1、UFC 4-020-01 11 September 2008 UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is unlimited. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC
2、 4-020-01 11 September 2008 UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual Any copyrighted material included in this UFC is identified at its point of use. Use of the copyrighted material apart from this UFC must have the permission of the copyright holder. DEP
3、UTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT) J3, DEPUTY DIRECTORATE FOR ANTITERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Preparing Activity) NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT AGENCY Record of Changes (change
4、s are indicated by 1 . /1/) Change No. Date Location Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-020-01 11 September 2008 FOREWORD The Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) system is prescribed by MIL-STD 3007 and provides planning, design, con
5、struction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization criteria, and applies to the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities in accordance with USD(AT (For Official Use Only (FOUO) 8 October 2003 Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-020-02, DoD Security Engineering Fac
6、ilities Design Manual, (Draft) DoD 6055.9-STD, DoD Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards, 5 October 2004 Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-020-01 11 September 2008 1-3 United States European Command (USEUCOM) Antiterrorism Ope
7、rations Order 08-01, January, 2008 (For Official Use Only (FOUO) United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Operations Order 05-01, Antiterrorism, 10 August 2005 Army Field Manual 3-9, Navy Publication P-467, Air Force Manual 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, 12 Dece
8、mber 1990 Army Field Manual 3-6, Air Force Manual 105-7, Fleet Marine Field Manual 7-11-H, Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries), 3 November 1986 1-6 THE PLANNING TEAM. Establishing the design criteria for security and antiterrorism is not something that can be done effecti
9、vely by any one person. It requires a team of people to ensure that the varied interests relating to a project are considered appropriately. The specific membership of a planning team will be based on local considerations, but in general, the following functions should be represented. 1-6.1 Facility
10、 User. The ultimate users of the planned facility identify the assets within the facility that will require protection and establish their relative value. The users also identify any special operational or logistical design constraints for the facility. 1-6.2 Antiterrorism. DoD Instruction 2000.16 r
11、equires every installation or base to have an antiterrorism officer. The role of the antiterrorism officer is to orchestrate the development of comprehensive antiterrorism plans and to coordinate the efforts of all organizations on the installations with respect to antiterrorism preparation and resp
12、onse. As such, the antiterrorism officer is a critical member of the planning team. 1-6.3 Intelligence. Representatives of this function are responsible for providing input for the identification of threats to identified assets including information on potential aggressors, their likely targets, and
13、 their likely tactics. Because the scope of security engineering potentially includes criminals, terrorists, subversives, and foreign intelligence agents, the intelligence role might not be represented by one person or organization. Criminal intelligence and terrorist intelligence may be in differen
14、t organizations, for example. This varies by DoD component and location. 1-6.4 Operations. Representatives of this function may be considered to serve as installation level user representatives or representatives of the senior tactical commander on an installation. The installation antiterrorism off
15、ice and the responsibility for antiterrorism commonly reside in operations. 1-6.5 Security. Representatives of the security and law enforcement function are responsible for detecting and defeating acts of aggression against assets. Therefore, these representatives supply information about the respon
16、se capabilities of military police, contract or security guards, local police, or other applicable security Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-020-01 11 September 2008 1-4 forces. They may also provide information on general securi
17、ty requirements and on criminal threats. 1-6.6 Logistics. Representatives of this function are commonly responsible for maintenance of installed equipment in facilities. They provide input on equipment maintenance and on integrating with existing systems. 1-6.7 Engineering. Representatives of this f
18、unction are responsible for facility planning, design, construction, maintenance, and repair. The Director of Public Works (DPW) or Base Civil Engineer (BCE) (or equivalent) organizations commonly include the master planner or project programmer. The programmer organizes and leads the planning team;
19、 consolidates all facility requirements, design criteria, and project cost information into the appropriate programming documents; and establishes the project cost estimate or budget. 1-6.8 Resource Management. The resource manager will be responsible for obtaining the funds necessary to implement w
20、hatever projects are formulated as part of this process. They are also familiar with what funds sources are available and with the requirements for programming those funds. 1-6.9 Others. Based on local considerations, there may be others who should be consulted for input into the design criteria. Th
21、ey might include Fire Marshals, communications people, environmental people, and historic preservation officers. 1-7 INTEGRATING WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS. Security and antiterrorism requirements will never be the only requirements associated with a project. Even where a project is specifically for se
22、curity and antiterrorism upgrades, there will still be other requirements that must be considered. There will be times where one criterion is more stringent than another, in which case the more stringent one must be applied. In some cases, criteria may conflict. In those cases, those conflicts must
23、be resolved, which may require compromise or adjustment to one or the other criteria. The following are examples of common criteria that must be integrated with security and antiterrorism requirements. 1-7.1 Security Regulations. Many security regulations specify protective measures, policies, and o
24、perations related to security. This UFC is intended to complement those existing regulations, not to contradict or supersede them. Regulatory requirements must be accommodated and coordinated. 1-7.2 Explosive Safety. Antiterrorism standards establish criteria to minimize the potential for mass casua
25、lties and progressive collapse from a terrorist attack. In addition, based on application of this UFC, planning teams may identify higher levels of protection against explosives threats than are mandated by the minimum standards. DoD 6055.9-STD, DoD Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards as imple
