1、A a - MI L - HD BK- 2 5 5 A ( AS 1 6 September 1984 SUPERSEDING MIL-HDBK-255 (AS) 5 Nay 1978 MILITARY HANDBOOK IIUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SAFETY, DESIGIJ, AND EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR NO DELIVERABLE DATA REQUIRED BY THIS DOCUNENT WUOR . THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS -77 PAGES Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo
2、reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,- MIL-HDBK-255A CHG NOTICE II m 9999970 0190041 Tb4 m 1 INCH-POUNDI MIL-HDBK-Z55A(AS NOTICE 1 9 September 1993 MILITARY HANDBOOK NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, SAFETY, DESIGN, AND EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR TO ALL HOLDERS OF MIL-HDBK-255A(AS):
3、1. THE FOLLOWING PAGES OF MIL-HDBK-Z55A(AS HAVE BEEN REVISED AND SUPERSEDE THE PAGES LISTED: NEW PAGE DATE SUPERSEDED PAGE DATE 3 3 6 September 1984 4 4 6 September 1984 5 5 6 September 1984 6 6 6 September 1984 7 7 6 September 1984 8 6 September 1984 8 REPRINTED WITHOUT CHANGE 27 27 6 September 198
4、4 28 28 6 September 1984 39 39 6 September 1984 40 40 6 September 1984 0 2. RETAIN THIS NOTICE AND INSERT BEFORE TABLE OF CONTENTS. 3. indicated above have been entered. sheet. Thi s issuance, together with appended pages, i s a separate pub1 i cation. Each notice is to be retained by stocking point
5、s until the military handbook is completely revised or cancelled. Holders of MIL-HDBK-255A(AS) wi 11 verify that page changes and additions This notice page will be retained as a check Preparing activity: Navy - AS (Project NUOR-N003) AMSC NIA FSC NUOR DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public r
6、elease; distribution is unlimited. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,- _L MIL-HDBK-255A NU W 7777770 00qb23b T M MIL-HDBK-255A( AS) THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitte
7、d without license from IHS-,-,-I .- I MIL-HDBK-255A NU 7777770 00116237 L m NI L-HDBK-25 5A ( AS ) DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY WASHINGPON, DC 20360 . NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS SAFETY, DESIGN AND EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR 1. This handbook, prepared by the Naval Air Systems Command, was approved 5 Nay 1978, for
8、 printing and inclusion in the Kilitary Standardization Handbook series. 2. This document provides basic and fundamental information on nuclear safety design and evaluation criteria. It will provide valuable information on nuclear safety design and evaluation criteria. It will provide valuable infor
9、mation and guidance to personnel concerned with the design and development of nuclear weapon systems and the evaluation criteria that is used to ensure nuclear safety. 3. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions) and any pertinent data which may be of use in improving this document
10、 should be addressed to: Engineering Specifications and Standards Department (Code 93) Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, Bew Jersey 08733, by using the self-addressed Standardization Document Improvement Proposal (DI) Form 1426) appearing at the end of this document or by letter. I iii Provid
11、ed by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-_x_Ix_ _ ._ -_ MIL-HDBK-255A NU 7799770 0046238 3 MI L-HDBK-2 5 5A (AS ) THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,
12、-MIL-HDBK-255A NU 9999970 0046239 5 m - _ MI L-HDBK-2 55A( kS ) FOREWORD Existing Departinent of Defense and Department of the Navy implementing instructions for nuclear weapon systems safety establish design requirements and evaluation criteria which are general iri nature. These requirements must
13、be analyzed to determine suitability and applicability for a given system development and procurement. This document provides additional information and guidance to the program manager, acquisition engineer, and others weapons components, equipment, subsystems, and systems on the nuclear safety desi
14、gn and evaluation criteria at various stages nuclear safety design and evaluation criteria, but rather to provide guidance and information which should be considered during design and procurement. I responsible for the design, test, and procurement of nuclear m of their life cycle. The intent is not
15、 to provide detailed Every effort was made to assure that the referenced documents (Section 2) were in effect on the date of publishing this document. However, the currency of each document should be checked before use, I- I a Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted with
16、out license from IHS-,-,-MI L-HDBK-2 5 SA ( AS ) TEIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi 7- . . . .I . , . . . _- ,e.:. . - . . Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-e- -=. I HI L-HDBK-255A ( AS ) a e . I O .- e SECTION 1 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS
