated to the newest version of its specification. Source ITU-T Recommendation H.234 was revised by ITU-T Study Gr

9、oup 16 (2001-2004) and approved under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure on 29 November 2002. ITU-T Rec. H.234 (11/2002) 1 FOREWORD The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sect

10、or (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every

11、 four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-Ts purview,

12、 the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with IS0 and IEC. NOTE In this Recommendation, the expression “Administration“ is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ITU draws attentio

13、n to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others ou

14、tside of the Recommendation development process. As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the late

15、st information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database. O ITU 2003 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU. 11 ITU-T Rec. H.234 (11/2002) CONTENTS Page 1 Scope 1 2 Normative r

16、eferences 3 Message system and key exchange . 3.1 Message channel . 3.2 Message formats . 3.2.1 Identifier . 3.2.2 Length . 3.3 Starting the privacy system 3.3.1 Starting messages . 3.3.2 Session key exchange . 3.2.3 Bit string . 4 IS0 8732 key management . 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Key management archit

17、ecture 4.3 Key management environments . Cryptographic service message exchanges Example of IS0 8732 message exchange 4.4 4.5 5 Extended Diffie-Hellman key distribution . 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The basic protocol 5.2.1 *Key* exchange method 5.2.2 Derivation of the *key* 5.3 Diffie-Hellman messages . 5

18、.3.1 *Key* exchange information . 5.3.2 Intermediate *key* exchange information . 5.3.3 Check code information from MCU . 5.4 Extension for line checks 6 RSA based operation 6.1 Introduction 6.1.1 General . 6.1.2 Notation 6.2 System Set-up 6.3 Authentication key generation and distribution . Certifi

19、cation 6.4 6.5 Alternative solution for certification without a GCA . 6.6 Authentication of entities . 2 9 9 9 10 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 15 16 16 . ITU-T Rec . H.234 (11/2002) 111 6.6.1 6.7 Generation of key for encryption of session keys 6.8 RSA messages 6.8.1 Authentication initiation

20、 . 6.8.2 Authentication response . 6.8.3 Authentication complete . Simultaneous transmission of RSA.Pl messages . 6.8.4 Authentication failed 7 MCU operation . Bibliography . Page 18 18 18 19 20 20 21 21 21 iv ITU-T Rec . H.234 (11/2002) ITU-T Recommendation H.234 Encryption key management and authe

21、ntication system for audiovisual services 1 Scope A privacy system consists of two parts, the confidentiality mechanism or encryption process for the data, and a key management subsystem. This Recommendation describes authentication and key management methods for a privacy system suitable for use in

22、 narrow-band audiovisual services conforming to ITU-T Recs H.221, H.230 and H.242. The confidentiality specification is independent, and is contained in the separate ITU-T Rec. H.233. Privacy is achieved by the use of secret keys. The keys are loaded into the confidentiality part of the privacy syst

23、em and control the way in which the transmitted data is encrypted and decrypted. If a third party gains access to the keys being used, then the privacy system is no longer secure. The maintenance of keys by users is thus an important part of any privacy system. Three alternative practical methods of

24、 key management are specified in this Recommendation. For cases where automated key management is not feasible, an unspecified alternative such as manual key management can be used. The first is identified as IS0 8732. It is based on manually installed keys in systems that physically afford those ke

25、ys a high measure of protection, and then an automated exchange of keys encrypted under the manually distributed keys. The algorithm used for encrypting these automatically distributed keys is normally the same as that used for encrypting the communication itself. The security of automatically distr

26、ibuted keys depends on the security of the manually distributed keys. Automatically distributed keys may be used for a single session, or may be used for multiple sessions in a given period of time (e.g. a month). IS0 8732 contains protocols not only for the automated exchange of information between

27、 the two terminals, but also physical protocols for ensuring the security of the manual distribution of keys as well. There are two distinct environments: direct point-to-point (two layer), where the two terminals share a common key, and a three-layer environment, where the two terminals who wish to

28、 communicate do not share a common key, but use the facilities of a mutual third party, with whom each of them do share a common key. The interfaces to the third party are outside the scope of this Recommendation, although it is required to distinguish between the two environments. Note that session

29、 key exchange specified in 3.3.2 is functionally duplicated in X9.17, in that the keys automatically distributed in X9.17 are strong enough to be used as session keys. However, to follow the form of this Recommendation, these keys will be used as *key*, the *key* in 3.3.2. The second is a simple yet

