1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1492Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1492a71 Lesson Date: 2004-04-27a71 Submitting Organization: LARCa71 Submitted by: Richard J. GilbrechSubject: Standards, Specifications and Processes for Projects with Outside Partners Abstract: In November of 2003, the NASA Engineering and S
2、afety Center (NESC) performed an Independent Technical Assessment of the Code Y CALIPSO satellite Proteus propulsion bus (ref. NESC Final Report NESC-RP-001, NASA Technical Memorandum number applied for). This is a joint mission with NASA GSFC, LaRC and the Centre National dEtudes Spatiales (CNES) s
3、cheduled to launch from Vandenberg Air Force base in April 2005 on a Delta II rocket. There was a high level of confusion among the partners as to what standards, specifications and processes were to be applied (i.e., NASA, French, or DOD).Description of Driving Event: The CALIPSO program involved N
4、ASA GSFC, LaRC, KSC Launch Services, CNES, and the Vandenberg Air Force Base Range Office. CNES contributed the Proteus hydrazine-fueled propulsion bus as part of their in-kind contribution. This bus was designed and built by Alcatel Space Industries under subcontract to CNES. The Memorandum of Unde
5、rstanding (MOU) between NASA and CNES placed the responsibility for design of the propulsion bus with CNES yet did not explicitly state which safety requirements applied. Several personnel hazards associated with the Proteus bus formed the basis of the NESC assessment (leakage of hydrazine from thre
6、aded A/N fittings, inadvertent thruster firings and leakage of hydrazine through the thrusters). It was accepted by all that the Air Force Eastern and Western Range (EWR) requirements applied (ref. CALIPSO-Tailored Eastern and Western Range 127-1 Safety Regulations, Doc. TP2.LB.0.AQ.1836 ASC dated O
7、ctober 21-22, 2002), but there was confusion over whether NASA Procedural Requirement NPR-8715.3, “NASA Safety Manual”; applied as well.Lesson(s) Learned: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-At the beginning of a project involving outside
8、 partners, NASA must clearly define and document its expectations, including the standards, specifications, and processes that should be followed by all parties. The level of NASA insight and influence on non-NASA hardware design, verification and acceptance testing should be documented, clearly com
9、municated, and carried as a project risk to be tracked.Recommendation(s): For NASA missions involving outside partners, the roles of the various in-line and independent engineering and safety organizations should be clearly defined. The expectations of each organization as well as the applicable sta
10、ndards, specifications and processes should be documented as project requirements explicitly in the appropriate document (e.g., Program/Project Plan, Program Commitment Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding). Projects should then act to meet these requirements or, when warranted, process waivers wi
11、th rigorous, documented, technical rationale. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: NPR 8715.3Mission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Sciencea71 Space Operationsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Flight Equipmenta71 Ground Operati
12、onsa71 NASA Standardsa71 Program and Project Managementa71 Range Operationsa71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 SpacecraftProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Additional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2004-05-16a71 Approval Name: Leslie Johnsona71 Approval Organization: LARCa71 Approval Phone Number: 757-864-9409Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-