17、IN TR O DUC T I O N PAGE 1.1 Scope . 1 1.2 Purpose . 1 REFERENCED DOCUMENTS 4 DEFINITIONS . 9 GEXERAL 4.1 Design and Evaluation Criteria 17 4.1.1 Ninimum Standards for Design 17 4.1.2 Plinimum Standards for Certification . 17 4.1.3 Binimum Standards for Specific Items 17 4.2 Nuclear Weapon System Sa
18、fety 17 4.3 DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards 18 4.4 Safety Design Criteria 18 COMBAT DELIVERY AIRCRAFT SYSTEES 5.1 General . 19 5.2 Nuclear Weapons Suspensior, anci Release Systems 21 5.3 Euclear Veapons !-!onitor and qontrol . 29 5.4 Nuclear Caution System 24 5.5 Air-Launched Missiles and
19、 Rockets . 25 5.6 Automata . 26 5.7 Aircraft Loading and Unloading Procedures . 26 vii Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-._ _ MIL-HDBK-255A NU 7797970 004b242 5 W MIL-HDBK-255A(AS) SECTION 6 NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM AUTOMATA 7 PAGE 6.1 Gen
20、eral . 27 6.2 Automata Design Criteria 27 6.2.1 Software Design and Development . 27 6.2.2 Nodule Coupling. 27 6.2.3 Documentation . 27 . 6.2.4 Critical Function Commands 27 6.2.5 Program Loading . 28 6.2.6 biemory Data Change 28 6.2.7 Memory Security . 28 6.2.8 Control . 28 6.3 Hardware Cross-Check
21、 29 6.3.1 Special Test Circuitry 29 6.3.2 Certification/Confidence Programs . 29 6.4 Software Nuclear Safety Analysis (SNSA) . 29 6.4.1 Purpose and Requirements 29 6.4.2 Guidance 29 6.4.3 Software Currency Requirements 70 6.4.4 Special Diagnostic Software . 30 6.4.5 SNSA agencies. 30 ARXING AND FUZI
22、NG (A time, phase, amplitude, or frequency). i 3.20 LLECTROEXPLOSIVE DEVICE.,&ED). explosive device within subsystem having an explosive or by an electro- explosive initiator. / An electrically initiated 3.21 ELE(2TROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EPIC). The ability of elec- tronic equipment, subsystems an
23、d systems to operate in their intended operational environments without suffering or causing unacceptable degradation because of unintentional electromag- netic radiation or response. 11 Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-12 MIL-HDBK-255
24、A NU 77 MI L-HDBK-255A (AS) 3.22 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI). An electromagnetic disturbance which interrupts, obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics/electrical equipment. It can be induced intentionally, as in some forms of electronic warfare, or
25、unintentionally, as a result of spur- ious emission and responses, intermodulation products, and the like. 3.23 ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP). The electromagnetic radia- tion from a nuclear explosion caused by Compton-recoil elec- trons ana photoelectrons from photons scattered in the materials of the
26、 nuclear device or in a surrounding medium. The resulting electric and magnetic fields may couple with military systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. 7.24 E.LECTROEAGNETIC RADIATION (EMR). Radiation made up of oscilating electric and magnetic fields and propagated with the speeG of
27、 light. Includes gamma radiation, X-rays, ultraviolet, visible and infrared radiation, and radar and radio waves. 3.25 FAIL-SAFE. A design feature of a nuclear weapon system/ component which ensures that, under failure, no critical func- tion, damage to equipment, or injury to personnel will occur.
28、3.26 FIRP1,IWARE. Logic circuits in read-only memory or specifi- cally protected portions of memory that may be altered by the software only under certain circumstances. 3.27 HARD-WIRE. A dedicated discrete electrical circuit. 3.28 LIMITED CURRENT. Nonitor or test currents which are lim- ited so tha
29、t the most current that can be delivered to a nuclear weapon for monitoring or testing purposes will be less than that required to activate the most sensitive component in the arming sequence. 3.29 LOGIC CIRCUITS, Interconnected electrical, electronic and microelectronic circuits that carry and cont
30、rol electrical iinpulses, for the purpose of providing the “ON-OFF“ intelligence for predetermined relationships within a system or subsystem. In many cases, these circuits perform functions which follow the laws of Boolean algebra, Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitte
31、d without license from IHS-,-,-L7 - I .- MIL-HDBK-255A NU m 7799770 0046261 7 - MI L-HD BK - 2 5 5 A ( AS ) 3.30 LOGISTIC NOVEMENT. The transport of nuclear weapons in connection with supply or maintenance operations. Under certain specified conditions, combat aircraft may be used for such movements
32、. 3.31 L0:ISTIC SYSTEN. The organization, noncombat delivery vehicles, and support equipment employed for loading, movement and transfer of nuclear cargo. 3.32 KODULE. An identifiable, self-contained, compilable,. independent set of computer instructions with one entry point and one exit point that
33、fulfills some well-defined function. A inodule is a combination of one or more units. - 3.33 MONITOR CURRENT. A limited current introduced into a nuclear weapon to determine the functional status of selected - components. 3.34 MULTIPLEXED SYSTEM. A signal transmission system in which two or more sig
