REG NASA-LLIS-1087--2001 Lessons Learned - Plan Timely Implementation of Backups In Case Breakthrough Technologies Fail to Meet Readiness Gates - 1998.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1087Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1087a71 Lesson Date: 2001-12-06a71 Submitting Organization: JPLa71 Submitted by: D. LehmanSubject: Plan Timely Implementation of Backups In Case Breakthrough Technologies Fail to Meet Readiness Gates - 1998 Abstract: Although the Deep Space 1

2、 mission exceeded its overall technology demonstration objectives, certain important technologies under development never achieved flight readiness.Develop a project implementation plan with preplanned alternatives that addresses technology readiness and risk mitigation. Cease development when techn

3、ology readiness gates for critical technologies are not met and implement preplanned alternatives. Avoid a spacecraft architecture where one new technology relies on another in order to demonstrate them in-flight.Description of Driving Event: The Deep Space 1 (DS1) mission included breakthrough tech

4、nologies that were critical to mission success and had not been proven in space flight. Although DS1 exceeded its overall technology demonstration objectives, certain important technologies under development never achieved flight readiness. Specifically, the Three Dimensional Stack (3DS) flight comp

5、uter was deferred to a subsequent mission, and the Remote Agent Flight Software was downgraded to an in-flight experiment.A set of technology readiness “gates“ had been established for evaluating the flight readiness of the breakthrough technologies. However, these gates were poorly defined, and the

6、 Integrated Product Development Teams and the Program Office did not fully commit to them. Further, the development schedules for these advanced technologies were too short. Plans were in place for backups for some of these technologies (but not all) should their development prove unsuccessful.Certa

7、in technologies were coupled such that problems with one could hinder the successful Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-development of another. In-flight demonstration of the autonomous onboard optical navigation system (AutoNav) was req

8、uired for mission success, yet its use depended on the performance of the Miniature Integrated Camera/Spectrometer (MICAS). Both AutoNav and MICAS involved new technologies: there was no backup for MICAS in the event its development proved unsuccessful. MICAS performance problems during both develop

9、ment and flight significantly compromised the in-flight demonstration of AutoNav, forcing major software modifications.References:“Deep Space 1 Lessons Learned,“ JPL internal presentation, David H. Lehman, December 1, 2000.“Controlling Risk on Cost-Capped, Schedule-Driven, Technology Validation Proj

10、ects“, NASA Lessons Learned “Reference Lesson #1033“Additional Key Words: Autonomous Navigation, Flight Qualification, Management and Planning, Technology Plan, Technology Readiness LevelLesson(s) Learned: 1. During formulation of technology demonstration missions, develop a project implementation p

11、lan with preplanned alternatives that addresses technology readiness and risk mitigation.2. Devise meaningful technology readiness gates and criteria to assess development progress. When gates are not met for critical technologies/subsystems, the project should cease development and implement prepla

12、nned alternatives.3. Avoid a spacecraft architecture where one new technology relies on another in order to demonstrate them in-flight.Recommendation(s): See Lessons LearnedEvidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: A JPL Corrective Action Notice may be assigned and practices modified as appropri

13、ate.Documents Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Sciencea71 Space Operationsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Flight Equipmenta71 Hardwarea71 Po

14、licy & Planninga71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 Spacecrafta71 Test & VerificationAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2002-02-12a71 Approval Name: Carol Dumaina71 Approval Organization: JPLa71 Approval Phone Number: 818-354-8242Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-

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