26、mented by Service component explosive safety standards, establish acceptable levels of protection for accidental explosions of DoD-titled munitions. The explosive safety and antiterrorism standards address hazards associated with unique events; therefore, they Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reprodu
27、ction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-020-01 11 September 2008 1-5 may specify different levels of protection. Compliance with both standards is required. Where conflicts arise, the more stringent criteria will govern. 1-7.3 Other DoD Component Standards. DoD components an
28、d Combatant Commanders are allowed to supplement the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, but those supplemental requirements may not be less stringent. Examples of such supplemental requirements include USEUCOM Operations Order 08-01 and USCENTCOM Operations Order 05-01. Those operati
29、ons orders establish additional construction standards for projects constructed in the European and Central Command areas of operations. In addition, DoD components may establish implementing instructions for applying the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, which need to be taken into
30、 account in project planning. 1-7.4 Historic Preservation. Implementation of security and antiterrorism requirements cannot supersede the DoD obligation to comply with federal laws regarding cultural resources to include the National Historic Preservation Act and the Archaeological Resources Protect
31、ion Act. The planning team needs to determine possible adverse effects upon an historic structure and/or archaeological resource in conjunction with establishing antiterrorism and security requirements to the greatest extent possible and to consult accordingly. Personnel at installations abroad shou
32、ld coordinate with the host nation regarding possible adverse effects to cultural resources. Conversely, historic preservation compliance does not negate the requirement to implement security and antiterrorism standards and requirements. Federal agencies are always the decision-maker in the Section
33、106 process of the National Historic Preservation Act. An agency should not allow for prolonged consultations that conflict with the eminent need to implement security and antiterrorism standards and requirements. Preservation issues need to be quickly and effectively resolved to avoid obstructing s
34、ecurity and antiterrorism efforts. 1-7.5 Sustainable Design. Sustainable design seeks to reduce negative impacts on the environment and on the health and comfort of building occupants, thereby improving building performance. The basic objectives of sustainability are to reduce consumption of non-ren
35、ewable resources, minimize waste, and create healthy, productive environments. Requirements for security and antiterrorism may pose challenges for sustainable design, but the two goals are not mutually exclusive. Two of the most significant areas of conflict are in providing plantings close to build
36、ings for shading and water conservation and in maximizing natural lighting. Issues such as those require careful coordination among design disciplines and may require tradeoffs. 1-7.6 Other Facility Requirements. Project programmers and designers also must consider issues such as life safety and fir
37、e protection, functional issues, energy conservation, seismic criteria, barrier-free handicapped access, and aesthetics. Protective measures may enhance energy conservation or seismic survivability, but the objectives of life safety requirements or barrier-free access may conflict with the objective
38、s of the protective system. The programmer and the planning team need to recognize conflicts and establish priorities in the programming phase to guide designers to appropriate and optimal solutions. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UF
39、C 4-020-01 11 September 2008 1-6 1-8 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES. This UFC is one of a series of security engineering Unified Facilities Criteria documents that cover minimum standards, planning, preliminary design, and detailed design for security and antiterrorism. The manuals in this series a
40、re designed to be used sequentially by a diverse audience to facilitate development of projects throughout the design cycle. The manuals in this series include the following: 1-8.1 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings. UFC 4-010-01 and 4-010-02 establish standards that provide minimum l
41、evels of protection against terrorist attacks for the occupants of all DoD inhabited buildings. Those UFC are intended to be used by security and antiterrorism personnel and design teams to identify the minimum requirements that must be incorporated into the design of all new construction and major
42、renovations of inhabited DoD buildings. They also include recommendations that should be, but are not required to be incorporated into all such buildings. 1-8.2 Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual. This manual presents processes for developing the design criteria necessary to incorporate
43、 security and antiterrorism into DoD facilities and for identifying the cost implications of applying those design criteria. Those design criteria may be limited to the requirements of the minimum standards, or they may include protection of assets other than those addressed in the minimum standards
44、 (people), aggressor tactics that are not addressed in the minimum standards, or levels of protection beyond those required by the minimum standards. The cost implications for security and antiterrorism are addressed as cost increases over conventional construction for common construction types. The
45、 changes in construction represented by those cost increases are tabulated for reference, but they represent only representative construction that will meet the requirements of the design criteria. The manual also addresses the tradeoffs between cost and risk. The Security Engineering Facilities Pla
46、nning Manual is intended to be used by planners as well as security and antiterrorism personnel with support from planning team members. 1-8.3 Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual. UFC 4-020-02 provides interdisciplinary design guidance for developing preliminary systems of protective measu
47、res to implement the design criteria established using UFC 4-020-01. Those protective measures include building and site elements, equipment, and the supporting manpower and procedures necessary to make them all work as a system. The information in UFC 4-020-02 is in sufficient detail to support con
48、cept level project development, and as such can provide a good basis for a more detailed design. The manual also provides a process for assessing the impact of protective measures on risk. The primary audience for the Security Engineering Design Manual is the design team, but it can also be used by
49、security and antiterrorism personnel. 1-8.4 Security Engineering Support Manuals. In addition to the standards, planning, and design UFCs mentioned above, there is a series of additional UFCs that provide detailed design guidance for developing final designs based on the preliminary Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,
