ASME NUCLEAR-2012 Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct《新型核安全结构的锻造》.pdf

1、Forging a New NuclearSafety ConstructThe ASME Presidennullal Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Plant EventsJune 2012Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct Prepared by: The ASME Presidential Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Plant Events Date of Issuance: June 14, 2012 This Te

2、chnical Report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by ASME. Neither ASME, the authors, nor others involved in the preparation or review of this Report, nor any of their respective employees, members or persons acting on their behalf (i) makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any

3、 legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or (ii) represents that its use would not infringe upon privately owned rights. ASME does not “approve,” “rate,” or “endorse” any item, construction, proprieta

4、ry device or activity. Reference in the Report to any particular commercial product, process or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by ASME or others involved in the preparation or review of

5、this Report. The views and opinions expressed in the Report do not necessarily reflect those of ASME or others involved in the preparation or review of this Report. ASME does not take any position with respect to the validity of any patents or other proprietary rights asserted in connection with any

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8、hout the prior written permission of the publisher. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Three Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5990 ISBN No. 978-0-7918-3435-0 Copyright 2012 by THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS All Rights ReservedForging a New Nuclear Safety Construct iii TABLE OF

9、 CONTENTS Foreword vii ASME Presidential Task Force Members . ix Executive Summary . x 1 BACKGROUND, SCOPE, AND NEW DIRECTION 1 1.1 Introduction . 1 1.2 ASME Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Events . 2 1.3 The Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Accident . 2 1.4 The Accidents Outcome . 3 1.5 Key

10、 Issues and Scope of Work 4 1.6 A New Nuclear Safety Construct 5 2 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY . 8 2.1 Introduction . 8 2.2 Life Cycle of Complex Technologies 8 2.2.1 A Textbook Example: Boiler and Pressure Vessel Technology 910 8 2.2.2 Other Non-Nuclear Examples 10 2.3 A Half-Centur

11、y of Nuclear Experience . 11 2.4 Nuclear Plant Safety 12 2.5 Acting on Nuclear Lessons Learned 16 2.6 Summary Comments . 17 3 GOING BEYOND THE DESIGN BASIS 18 3.1 Introduction . 18 3.2 How Designs Have Been Established Up to Now . 19 3.2.1 The Design Basis 19 3.2.2 Defense-In-Depth . 23 3.2.3 Determ

12、inistic Approach to Achieve Defense-In-Depth . 24 3.2.4 Probabilistic Approach to Achieve Defense-In-Depth . 25 3.3 How Designs Might Change to Reflect Lessons Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi The Emergent Safety Construct 28 3.4 Designing New Nuclear Power Plants 30 3.5 Summary Comments . 30 4 ACCID

13、ENT PREVENTION AND CORE COOLING: THE PRINCIPAL SAFETY STRATEGY AND THE OVERRIDING SAFETY FUNCTION . 32 4.1 Introduction . 32 4.2 Growing Recognition of Core Cooling as the Overriding Safety Function 32 4.3 Insights on Core Cooling from the 1975 Reactor Safety Study 36 4.4 Insights on Core Cooling fr

14、om the TMI-2 Accident . 36 4.5 Insights on Core Cooling from the Events of September 11, 2001 . 37 4.6 Insights on Core Cooling from the Fukushima Accident 37 4.7 Protection from Rare Yet Credible Events 38 Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct iv 4.8 Summary Comments 38 5 MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED H

15、UMAN PERFORMANCE 40 5.1 Introduction 40 5.1.1 Traditional Approaches to Human Performance 40 5.1.2 Responsibility, Accountability and Authority for Decision-Making in a Crisis . 41 5.1.3 Organizational Human Performance . 41 5.1.4 Organizational Failures . 42 5.2 Human Performance in Nuclear Power P

16、lant Accidents . 43 5.3 Human Performance Lessons from Fukushima . 44 5.4 Summary Comments 46 6 MANAGING ALL RISKS . 47 6.1 Introduction 47 6.2 Defining Accident Management 47 6.3 History of Accident Management 48 6.4 Accident Management at Fukushima . 49 6.4.1 Multi-Faceted Disaster 49 6.4.2 Accide

17、nt Measures Against a Severe Tsunami . 50 6.4.3 Plant Conditions 50 6.5 Lessons in Accident Management from Fukushima 50 6.6 Post-Fukushima Global Response . 51 6.7 Beyond the Present Response 52 6.8 Summary Comments 53 7 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 54 7.1 Introduction 54 7.2 EP-Related Lessons from Fuku

