ITU-T H 235 4-2005 H 323 security Direct and selective routed call security (Study Group 16)《H 323 安全框架 直接和选择发送命令安全 研究组16》.pdf

1、 International Telecommunication Union ITU-T H.235.4TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU (09/2005) SERIES H: AUDIOVISUAL AND MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMSInfrastructure of audiovisual services Systems aspects H.323 security: Direct and selective routed call security ITU-T Recommendation H.235.4 ITU-

2、T H-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS AUDIOVISUAL AND MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS OF VISUAL TELEPHONE SYSTEMS H.100H.199 INFRASTRUCTURE OF AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES General H.200H.219 Transmission multiplexing and synchronization H.220H.229 Systems aspects H.230H.239 Communication procedures H.240H.259 Codin

3、g of moving video H.260H.279 Related systems aspects H.280H.299 Systems and terminal equipment for audiovisual services H.300H.349 Directory services architecture for audiovisual and multimedia services H.350H.359 Quality of service architecture for audiovisual and multimedia services H.360H.369 Sup

4、plementary services for multimedia H.450H.499 MOBILITY AND COLLABORATION PROCEDURES Overview of Mobility and Collaboration, definitions, protocols and procedures H.500H.509 Mobility for H-Series multimedia systems and services H.510H.519 Mobile multimedia collaboration applications and services H.52

5、0H.529 Security for mobile multimedia systems and services H.530H.539 Security for mobile multimedia collaboration applications and services H.540H.549 Mobility interworking procedures H.550H.559Mobile multimedia collaboration inter-working procedures H.560H.569 BROADBAND AND TRIPLE-PLAY MULTIMEDIA

6、SERVICES Broadband multimedia services over VDSL H.610H.619 For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations. ITU-T Rec. H.235.4 (09/2005) i ITU-T Recommendation H.235.4 H.323 security: Direct and selective routed call security Summary The purpose of this Recommendation is to p

7、rovide recommendations of security procedures for using direct-routed call signalling in conjunction with H.235.1 and H.235.3 security profiles. This security profile is offered as an option and may complement the security profiles in ITU-T Recs H.235.1 and H.235.3. It also provides implementation d

8、etails for clause 8.4/H.235.0 using symmetric key management techniques. In earlier versions of the H.235 subseries, this profile was contained in Annex I/H.235. Appendices IV, V, VI to H.235.0 show the complete clause, figure, and table mapping between H.235 versions 3 and 4. Source ITU-T Recommend

9、ation H.235.4 was approved on 13 September 2005 by ITU-T Study Group 16 (2005-2008) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure. Keywords Authentication, direct-routed call security, encryption, integrity, key management, multimedia security, security profile, selective routed call security. ii ITU

10、-T Rec. H.235.4 (09/2005) FOREWORD The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating

11、 and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produc

12、e Recommendations on these topics. The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-Ts purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. NOTE In this

13、Recommendation, the expression “Administration“ is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. intero

14、perability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words “shall“ or some other obligatory language such as “must“ and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest tha

15、t compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, v

16、alidity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process. As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be r

17、equired to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database. ITU 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever,

18、without the prior written permission of ITU. ITU-T Rec. H.235.4 (09/2005) iii CONTENTS Page 1 Scope 1 2 References. 1 2.1 Normative references 1 2.2 Informative references 1 3 Terms and definitions . 2 4 Symbols and abbreviations. 2 5 Conventions 2 6 Introduction 2 7 Overview 3 8 Limitations 4 9 Pro

19、cedure DRC1 (corporate environment). 4 9.1 GRQ/RRQ phase 4 9.2 ARQ phase 4 9.3 LRQ phase 4 9.4 LCF phase. 5 9.5 ACF phase 6 9.6 SETUP phase 7 10 Procedure DRC2 (interdomain environment). 9 10.1 GRQ/RRQ phase 9 10.2 ARQ phase 9 10.3 LRQ phase 9 10.4 LCF phase. 9 10.5 ACF phase 10 10.6 SETUP phase 12

20、11 Procedure DRC3 (interdomain environment). 14 11.1 GRQ/RRQ phase 14 11.2 ARQ phase 14 11.3 LRQ phase 14 11.4 LCF phase. 14 11.5 ACF phase 15 11.6 SETUP phase 16 12 PRF-based key derivation procedure 18 13 FIPS-140-based key derivation procedure 18 14 List of object identifiers 19 ITU-T Rec. H.235.

