NAVY MIL-HDBK-293-1987 ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES CONSIDERATIONS IN RADAR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION《雷达探测系统的对抗措施要素电子计数器》.pdf

1、 MIL-HDBK-293 EM W 9999970 0035380 9 W MILITARY HANDBOOK Electronic M IL-H D B K -293 (NAVY I 5 J me 1987 Counter- countermeasures Considerations in Radar Systems Acquisit ion AMSC N/A EMCS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS CMM I Provided by IHSNot

2、 for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-s MIL-HDBK-273 EN W 7777770 03.5l- Electronic Counter-Countermeasures Cons MIL-HDBK-293 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Washington, DC 20363 derations In Radar Systems Acquisition 1. This standardization handbook was developed by

3、the Department of the Navy with Le assis of industry. ince 2. This document supplements department manuals, directives, and military standards, etc. provides basic and fundamental information on electronic counter-counter measures considerations that should be taken into account to ensure the abilit

4、y of the radar system being acquired to operate within its design specifications when exposed to hostile electronic countermeasures. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions) and any pertinent data which may be of use in improving this document should be addressed to: Systems Comma

5、nd, Attn: SPAWAR 003-121, Washington, DC 20363, by using the self-addressed Standardi- zation Document Improvement Proposal (DD Form 14261 appearing at the end of this document or by letter. It 3. Commander, Space and Naval Warfare ii Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permit

6、ted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-273 EH 7977770 0035382 2 MIL-HDBK-293 FOREWORD The nature of Naval warfare has undergone an extraordinary transformation since World War II. the forefront of this change has been the increasing need for reliable radar information in the presence of an expand

7、ing electronic warfare (EW) threat technology. the potential detrimental effects of various hostile EW techniques designed to preclude effective friendly radar operation and to determine the means to eliminate, or at least to minimize, these effects through the use of electronic counter-countermeasu

8、res (ECCM). nature, ECCM must be at the forefront of the ever-advancing state-of-the-art of electronics, and its techniques must always be at least one step ahead of the latest Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) threat. invulnerable system could be developed (an idealistic situation which may never be

9、 completely achieved), it would only be a matter of time before the enemy would discover and decode the techniques, or perhaps overpower and evade them. sometimes impossible, to properly evaluate the threat and forecast the effectiveness of an ECCM approach in a timely manner, or to establish a reli

10、able long term solution to the problem. project directors task is to ferret out enough information, sometimes from highly sensitive and not always complete or readily accessible sources, and evaluate the kinds and extent of required ECCM actions that will provide an acceptable degree of performance

11、for the systems operational mission. Finally, the project director must follow through and ensure that the ECCM design is properly implemented in the radar system. cycle of a U.S. Naval radar system. Presumably, the manager is already completely familiar with the acquisition management process and h

12、as a background primarily in management. presented in the handbook will ensure that the proper emphasis is placed on securing adequate ECCM capability in the operational system. At The task at hand is to investigate The technology of ECCM for radar is continually evolving and is often very complex.

13、By its very This situation is never stable, and even though a truly effective ECCM-hardened, totally Because of this unstable situation, it is difficult, and Thus, the This handbook provides guidance for establishing an effective ECCM program throughout the 1 i fe Following the guidelines iii Provid

14、ed by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-273 EN W 9977970 0035383 4 W NI L-HDBK-293 1.1.2.1 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.2.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3 1.4 2 2.1 2.1.1 2.2 3 3.1 3.2 4 4.1 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.2.5 4.2.6 4.2.7 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.

15、9 4.10 4.10.1 4.10.2 4.10.3 4.10.4 4.10.4.1 4.10.4.2 4.10.5 4.10.6 CONTENTS SCOPE General Multi dimensional ECCM concerns EW threat to Naval radar systems Threat overview Hostile ECM operations Passi ve electronic survei 11 ance systems Incorporating effective ECCM into radar systems Judicious use o

16、f ECCM Command, control, communications and intelligence (C31) The jamming threat to U.S. Naval radars Threat growth Future weapons EW and radar Functional aspects of ECM Functional aspects of ESM Functional aspects of ECCM Applicability Format REFERENCED DOCUMENTS Government documents Government pu

17、blications Other pub1 ications Definitions of electronic terms Acronyms and abbreviations DEFINITIONS GENERAL REQUIREMENTS General Life cycle flow Program identification Concept devel opment Concept validation Fu1 1 scale devel opment Production Deployment DVAL methodology Procedural method for addr

18、essing ECCM Operational requirement (OR) DP NDCP TEMP Decision coordinating paper (DCP) Integrated program summary ( IPS) and the mil estone Policies for ECCM DOD ECCM policy SECNAV CNO Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI). Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOI) NIC NSG SYSCOMS reference