18、shima Dai-ichi 54 7.3 EP-Related Lessons in the New Safety Construct . 56 7.3.1 Infrastructure Improvements . 56 7.3.2 More Realistic Drills and Training . 57 7.3.3 Criterion for Long-Term Habitability (Reentry) . 58 7.3.4 Building Public Trust 59 7.3.5 Updated Basis for EPZ Size 59 7.4 Risk-Informe

19、d, Performance-Based Approach to EP 62 7.5 Summary Comments 62 8 REINFORCING THE NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT 64 8.1 Introduction 64 8.2 Community Outreach Conducted During the Normal Course of Events . 64 8.3 Crisis Communications: What is Happening and Why . 65 8.3.1 EP Command and Control, and Decisi

20、on-Making Authority . 66 8.4 Earning Public Trust 67 8.5 Summary Comments 69 9 FORGING A NEW NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT 71 9.1 Introduction 71 9.2 The Evolving Nuclear Safety Construct 72 Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct v 9.3 The Lesson Learned 73 9.4 A New Nuclear Safety Construct 74 9.5 Princ

21、iples of the New Nuclear Safety Construct . 74 9.6 Additional Conclusions on the New Safety Construct 75 9.6.1 Design Basis Extension 75 9.6.2 Risk-Informed Defense-In-Depth Construct 76 9.6.3 Human Performance Management . 76 9.6.4 Accident Management 76 9.6.5 Emergency Preparedness Management 76 9

22、.6.6 Communications and Public Trust Issues. 76 9.7 Recommendations for Next Steps in Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct . 77 9.7.1 Workshop(s) on Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct 77 9.7.2 Updating and Expanding Nuclear Codes and Standards 78 9.7.3 Dissemination of Conclusions and Guidance

23、 . 79 9.8 Summary Conclusions . 79 References 80 Appendix A The Social Impact of Nuclear Power 86 A.1 Introduction . 86 A.2 Economic and Socio-Political Impact of Major Reactor Accidents 86 A.2.1 Impact of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident 86 A.2.2 Impact of the Chernobyl Accident . 87 A.2.3 Impact of

24、 the Three Mile Island 2 Accident . 88 A.3 The Present and Future Value of Nuclear Power in the U.S. 89 A.4 The Reliability of Nuclear Power 90 A.5 Price Stability and Energy Security . 91 A.6 Greenhouse Gas Emissions . 92 A.7 Relative Health Risks of Electrical Generation Sources . 92 Acknowledgeme

25、nts 94 Abbreviations and Acronyms . 95 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Pivotal Events in World Nuclear Experience . 13 Table 2 Comparison of Deterministic and PRA Approaches to Safety Assessment . 26 Table 3 Improvements Suggested by Events at Fukushima The Emergent Safety Construct 29 Table 4 List of Import

26、ant Fukushima EP-Related Lessons . 55 Table 5 Dose Exceedance Results for Plant with Recent Source Terms vs. NUREG-0396 . 60 Table A-1 Average Capacity Factor in the U.S. by Energy Source (1998 2009) . 91 Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Forging a New Nuclear Safety

27、 Construct 7 Figure 2 Boiler Explosion Trends in the U.S. 9 Figure 3 Commercial Aircraft Accident Rates by Year . 10 Figure 4 Safety Significant Events Per Plant and Fleet Capacity Factors . 12 Figure 5 Organizational Levels/Barriers of Defense-In-Depth 41 Figure 6 Physical Barriers of Defense-In-De

28、pth 42 Figure 7 Phases of Accident Management . 47 Figure 8 Public Opinion on Nuclear Power Before and After the Fukushima Accident . 68 Figure A-1 Nuclear Generation from Existing U.S. Nuclear Plants 90 Figure A-2 U.S. Electricity Production Costs by Fuel Type 91 Figure A-3 Power Generation by Fuel

29、 Type (1990 to 2040) . 92 Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct vii FOREWORD On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake unleashed seismic shocks and tsunami waves of unprecedented magnitudes from the Pacific Ocean, inflicting devastating damage to the nation of Japan. Key infrastructure was

30、 destroyed along nearly 650 kilometers or 400 miles of coastline, with major impacts to several nuclear power plants, thermal power plants, dams, oil refineries, the electric power grid, trains, highways, airports, shipyards, manufacturing facilities, and to entire townships. More than 125,000 build

31、ing structures were ruined and over 300,000 people were left homeless. Most unfortunately, as of March 12, 2012, there have been 15,854 confirmed deaths, 26,992 injured, and 3,155 people missing across twenty Prefectures from the widespread devastation inflicted by the earthquakes and the multiple t

