REG NASA-LLIS-1033-2001 Lessons Learned Controlling Risk on Cost-Capped Schedule-Driven Technology Validation Projects (1998).pdf

1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1033Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1033a71 Lesson Date: 2001-01-01a71 Submitting Organization: JPLa71 Submitted by: David H. LehmanSubject: Controlling Risk on Cost-Capped, Schedule-Driven, Technology Validation Projects (1998) Abstract: Deep Space 1 (DS1) was a cost-capped, s

2、chedule-driven, technology validation project, designed to flight validate 12 advanced technologies that represented major breakthroughs over state-of-the-art systems. DS1 exceeded its mission success criteria, both in terms of technology demonstration and mission duration.The lesson lists 7 recomme

3、ndations/success criteria for high risk, cost capped missions.Description of Driving Event: Deep Space 1 (DS1) was a cost-capped, schedule-driven, technology validation project, designed to flight validate 12 advanced technologies that represented major breakthroughs over state-of-the-art systems. A

4、n aerospace industry partner was originally selected to provide much of the spacecraft hardware and integration, but ultimately required significant JPL expertise and assistance. JPL was originally responsible for project management and several other elements, but assumed significant additional resp

5、onsibilities. NASA Lewis (now Glenn) Research Center, through the NSTAR program provided the highest priority technology, the ion propulsion system.DS1 exceeded its mission success criteria, both in terms of technology demonstration and mission duration. In addition, it provided the first close-up s

6、pectacular views of a cometary nucleus as part of a very successful extended mission.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-refer to D descriptionDFrom the very beginning, the project accepted very high risk in developing and flying the miss

7、ion. The accepted risk was compounded by what turned out to be insufficient schedule and funding, leading to insufficient review and oversight of several crucial processes:a71 A lack of an early and complete review of the project to (1) assess adequacy of plans, schedule, cost, resource margins, and

8、 (2) gain a full understanding of the projects risk posture.a71 Cost and schedule reserves that were inadequate given the many advanced technologies to be demonstrated during the mission.a71 Level 1 requirements and mission success criteria that remained unresolved until very late in development.a71

9、 Accepting a formulation phase that was too short for the team to develop a good plan for implementation.a71 A funding profile that lagged the fast-paced schedule, and caused serious inefficiencies during project start-up. This delayed early and full integration of the industrial partner into the pr

10、oject team.a71 Launch vehicle selection that took too long. External influences caused too many different vehicles to be considered.a71 Some technologies were selected for demonstration that proved too ambitious.a71 A cost cap that was imposed early, before the selection of the payload, launch servi

11、ce, and mission plan was finalized.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-a71 The project manager was not fully empowered.References:1. “Deep Space 1 Lessons Learned,“ JPL internal presentation, David H. Lehman, December 1, 2000.2. “Plan Tim

12、ely Implementation of Backups In Case Breakthrough Technologies Fail to Meet Readiness Gates“Additional Key Words: Autonomous Navigation, Flight Qualification, Management and Planning, Technology Plan, Technology Readiness LevelLesson(s) Learned: 1. The Formulation process (Phase A/B) for a typical

13、spacecraft project should be at least one year; it might be shorter for smaller projects as determined on a case-by-case basis. It must culminate in a review to ensure that the mission concept is sound, the requirements are well defined and acceptable, and sufficient resources are available to compl

14、ete the project.2. Very early in the Formulation phase, define: (1) the funding profile, (2) the date the launch vehicle is needed, (3) the Level 1 requirements and success criteria, (4) the reserves strategy and (5) the partnering approach. Do not proceed with further commitments until an agreement

15、 has been reached with NASA.3. Also very early in the Formulation phase, define the use of new technology and its readiness, and backups for risk mitigation.4. Create a project team environment that forces problems to be addressed immediately as they are identified. The extensive JPL technical resou

16、rces should be utilized to assist in early problem resolution.5. Challenge every “new“ or “creeping“ requirement.6. Rigorous technical evaluations of potential industrial partners must be completed. Provide adequate early funding for the chosen partner.7. Co-location of all project team members is a

17、 desired arrangement, but must be implemented very early in the project life cycle to achieve maximum effectiveness.Recommendation(s): See Lesson(s) Learned.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: Implementation of NPG 7120.5 effectively addresses all of the high level issues. JPL Corrective A

18、ction Notices have already addressed others.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Documents Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Sciencea71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 External Relat

19、ionsa71 Payloadsa71 Policy & Planninga71 Procurement Small Business & Industrial Relationsa71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission AssuranceAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2001-12-05a71 Approval Name: Carol L. Dumaina71 Approval Organization: JPLa71 Approval Phone Number: 818-354-8242Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-