19、file (MRF) Page 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 8 30 34 34 34 34 34 34 36 36 36 36 36 36 37 37 37 37 8 - 30 37 37 37 . 38 38 38 38 38 38 39 iv Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-293 EM 9999970 0035184 b W Paragraph

20、 5 5.1 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.1.1 5.2.1.2 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4 5.2.5 5.2.6 5.2.7 5.3 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.3.3.1 5.3.3.2 5.3.3.3 5.3.3.4 5.3.3.5 5.3.3.6 5.3.3.7 5.3.3.8 5.3.3.9 5.4 5.4.1 5.4.2 5.4.3 5.4.4 5.4.4.1 5.4.4.2 5.4.4.3 5.4.5 5.4.5.1 5.4.5.1.1 5.4.5.1.2 5.4.5.2 5.4.5.2.1 5.4.5.2.2 5.4.6 5.4.6.1 5.4.6.2 5

21、.4.7 5.4.7.1 5.4.7.2 5.4.8 5.5 5.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.2.1 5.5.2.2 5.5.2.3 5.5.3 5.5.3.1 5.5.3.1.1 5.5.3.1.2 5.5.3.1.3 5.5.3.1.4 MIL-HDBK-293 CONTENTS - (Conti nued) DETAILED REQUIREMENTS Introduction to ECCM for radar systems ESM functions ELINT collection EL RECON Tactical ESM TW receivers IFM receivers C

22、hannel i zed receivers Superheterodyne receiver Compressi ve receivers ESM parameter measurement ECM Electronic jamming Active jamming Radar fundamentals RF Transmi tter power Antenna gain and beamwidths Antenna sidelobes Target RCS Receiver noise threshold or sensitivity Signal -to-noi se (S/N 1 re

23、qui red Radar system losses Integration improvement factor Jammer characteristics Output power Antenna gain J amer bandwi dth Jami ng tac tics Standoff januning Escort jamming Self-screening jamming Jamming techniques Barrage jamming Barrage noise techniques Barrage jammer instal 1 ation Spot jannni

24、 ng PM j ami ng Active jamming reradiation Passive jamming ECM Reflective passive jamming RCS Other reflective Cf4 Corner reflectors Lens ref1 ectors Absorptive passive ECM DECM Active DECM Active false target techniques FTG against chirp radars FTG versus FA radars FTG versus phase coded pulse rada

25、rs Active break lock techniques Angle deception techniques IG Swept audi o Crosseye Terrain bounce V Page 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 41 41 41 41 42 42 . 42 42 42 42 42 43 43 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 46 46 46 46 46 46 48 48 . 48 48 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 48 Provided by I

26、HSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-293 EH 7999970 0035185 8 H Paragraph 5.5.4 5.5.5 5.5.6 5.5.6.1 5.5.6.2 5.6 5.6.1 5.6.2 5.7 5.8 5.8.1 5.8.2 5.8.3 5.8.4 5.8.4.1 5.8.4.2 5.8.4.3 5.8.4.4 5.8.4.5 5.8.4.5.1 5.8.4.5.2 6. 6.1 5.8.4.3.1 Figure 1 2

27、 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TabTe I II III IV V VI - VI1 MIL-HDBK-293 CONTENTS - (Continued) Range deception techniques Velocity deception techniques Passive DECM Passive false target techniques Passive break 1 ock techniques Destructive CM Electromagnetic Pul se (EMPI ARM ECCM ECCM and counter-EW ECCM dimension

28、s Physical and fiscal considerations Counter-ESM ECCM versus ECM ECCM against active jamning ECCM against active jamming-reradiation ECCM against passive jamming ECCM against passive jamming - chaff ECCM aaainst deCeDtiVe ECM ECCM against destructive CM ECCM against EMP ECCM against ARMS NOTES Subje

29、ct term (keyword) list techniques ng FIGURES Overview of the functional relationships of EW Functional aspects of ECM Functional aspects of ESM Functional aspects of ECCM Major ECCM acquisition activities Radiation pattern for a parobolic reflector antenna Representation of standoff jamming Stacking

30、 versus staggering for jamming systems Types of corner reflectors illustrating the main beam and the sidelobe radiation TABLES ESM types ECCM versus ESM tactical objectives and dimensions ESM functions and primary point of ECCM implementation Generic Counter ESM technique summary Examples of ECCM te

31、chniques to counter active Examples of ECCM techniques to counter chaff jamming Examples of ECCM techniques to counter DECM radiation jamming 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 52 52 52 54 54 57 57 57 59 61 61 61 62 62 4 5 6 35 43 45 47 49 41 53 53 54 55 58 59 Planning and Spec APPENDIX fication Out1 ne 63 vi