32、sunamis. We have been and continue to be deeply saddened by the great losses and continued suffering of the Japanese people. More than 650 Japanese engineers participate as members of ASME, and more than 50 Japanese engineers are actively engaged in the development of ASME Standards and Certificatio

33、n programs. Therefore, we have been in direct contact with our colleagues in the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME) since the day of the event, offering our help and support. While a team of ASME leaders has been engaged with JSME colleagues in working on the potential impact of the Japan

34、events on nuclear codes and standards since spring 2011, a greater need exists to identify broader lessons learned, particularly from the impact of the earthquake and tsunami on the status and future of all Japan nuclear power plants, as well as its potential impact on worldwide energy portfolios an

35、d nuclear power deployment. It was exactly 100 years ago that members of the newly formed ASME Boiler Code Committee began to meet in New York to address major public outcry for someone to eradicate deadly boiler explosions that were occurring frequently in factories, schools, churches and other loc

36、ations, with serious consequential human loss, suffering, and economic impact. George Westinghouse had just finished serving as President of ASME in 1910-1911, and the ASME had gained significant respect and stature from its first 30 years of work, particularly with Thomas Edison, Henry Ford, and ot

37、her industrialists actively engaged as ASME members. The ASME Boiler Code Committee worked hard at reaching a consensus from engineers and other jurisdictions in the United States (U.S.), prior to issuing the first ASME Boiler Code in December 1914. This document provided comprehensive requirements

38、for boiler design, construction, and operation. Shortly after its publication, the ASME Boiler Code was used by several states and local jurisdictions. As a result, the number of boiler explosions plummeted, and this effort was recognized as one of the top 10 engineering achievements of the 20th cen

39、tury. Undoubtedly, the Boiler Code was a successful beginning to an era of technological achievements that require standards and codes for their useful implementation by society. Today, once again, we find ourselves facing major events and accidentsbut under different circumstances. The recent event

40、s in Japan come on the heels of other recent catastrophes, including the Deepwater Horizon accident, the San Bruno (California) gas pipeline explosion, mining accidents, and a major dam failure in Russia. With more than seven billion people now inhabiting the globe with increasing needs for energy t

41、o sustain or improve their quality of life, we find technological advances pushing limits on many frontswe are digging and drilling deeper, facilities are operating at higher temperatures and pressures and for longer periods of service, and technology has become vastly more complex and highly interc

42、onnected. In fact, ASME recently published a report titled, “Initiative to Address Complex System Failure: Prevention and Mitigation of Consequences,” June 2011, initiated after the Deepwater Horizon accident. Forging a New Nuclear Safety Constructviii The events at the Japan Fukushima Dai-ichi reac

43、tors were occurring as the ASME Complex System Failure work was nearing completion. To this end, I appointed an ASME Presidential Task Force to review events that occurred and subsequent activities undertaken in Japan and the U.S., develop and disseminate its perspective on the impact of these event

44、s on the future direction of the nuclear power industry, and make recommendations on ASMEs role in addressing issues and lessons learned from these events. I was pleased that Dr. Nils Diaz, Past Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Dr. Regis Matzie, former Senior Vice President an

45、d Chief Technology Officer at Westinghouse Electric Company, agreed to serve as Chair and Vice Chair, respectively, of the ASME Presidential Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Plant Events. This report represents the collective opinion of the group of experts brought together to form the

46、Task Force and evaluate this challenging topic. On behalf of ASME, I want to thank the members of the Task Force for their service and dedication to this vital study. The Task Force review and recommendations provided in this report will hopefully launch activities within ASME, and working with othe

47、r professional engineering societies, industry organizations, and government agencies worldwide, recommend global actions to prevent and mitigate the consequences of severe nuclear accidents, in a manner similar to ASME efforts a century ago. Victoria A. Rockwell ASME President 2011-2012 Established

48、 in 1880, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) is a professional not-for-profit organization with more than 127,000 members promoting the art, science, and practice of mechanical and multidisciplinary engineering and allied sciences. ASME develops codes and standards that enhance publ

49、ic safety, and provides lifelong learning and technical exchange opportunities benefiting the engineering and technology community. Visit www.asme.org for more information. Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct ix ASME PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE MEMBERS Chairman Nils J. Diaz Vice Chairman Regis A. Matzie Kenneth R. Balkey John D. Bendo John C. Devine Jr. Romney B. Duffey Robert W. Evans Thomas R. Hafera James A. Lake David E. W. Leaver Robert Lutz, Jr. Roger J. Mattson Richard R. Schultz J. Robert Sims Douglas E. True John M. Tuohy Jr. F