21、4 (09/2005) 1 ITU-T Recommendation H.235.4 H.323 security: Direct and selective routed call security 1 Scope The purpose of this Recommendation is to provide recommendations of security procedures for using direct-routed and selective routed call signalling in conjunction with H.235.1 and H.235.3 se

22、curity profiles. This security profile is offered as an option and may complement the H.235.1 or H.235.3 security profiles. It also provides implementation details for clause 8.4/H.235.0 using symmetric key management techniques. 2 References 2.1 Normative references The following ITU-T Recommendati

23、ons and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore

24、 encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alo

25、ne document, the status of a Recommendation. ITU-T Recommendation H.225.0 (2003), Call signalling protocols and media stream packetization for packet-based multimedia communication systems. ITU-T Recommendation H.235 (2003), Security and encryption for H-series (H.323 and other H.245-based) multimed

26、ia terminals, Corrigendum 1 (2005), plus Erratum 1 (2005). ITU-T Recommendation H.235.0 (2005), H.323 security: Framework for security in H-series (H.323 and other H.245-based) multimedia systems. ITU-T Recommendation H.235.1 (2005), H.323 security: Baseline security profile. ITU-T Recommendation H.

27、235.3 (2005), H.323 security: Hybrid security profile. ITU-T Recommendation H.235.6 (2005), H.323 security: Voice encryption profile with native H.235/H.245 key management. ITU-T Recommendation H.323 (2003), Packet-based multimedia communications systems. ITU-T Recommendation X.800 (1991), Security

28、architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications. ISO/IEC 7498-2:1989, Information processing systems Open Systems Interconnection Basic Reference model Part 2: Security Architecture. ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004, Information technology Security techniques Hash functions Part 3: Dedicate

29、d hash-functions. 2.2 Informative references ITU-T Recommendation H.235.2 (2005), H.323 security: Signature security profile. IETF RFC 4120 (2005), The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5). 2 ITU-T Rec. H.235.4 (09/2005) 3 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this Recommendation the def

30、initions given in clause 3 of ITU-T Recs H.323, H.225.0, H.235.0 and X.800 | ISO 7498-2 apply. 4 Symbols and abbreviations This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations: CT ClearToken DH Diffie-Hellman DRC Direct-Routed Call EKAGThe encryption key shared between EP A and GK G EKBHThe encrypti

31、on key shared between EP B and GK H EKGHThe encryption key shared between GK G and GK H ENCK; S, IV(M) EOFB Encryption of M using secret key K and secret salting key S and initial vector IV EPID Endpoint Identifier GK Gatekeeper GKID Gatekeeper Identifier gx, gyDiffie-Hellman half-key of GK G, GK H

32、KABThe encryption key shared between EP A and EP B KAGShared secret (H.235.1, H.235.3) between EP A and GK G KBHShared secret (H.235.1, H.235.3) between EP B and GK H KGHSecret, secret (H.235.1, H.235.3) between GK G and GK H KSAGSecret, shared salting key between EP A and GK G KSBHSecret, shared sa

33、lting key between EP B and GK H KSGHSecret, shared salting key between GK G and GK H PRF Pseudo-Random Function 5 Conventions In this Recommendation the following conventions are used: “shall“ indicates a mandatory requirement. “should“ indicates a suggested but optional course of action. “may“ indi

34、cates an optional course of action rather than a recommendation that something take place. The object identifiers are referenced through a symbolic reference in the text (e.g., “I11“), clause 14 lists the actual numeric values for the symbolic object identifiers, see also clause 5/H.235.0. 6 Introdu