30、 secure method known as “extended Diffie-Hellman“, which generates and exchanges keys automatically via the system itself (this key exchange is itself encrypted). It requires no action from users until keys have been exchanged; they are then advised to confirm verbally that the same check sequence i

31、s available at each terminal. The method is quite adequate to prevent outsiders listening in on an audiovisual call carried over a satellite channel for example. To defeat the system, it would be necessary for the interloper to intercept totally the bidirectional communication before encryption had

32、been activated, and to exchange keys with both parties, pretending to each that it is the other legitimate party. The method does not provide authentication. The third method is again more complex and provides a higher degree of privacy and also provides authentication of audiovisual service entitie

33、s (terminals, MCUs, etc.). The “RSA Method“ is very similar to the public key method specified in ITU-T Rec. X.509 and uses the RSA algorithm. The method requires the establishment of a security agency, available to the whole population of entities ITU-T Rec. H.234 (11/2002) 1 which require intercon

34、nectability: certification is effectively “off-line“, and relies on the integrity of the agency. This authentication mechanism allows the parties involved in a conference call to be identified to others in an assured manner, and can be operated in multipoint as well as point-to-point calls. All meth

35、ods require the use of an associated error-free clear channel. Note that Access Control, Integrity and Non-repudiation are not provided by any of these methods. A fourth method is referred to in this Recommendation as “manual key exchange“. Manual key exchange is defined as the users entering Key En

36、cryption Keys directly into terminals, without H.234 message exchanges. The same key is entered at both locations. The length of the keys is dependent on the encryption algorithm. The bit order for the keys is most significant bit (MSB) entered first and least significant bit (LSB) entered last. The

37、 actual mechanism for entering the keys into the terminal is terminal-dependent and beyond the scope of this Recommendation. Examples are given below: use a telephone keypad to enter: (MSB) O01 11010 . O1110100 (LSB); e download the same from a computer; use a keyboard to enter the same as hexadecim

38、al characters: (MSB) 3A . 74 (LSB). e Manual entry may occur prior to initiating the call, or while in a call, In the latter case, the parties may decide to invoke encryption while in a conference, enter a key using the interface provided by the terminal, and then initiate encryption through the ter

39、minals user interface. It is when encryption is requested through the user interface that the BAS code “Encryp-On“ is sent, the ECS channel is opened, encryption algorithms are selected, manual mode of key management is agreed to, and session keys are exchanged. For an encryption system to be regard

40、ed as private all conferees should be aware of who/what has access to unencrypted data, whether other conferees or equipment such as MCUs or conversion facilities. This requires an initial Set-up period before a conference starts so that entities can authenticate each other. Thus all entities that h

41、ave access to unencrypted data are identified in an assured manner to all other entities before the conference commences. The authentication framework also provides information to any network provider, for example billing information for an MCU call. If unencrypted data is available at the MCU (a so

42、-called “trusted MCU“) the equipment should be part of any authentication framework. Users should also be made aware that there is a trusted MCU in the network. Clause 3 deals with aspects common to all methods, while clauses 4, 5 and 6 deal respectively with IS0 8732, Diffie-Hellman, and RSA method

43、s. Abbreviations and definitions AVSE *key* Key-encrypting key Audiovisual Service Entity (terminals, MCUs, etc.) 2 Normative references The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At

44、 the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed b

45、elow. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. 2 ITU-T Rec. H.234 (11/2002) ITU-T Recommendation H.22 1 (1 999), Frame structure for

46、a 64 to 1920 kbith channel in audiovisual teleservices. ITU-T Recommendation H.230 ( 1999), Frame-synchronous control and indication signals for audiovisual systems. ITU-T Recommendation H.233 (2002), Confidentiality system for audiovisual services. ITU-T Recommendation H.242 ( 1999), System for est

47、ablishing communication between audiovisual terminals using digital channels up to 2 Mbit/s. ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2000), Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certijkate frameworks. ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002), Information techno

48、logy - ASN 1 encoding rules. Specijkation of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). IS0 8732: 1988, Banking - Key Management (wholesale). IETF RFC 241 2 (1 998), The Oakley Key Determination Protocol. Message system and key exchange Message

49、 channel The system described below consists of a number of defined messages conveyed in sequence between the two ends of the link. The error-free channel required for this purpose is described in ITU-T Rec. H.233, where reference is made to session exchange (SE) blocks. 3.2 Message formats The messages used by the encryption system for key distribution and authentication are formatted in a nested ILC (identifier, length, content) form as described in ITU-T Rec. X.690. The length may be encoded in short form or long form. The indefinite form as defined in ITU-T Rec. X.690 will not be u