1、UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) SECURITY ENGINEERING ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-02
2、1-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS Any copyrighted material included in this UFC is identified at its point of use. Use of the copyrighted material apart from this UFC must have the permission of the copyright holder. U.S.
3、 ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND (Preparing Activity) AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT AGENCY Record of Changes (changes are indicated by 1 /1/) Change No. Date Location 1 23 Oct 06 Title adjusted Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted witho
4、ut license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 FOREWORD The Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) system is prescribed by MIL-STD 3007 and provides planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization criteria, and applies to the Military Depart
5、ments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities in accordance with USD(AT architectural issues of construction materials, barriers, doors, windows, and door hardware; structural issues of blast resistant protection; mechanical issues of HVAC protection, electrical engineering issues of pow
6、er redundancy and lighting systems, ESS, and operational considerations such as policy, procedures, and response times . In summary, the ESS is one component of a bigger physical protection scheme. This chapter describes the ESS in general as a lead-in to subsequent detailed chapters on each of the
7、ESS subsystems. Service Exception, Marine Corps: Aboard Marine Corps Installations, Mass Notification Systems (MNS) are considered a component of the ESS. Design of Mass Notification Systems is not within the scope of this UFC, refer to UFC 4-020-01 for Mass Notification System design guidance. 2-2
8、DETECT, DELAY, AND RESPOND 2-2.1 For effective intrusion intervention, the ESS should operate on the Detect, Delay, and Respond principle that ensures the time between detection of an intrusion and response by security forces is less than the time it takes for damage or compromise of assets to occur
9、. Refer to Figure 2-2. (Note: Some documents consider the additional specific steps of Annunciate, Classify, and Assess as part of the intrusion intervention process. These additional steps are part of the process, but for this document are intrinsically included as part of the Detect step.) 2-2.2 T
10、able 2-1 provides an example of the times related to each detect and delay option in Figure 2-2. The cumulative delay times shown in this example, illustrated by a timeline in Figure 2-3 are estimated at slightly over eight and a half minutes. Assuming a security forces response time of eleven minut
11、es, the sequence of events shown in Table 2-1 allows sufficient time for an adversary to compromise and/or damage the targeted asset. Depending on the nature of the asset, there are some dictated response times. Security and planning personnel should refer to DoD, agency, and service directives to i
12、dentify response requirements. 2-2.3 Conversely, assuming a security forces response time of five minutes, the sequence of events shown in Table 2-1 allows sufficient time to intervene on the Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-
13、02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 13intrusion efforts. In designing an ESS, the designer should work with the facility/base security officer to identify the response forces and reaction times. 2-2.4 The above example is provided to illustrate the general principles of Detect, Delay, a
14、nd Respond. Table 2-2 provides additional samples of Detect, Delay, and Respond factors. For additional information on delay times, refer to the book The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems. Figure 2-1. ESS as a Part of a Physical Security System Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo repr
15、oduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 14Figure 2-2. Example Detect and Delay Options Table 2-1. Example Breach Events and Delay Time Delay Options Delay Time Detection Options 1 Climb fence 8-10 sec. Perimeter fence d
16、etection system 2 Cross open ground 10 feet/sec. Microwave sensors 3 Breach building door or window or wall 1-2 min. Door contacts or glass breakage sensor 4 Breach interior hardened door 2-4 min. Door contacts 5 Work time in breached space 3 min. Motion sensor TOTAL DELAY TIME 8 min 39 sec nominal
17、for this example Table 2-2. Sample Detect, Delay, and Respond Measures Detect Measures Delay Measures Respond Measures Intrusion detection devices Fences Response force alerted Alarm notification Walls Response force travel Visual displays Doors Neutralization Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reprodu
18、ction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 152-2.5 Figure 2-3 shows two cases of alerting a response force. In the first case, initial detection is not made until the interior wall of the critical asset has been breached. Wit
19、h initial detection at six minutes, response forces do not arrive on the scene until after some compromise of the critical asset has been achieved. In the second case, initial detection is made at the fence line and allows response forces to arrive and intervene before asset compromise. Figure 2-3.