32、Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-273 EM U 7777770 0035386 T U MI L-HDBK-293 1. SCOPE 1.1 General. This handbook provides guide1 ines for incorporating electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCbl) into United States Naval radar s

33、ystems during the system acquisition process. The handbook should be useful to project or acquisition directors and other participants in the acquisition process, particularly cognizant managers in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Naval Systems Commands (SYSCOM), the Naval. Int

34、el1 igence Center (NIC), the Naval Security Group (NSG), and personnel in the design, development and production agencies. of the Soviet threat facing the fleet and the Navys critical need for command and control in performing its various missions, managers must understand the importance of measures

35、 necessary to ensure the viability of radar systems. radar systems. mission in the presence of a determined threat. 1.1.1 Multidimensional ECCM concerns. Eilanagers need to appreciate the complex nature of the issues involved in developing ECCM-hardened radar systems. issues specified in a through c

36、: vulnerability) to the threat and the means to counter those weaknesses timely, reliable and adequate radar information to conform to their needs anti-electronic warfare support measures (ESM) ) must be resolved within the 1 imitations of budget, size, weight, platform, maintenance and environmenta

37、l constraints. Because of the gravity This is the purpose for incorporating ECCM into the design of Without ECCM, a radar system will not be capable of fulfilling its military (combat,) ECCt.1 multidimensional concerns involve the a. b. c. Sensitive security issues that relate to potential system we

38、aknesses (susceptibility and Operational issues in which a variety of Naval missions and platforms must be assured of Technical issues, wherein difficult challenges (for example, anti jamming (AJ) and 1.1.2 Electronic Warfare (EW) threat to Naval radar systems. The urgent need for ECCM techniques in

39、 Naval radar svstems continues to increase with the qrowinq seriousness of the threat and the NaV.vs vital dependence-upon radar information for executing its various missions. threat is presented in 1.1.2.1 through 1.1.2.6. coastal defensive force to an offensive striking arm with global capabiliti

40、es. U.S. Naval forces, in large measure, have been shaped by this threat, and in particular by the need for command and control in a wartime environment. the Soviet Union far overshadow the capabilities and tactics of all other Warsaw Pact nations. intercept and jamming capabi 1 ities of these Europ

41、ean communist countries are comprehensive and continue to grow in sophistication. The advances in Soviet technology from rudimentary, manually operated noise jamers to sophisticated detection and jamming equipment give the U.S. considerable cause for concern about existing4J.S. Naval radar systems w

42、hich need ECCM improvements, and about U.S. Naval radar systems being planned for the future. are able to cover all of the frequency bands used by the various U.S. Naval radar systems. Soviet jamners are theoretically deployable on virtually every type of operational platform - surface, subsurface,

43、or aircraft (A/C). and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, or between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R) and the U.S., the initial battle may be the deciding factor, lasting only hours, with the outcome determined in the first few minutes. essential to both the NAT

44、O and Warsaw Pact forces. National and tactical sensor systems of both Sides will be extensively involved. Passive electronic surveillance systeriis will be keenly attuned to the descriptors and indicators of actions which can tipoff intentions of impending attack. A description of the 1.1.2.1 Threa

45、t overview. Since the early 1960s, the Soviet Navy has been transformed from a The requirements for 1.1.2.2 Hostile Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) operations. The EW capabilities and tactics of The EW Soviet jammers are developed to the point where spectrally they 1.1.2.2.1 Passive electronic surv

46、eillance systems. In a war involving the Warsaw Pact countries Threat indications and warning information are 1 Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-273 EM m 3777770 0035387 L m MIL-HDBK-293 1.1.2.2.2 Incorporating effective ECCM

47、into radar systems. The Soviet Ocean Surveillance System SOSS) has capabilities usinci both sensors and infrared (IR) detectors to locate and track anti-Soviet forces, possibly introducing-expendable jammers to suppress radar and communications. fonnidable strain on the U.S. Navy to anticipate and d

48、efeat the enemys ESM and ECM systems by incorporating effective ECCM into its radar and communications system. jamming methods on U.S. Navy radar frequencies may answer the Warsaw Pact question, Do we jam or do we listen?, and makes more certain the obvious decision to jam our Command, control, and

49、communication (C3) networks. Following the successful large-scale invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in August 1968, the Warsaw Pact forces have reportedly made considerable investment in EW with particular emphasis upon training. Soviet jamming equipments, techniques and practices are generally less sophisticated than those of the U.S., and the Soviets appear to prefer a brute-force approach like broadband noise jammi