35、ction H.323 is often deployed using the gatekeeper-routed model (for example, to take advantage of better billing functionalities). The widespread use of gatekeeper-routed call models is also the ITU-T Rec. H.235.4 (09/2005) 3 reason why different security profiles, focused exactly on this call mode

36、l, are defined within ITU-T Rec. H.235.0 (such as H.235.1, H.235.2, H.235.3). However, with the need to support an increasing number of parallel channels, the direct-routed call model with a gatekeeper could yield better performance and scalability properties. The advantage of this mode is the utili

37、zation of a gatekeeper for registration, admission, address resolution, and bandwidth control, while performing the call establishment directly between the end points in an end-to-end fashion. This Recommendation describes the enhancements for the H.235.1 baseline and for H.235.3 hybrid security pro

38、files to support direct-routed calls with gatekeeper(s). 7 Overview The H.235.1 baseline, as well as the H.235.3 hybrid security profiles, apply a shared secret (after the first handshake) to assure message authentication and/or integrity in a hop-by-hop fashion using the gatekeeper as a trusted int

39、ermediate host. Using the direct-routed call model, a shared secret between two endpoints cannot be assumed. It is also not practical to use a pre-established shared secret to secure the communication since, in this case, all endpoints would have to know in advance which other endpoint will be calle

40、d. ITU-T Rec. H.235.4 addresses the scenario shown in Figure 1, where endpoints are attached to a gatekeeper and deploy direct-routed call signalling. The scenario assumes an unsecured IP network in the gatekeeper zone. It is assumed that each endpoint has a communication relation and a security ass

41、ociation with its gatekeeper, and that each endpoint has registered securely with the gatekeeper using either the baseline or the hybrid security profile. Hence, the gatekeeper of the initiating endpoint (DRC1) or the gatekeeper of the terminating endpoint (DRC2) is able to provide a shared secret f

42、or the directly communicating endpoints using a Kerberos-like approach (see RFC 4120). Figure 1/H.235.4 Direct-routed call scenario This Recommendation features two procedures, DRC1 and DRC2, for different environments. Procedure DRC1 (see clause 9) is applicable in corporate environments where the

43、gatekeepers are situated within different (local) sites but where the sites adhere to a common corporate security policy. In such an environment it is assumed acceptable that the originating gatekeeper G determines the effective security policy for a call to be established; thus the originating 4 IT

44、U-T Rec. H.235.4 (09/2005) gatekeeper G selects and chooses the applied security parameters. The terminating gatekeeper H will accept the chosen security parameters. Procedures DRC2 (see clause 10) and DRC3 (clause 11) are applicable in interdomain environments where the gatekeepers are situated wit

45、hin different administrative domains where each domain may employ a different security policy. Procedure DRC2 is applicable in cases where the calling endpoint or the gatekeepers do not support the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. In such an environment it is assumed acceptable that the terminating gatekee

46、per H determines the effective security policy for a call to be established; thus the terminating gatekeeper H selects and chooses the applied security parameters. The originating gatekeeper G will accept the chosen security parameters. Procedure DRC3 is applicable in cases where the calling endpoin

47、t does not support the Diffie-Hellman algorithm while the Gatekeepers in the calling and called domain both support the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. At the beginning of call registration, the procedures provide signalling means to negotiate which of DRC1, DRC2 or DRC3 is to be applied. 8 Limitations Th

48、is Recommendation does not address direct-routed scenarios without any gatekeeper. This remains for further study. 9 Procedure DRC1 (corporate environment) The procedure described in this clause is applicable in corporate environments where the gatekeepers are situated within different (local) sites

49、 but where the sites adhere to a common corporate security policy. In such an environment, it is assumed acceptable that the originating gatekeeper G determines the effective security policy for a call to be established; thus the originating gatekeeper selects and chooses the applied security parameters. The terminating gatekeeper H will accept the chosen security parameters. 9.1 GRQ/RRQ phase Endpoints capable of supporting this security profile shall indicate this fact during GRQ and/or RRQ by including a separate ClearToken w