20、Timeline Showing Two Cases of Breach and Detection Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 16In the above timeline, there will be a difference in time required to provide protection d
21、epending on whether or the desired protection is to prevent compromise or prevent destruction. If the goal is to prevent compromise of the asset, the response force must arrive in time to prevent the threat from reaching the asset. The above timelines needs to be created according to the protection
22、required and may be shorter or longer depending on differences between compromise and destruction of protected assets. 2-3 ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS 2-3.1 Establish the requirement for ESS early in the planning process.Establishing the requirement necessitates an interdisciplinary planning team to ensu
23、re all interests related to a project are considered appropriately and how security fits into the total project design. The specific membership of the planning team will be based on local considerations, but in general, the following functions should be represented: facility user, antiterrorism offi
24、cer, operations officer, security, logistics, engineering, life safety, and others as required. The interdisciplinary planning team will use the process in UFC 4-020-01 to identify the design criteria, which includes the assets to be protected, the threats to those assets (the Design Basis Threat),
25、and the levels of protection to be provided for the assets against the identified threats. In addition to the above listed criteria elements, the planning team may also identify user constraints such as appearance, operational considerations, manpower requirements or limitations, and sustaining cost
26、s. That design criteria will be the basis for establishing the requirements of the ESS and other elements of the overall security solution. 2-3.3 For existing facilities, the design criteria is used to perform a vulnerability assessment, the results of which are used to establish the requirements fo
27、r the ESS. For new facilities, the design criteria is used to establish the requirements directly. The levels of protection will be the most important criteria element in establishing the ESS requirements. The process outlined in UFC 4-020-02 establishes the planning requirements. It also provides a
28、 risk management process that can be used to evaluate the resulting requirement. Figure 2-4 depicts the life cycle of an ESS. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 17Figure 2-4. Pro
29、ject Process Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 182-4 SYSTEM COMPLEXITY 2-4.1 General. ESS can range from simple to complex systems. While there may be some different views or de
30、finitions of what constitutes a simple or a complex system, this guide will use the criteria described in this section. The definitions used are an academic basis for presenting different system configurations and integration needs rather than standardized industry terminology, which does not exist
31、for defining system complexity. 2-4.2 Simple System. The simplest ESS consists of a single ESS subsystem. For example, a simple IDS at a low value asset is a simple system as shown in Figure 2-5. Other examples are an IDS with door contact, motion sensors, break-glass sensors and other digital input
32、 type sensors that do not require integration with another ESS subsystem. Another example of a simple system would be a basic CCTV system of two cameras going to a Digital Video Recorder (DVR). Figure 2-5 shows a block diagram of a simple system. Figure 2-5. A Simple ESS System 2.4.3 Intermediate Sy
33、stem. An intermediate system contains elements of at least two ESS subsystems requiring integration. One example would be an ESS system requiring both an ACS and an IDS. A basic block diagram for this type of system reporting to a common Dispatch Center is shown in Figure 2-6. Figure 2-6. Intermedia
34、te System with Separate ACS and IDS Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 192-4.3.1 Combining ACS and IDS. Virtually all ACS can accommodate digital input signals. Quite often it is
35、 possible to combine ACS and IDS when the IDS inputs are limited to simple digital input devices that do not require separate IDS controllers. Examples of these types of digital input IDS devices are door contacts, glass-break sensors, and motion sensors.2-4.4 Complex System. A complex system has a
36、separate ACS and IDS system as well as a CCTV system communicating to a Dispatch Center through a DTM as shown in Figure 2-7. Figure 2-7. Complex System With Separate ACS, IDS, and CCTV Subsystems In Figure 2-7, the curved line from the ACS/IDS to the CCTV system represents the interface that occurs
37、 between an alarm event (door contact alarm or fence detection alarm) to the action that causes the output from a CCTV to be displayed on an alarm indication screen and provide alarm annunciation in the Dispatch Center. The interface can vary from hardwired contacts to intelligent data communication
38、s. System interfaces and integration are described further in Chapter 8, “ESS Subsystem Integration.” 2-4.5 Networked System. Figures 2-5, 2-6, and 2-7 show discrete systems. An emerging trend in the security industry is an evolution towards networked systems as shown conceptually in Figure 2-8. Pro
39、vided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 20Figure 2-8. Networked System The networked security system operates on a single network with drivers to the different discrete components of the
40、 subsystems. While it is possible to procure networked systems, security suppliers are at different stages of development of providing networked systems for all ESS capabilities. At this writing, a lot of effort is being spent by individual vendors of ACS, CCTV, IDS and DTM to partner with other sub
41、system suppliers or write software drivers to achieve a networked ESS. Typically, networked security systems are typically a Proprietary Security Network. Refer to Chapter 8, “ESS Subsystem Integration” for more information. 2-5 MONITORING METHODS 2-5.1 General. Determine the alarm monitoring method
42、 early in the project planning process. There are several different monitoring methods. Monitoring configurations, as defined in DoD 0-2000.12-H, including local alarm, central station, connection, and proprietary station. It is vital that the ESS designer understand the need to identify the Dispatc
43、h Center and type of communications early in the project design. 2-5.2 Local Alarm. Local alarms actuate a visible and/or audible signal, usually located on the exterior of the facility. Refer to Figure 2-9. Alarm transmission lines do not leave the facility. Response is generated from security forc
44、es located in the immediate area. Without security forces in the area, response may only be generated upon report from a person(s) passing through the area or during security checks. Local alarms may offer some deterrence value. Local alarm systems do not initiate the Detect, Delay, Respond sequence
45、. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-021-02NF 27 September 2006 change 1, 23 October 2006 21Figure 2-9. Local Alarm Monitoring 2-5.3 Central Station. Devices and circuits are automatically signaled to, recorded, maintained, and sup
46、ervised from a central station owned and managed by a commercial firm with operators in attendance at all times. The Central Station personnel monitor the signals and provide the response force to any unauthorized entry into the protected area. Connection of alarm equipment to the central station is
47、 usually over leased telephone company lines for systems of significance. Dial-up modems maybe used for simpler systems. Refer to Figure 2-10. Figure 2-10. Central Station Monitoring 2-5.4 Police Connection. Police connection systems are transmitted to and annunciated at a local police agency dispat
48、ch center that records alarm annunciation. Connection to the police is primarily over leased telephone lines. Police personnel respond to alarms. A formal agreement with the police department is required to ensure monitoring and response requirements. Often police departments impose a penalty after some quota of false alarms, thus the sensitivity is often turned down to minimize nuisance alarms and may result in missed indications. Police responders may be attending to other emergencies and unavailable to respond when needed. Police connection configurations are typica