34、nals share one transmission path or bus. A multiplexer is that portion of the niltiplex system which Por- mats, transfers, and processes signals required for nuclear weapon monitoring, control, and separation. 3.35 NONCOI4BAT DELIVERY VEHICLE. Any vehicle and its installed equipment used for the mov
35、ement, loading, or transfer of nuclear weapons, but not the subject of specific nuclear safety rules. 3.36 &ORMAL ENVIRONMENT. The expected logistical and opera- tional environments, as defined in the weapons stockpile-to- target sequence in which the weapon is required to survive without egradation
36、 in operational reliability. 3.37 NUCLEAB CARGO. A nuclear weapon or nuclear component (except Limited Life Components (LLC) prepared for logistic movement. c 3.38 NUCLEAR CONSENT SIGNAL. An electrical enabling signal( s) originated by a conscious, deliberate human act signifying intent of release o
37、r launch of an unarmed or prearmed weapon. - 3.39 NUCLEAR SAFETY CRITERIA. Design and evaluation criteria eatablished as aids for ensuring that nuclear safety is a basic system engineering and procedural requirement in nuclear weapon systems and logistics systems. 13 I F .LA Provided by IHSNot for R
38、esaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-_I_ -_- MIL-HDBK-255A NU a 7779970 004b262 O 3.40 NUCLEAR SAFING. The influence of a nuclear warhead design feature which prevents a significant nuclear yield as a result of detonating the high explosive (HE) by any means othe
39、r than the intended firing system. 3.41 NUCLEAR WARHEAD. An item which normally consists of the explosive system, the nuclear system, and electrical circuitry. It may be of an implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear. Nuclear components may be integrally contained. It is usually designed to be mou
40、nted in or on a torpedo, guided missile, rocket, bomb, or similar delivery system. 3.42 IJUCLEAR WEAPON, a. A device in which the explosion results from the energy released by reactions involving atomic nuclei, either fission or fusion, or both. b. A nuclear bomb, warhead, reentry system, reentry ve
41、hicle, or payload section containing a nuclear warhead (includes guided air-launched missiles). 3.43 NUCLEAR WEAPON INTERFACE (NWI). A system interface through which information is passed between YMCRS and a nuclear weapon and the in-flight operable bomb rack lock (IFOBRL)/weapon release mechanism.
42、3.44 MUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM. A combat delivery vehicle with its nuclear weapon(s) and associated support equipment, noncombat delivery vehicles, facilities, and services. 3.45 ONE-POINT SAFE. A term used to describe the degree of safety in a nuclear weapon. A characteristic of a nuclear weapon which,
43、 upon undergoing one-point detonation initiated anywhere in the high explosive (HE) system, has a probability of no greater than one in one million of producing a nuclear yield in excess of 4 pounds of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent. 3.46 PHYSICAL ISOLATION. Physical separation of wiring, parts, m
44、odules, assemblies, and so forth, to assure no physical con- tact or interaction. 3.47 PREARMBD. The state of a weapon system in which a single launch, release, or command signal will irreversibly initiate the arming/firing sequence. 14 Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking perm
45、itted without license from IHS-,-,-_ MIL-HDBK-255A NU 7777770 0046263 2 KIL-HDBK-255A ( AS ) 3.48 PREARMING. A function(s) initiated by an operator(s) which places the weapon in a prearmed state. 3.49 SAFE/ARIQ (S/A) DEVICE. A device which provides electrical interruption of the firing circuits and
46、mechanical interruption between the initiator and the subsequent explosive or pyro- technic train. 3.50 SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR YIELD. The energy released through nuclear fission . or fusion equivalent to or greater than the energy release by detonation of 4 pounds of TNT. - 3.51 SOFTWARE. Information u
47、sed to control or program, and which is processed or produced by automatic machines. it nay be stored or transferred on a variety of informational storage media, Software, as used in the context of this instruction, includes firmware. 3.52 STOCKPILE-TO-TARGET SEQUENCE. a. The order of events involve
48、d in removing a nuclear weapon from storage, and assembling, testing, transporting, and delivering it on the target. b. A document which defines the logistical and employment concepts and related physical environments involved in the delivery of a nuclear weapon from the stockpile to the target. 3.53 STRAY VOLTAGE, An extraneous voltage on a deenergized circuit. e 3.54 STRUCTURED DESIGN. A software hierarchial design tech- nique with specified rules governing the hierarchy in terms of design order of modules, independence of modules, and specifi- cation of data a
