1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1849Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1849a71 Lesson Date: 2008-04-1a71 Submitting Organization: JPLa71 Submitted by: David Oberhettingera71 POC Name: Ronald Welcha71 POC Email: Ronald.T.Welchjpl.nasa.gova71 POC Phone: 818-354-7096Subject: Exercise Strict Controls in the Packagin
2、g and Oversight of Critical Hardware Shipped by Third-Party Courier Services Abstract: When Mars Phoenix spaceflight hardware was transported from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory using a third-party (independent) courier service, it was discovered at the destination that the shock sensors mounted to t
3、he hardware were all tripped. The design of packaging for shipment should be reviewed and pre-approved, a packaging inspection report prepared at the source and destination site, and a project Critical Hardware Handling Plan address how critical items are to be shipped.Description of Driving Event:
4、Following EMC testing at the NASA/Caltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), spaceflight hardware was transported from JPL in Pasadena, California, to the Canadian Space Agency in Toronto, Canada, using a JPL-designated, third-party (independent) courier service. The hardware was an engineering qualif
5、ication model (flight spare) of the Mast for the Meteorological Experiment (MET), an instrument aboard the Mars Phoenix spacecraft launched in August 2007. The MET Mast is a tubular structure mounting science instruments/sensors that positions them above the Phoenix spacecraft after landing on Mars.
6、 Upon arrival of the package at its destination, the recipient discovered that all shock sensor pairs (20G, 30G, and 50G) mounted to the hardware were tripped, indicating that the hardware was subjected during shipment to shock loadings equivalent to at least 50G. In addition, at least one shock sen
7、sor cap was displaced and the shock sensor broken loose from its mounting (Figure 1), allowing the steel balls and springs to roll around inside the carrying case. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Figure 1 is a color photo of an alumin
8、um support fixture set within a rectangular aluminum shipping case, which appears somewhat similar to an item of aluminum luggage with the lid fully open. The support fixture, a flat metal plate set horizontally in the shipping case with a welded aluminum flange welded so it rises orthogonal to the
9、plate, is set in a bed of shiny metallic packing material. Attached to the flange is the end of the tubular MET Mast, which is mounted parallel to the plate, suggesting that the other end of the Mast may be supported by another flange that is not visible in the photo. Three other items set on the su
10、pport fixture plate are visible in the photo. One is a clear plastic container similar to a small drinking water glass with a lid that is mounted to the surface of the plate and labeled as a shock sensor. The second is an identical shock sensor, except this one is tipped over partially or fully deta
11、ched from the support fixture plate with an upper edge resting against the vertical flange and no lid is visible. The third item is a metal spring lying on the flat plate near the dismounted shock sensor.Figure 1. MET Mast photographed in the shipping container following delivery. The shipped item w
12、as a bare mast without mounted science sensors.Reference (1) concluded that the shipping company did not handle the package to prevent excessive shock. The item was mounted to a rigid handling fixture (to which the shock sensors were mounted), which was enclosed in foam within an aluminum shipping c
13、ontainer (similar to a golf club hard case), packed within a cardboard box that was badly damaged in transit. It was not skid-mounted for protection during transport and handling, and the tripping and detachment of the shock sensors strongly suggests that the package was not fastened in place during
14、 transport. Other JPL projects have experienced problems with unescorted transportation of flight hardware. Following this Phoenix incident, JPL flight projects instituted a practice of preparing a Critical Hardware Handling Plan (CHHP). This planning was initiated on the Phoenix project but was fir
15、st formalized on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) project (Reference (2). Reference (2) is applicable to the movement and storage of MSL Critical Items (MSLCI) at JPL, and to or from JPL and its suppliers during all phases of development, including pre-launch activities at Kennedy Space Center. The
16、 document provides very specific guidelines that apply when MSLCI is to be shipped by independent carrier services instead of being hand-carried to the destination. Reference (2) calls out the requirements of relevant JPL standards, specifications, and procedures governing critical item shipping, in
17、cluding References (3), (4), and (5). Also, the JPL Transportation Survey Form (Reference (2), Appendix A) was updated following this incident: it must be completed to assure that items of concern are addressed before MSLCI is shipped. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permi
18、tted without license from IHS-,-,-References: 1. “Shock Sensors Tripped During Transportation (50g),“ Problem/Failure Report No. 3584, NASA/Caltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory, January 10, 2006. 2. “Mars Science Laboratory Critical Hardware Handling Plan,“ JPL Document No. D-34659, August 10, 2006. 3.
19、 JPL Standard for Systems Safety (D-560), Rev D, JPL Document No. DocID 34880, Paragraph 4.2 “Transportation and Handling“, September 17, 2007. 4. JPL Engineering Specification 501492, “Safety Requirements for Mechanical Support Equipment for JPL Critical Items Equipment, Rev G,“ JPL Document No. Do
20、cID 35412, Section 12.0: Shipping Containers, July 27, 2000. 5. JPL Quality Assurance Procedure QAP 61.10, “Handling, Movement, Storage, and Shipment of JPL Critical Hardware,“ JPL Document No. DocID 38112, October 4, 2007.Lesson(s) Learned: The use of third party (independent) courier services for
21、the shipment of critical hardware should be discouraged or at least considered a risk that should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. (Government bill-of-lading (GBL) regulations presently prohibit hand carrying of international shipments.) Because of the unknown extent to which critical items are
22、 controlled between the point of departure and destination, it is imperative that strict procedures and controls be utilized in the packaging and oversight of the shipment if a courier service is to be used.Recommendation(s): The preferred shipping method is to transport all flight hardware, either
23、international or domestic, by the hand carry method where feasible. This minimizes the risk of third-party handling and maximizes the safety of the flight hardware in transit. It is further recommended that when third-party handling is unavoidable, special precautionary methods be implemented as fol
24、lows: 1. Packaging design should be reviewed and pre-approved by the cognizant engineer with concurrence by the project safety engineer and the Quality Assurance Engineer. Packaging material and marking should meet the requirements of Reference (3).2. A packaging inspection report should be generate
25、d by the quality assurance engineer at the source and destination port to assure that the critical item was packaged and safely received.3. Each project should develop a CHHP which addresses how flight and other critical item hardware is to be transported from and to JPL and pulls together all the c
26、urrent documented JPL requirements affecting packaging and shipment. The CHHP should also address when an independent courier service can or cannot be used.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness:
27、JPL has referenced this lesson learned as additional rationale and guidance supporting Paragraph 6.12.5.1 (“Engineering Practices: Protection and Security of Flight Hardware“) in the Jet Propulsion Laboratory standard “Flight Project Practices, Rev. 6,“ JPL DocID 58032, March 6, 2006.Documents Relat
28、ed to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 ScienceAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Program Management.a71 Program Management.Business processesa71 Program Management.Risk managementa71 Safety and Mission Assurance.a71 Safety and Mission Assurance.Advanced planning of safety systemsa71 Safety and Miss
29、ion Assurance.Early requirements and standards definitiona71 Safety and Mission Assurance.Product Assurancea71 Safety and Mission Assurance.Qualitya71 Additional Categories.a71 Additional Categories.Flight Equipmenta71 Additional Categories.Hardwarea71 Additional Categories.Logisticsa71 Additional C
30、ategories.Packaging, Handling, Storagea71 Additional Categories.Payloadsa71 Additional Categories.Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Additional Categories.TransportationAdditional Info: a71 Project: Mars PhoenixProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2008-05-27a71 Approval Name: mbella71 Approval Organization: HQProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-
