1、 TECHNICAL REPORT IOSGO1 IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM A Wbte Paper Prepared for the 1995 International Oil Spill Conference American Petroleum 1 Institute Prepared by: Ann Hayward Walker, Donald L. Ducey, Jr., Scientific and Environmental Associates, 4605 H Pinecrest Office P
2、ark Drive Alexandria, Virginia 22312 John R. Harrald George Washington University School of Engineering and Applied Science Melvin Gehnan Library Washington, DC 20052 December 1994 and Stephen J. Lacey incorporated American Petroleum Institute 1220 L Street, Northwest Washington, DC 20005 Printed in
3、 the United States of America API Publication No. 4621A PREFACE he 1995 International Oil Spill Conference sponsors, American Petroleum Institute, US. Coast Guard, US. Environmental Protection Agency, International Maritime Organization, and T International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservat
4、ion Association, commissioned three white papers to address issues of special importance to the oil spill community. They assigned the respon- sibility for general management and oversight, scope definition, peer review, and publication of the white papers to the Program Committee. The goals of the
5、white papers are to educate the spill community, to stimulate open discussion of com- plex and controversial issues, and balance the diverse positions of stakeholders. Each topic addresses vary- ing scientific/technical and socio/political concerns. Therefore, each white paper differs as to depth of
6、 study and breadth of conclusions. The views and opinions presented are those of the authors solely and do not represent the views, opinions, or policies of the International Oil Spill Conference or its sponsors. During the 1995 Conference, each white paper will be the topic of a special panel sessi
7、on. Separate publication of the white papers initiates the International Oil Spill Conference Technical Report Series. The Technical Reports are to be published in conjunction with the International Oil Spill Conference on a bien- nial basis. It is the Program Committees hope that each white paper w
8、ill stimulate substantive discussion and serve as a catalyst for solutions. Robert G. Pond CDR, U.S. Coast Guard Chairman, Program Committee i995 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 3 1995 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE CORE PROGRAM COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP Chairman Robert Pond, Commander US. Coast G
9、uard John Cunningham U.S. Environmental Protection Agency John Lemlin international Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association Oleg Khalimonov International Maritime Organization Alexis Steen American Petroleum Institute WHITE PAPER TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES Rhae Giacoma, Lt. Commande
10、r US. Coast Guard Implementing an Effective Response Management System Technical Report IOSC-001 Lawrence Reitsema, Ph.D. Marathon Oil Company The Use and Misuse of Science in Natural Resource Damage Assessment Technical Report IOSC-O02 Michael Smith, Lt. Commander US. Coast Guard Perspectives on Es
11、tablishing and Maintaining Oil Pollution Response Capabilities Technical Report IOSC-003 1995 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 5 6 TECHNICAL REPORT IOSC-001 DISCLAIMER This publication is designed to provided accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. The views
12、 and opinions presented are those of the authors solely and do not represent the views, opinions, or policies of the Inter- national Oil Spill Conference or its sponsors. The i995 International Oil Spill Conference is not engaged in rendering legal, or other professional advice. if advice or assista
13、nce is required, the services of a professional should be sought. 1995 CONFERENCE SPONSORS: American Petroleum Institute, U.S. Coast Guard, US. Environmental Protection Agency, international Maritime Organization, and International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association ACKNOWLEDG
14、MENTS his report would not be possible without the constructive, timely and generous assistance of many of the international oil spill response professionals. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contri- T butions of everyone with whom we worked during this project. The following people are recog-
15、 nized for their special contributions of time and expertise in the preparation of this report: Capt. Michael J. Donohoe, USCG, Chief, Marine Environmental Protection Division, USCG Headquarters Stephen D. Jarvela, On-Scene Coordinator, US Environmental Protection Agency Region III Capt. Donald S. J
16、ensen, Commanding Officer National Strike Force Coordination Center Thomas G. McCloskey, President, The McCloskey Group, Inc. Joseph A. Nichols, International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, Ltd. James L. OBrien, President, OBrien Oil Pollution Services, Inc. 1995 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERE
17、NCE 7 ABSTRACT he challenge for oil spill response professionals is to develop a process during pre-spill planning that enables a responder to incorporate the positive aspects of both closed and open management T systems. By building a system that has the potential for operational efficiency offered
18、 by closed systems and the adaptability of open systems, the capability to successfully manage the full range oil spill response operations can be developed. Developing and implementing an effective Response Management System is difficult due to the technological, political, economic and socio-cultu
19、ral differences between organ- izations and nations. It can best be accomplished during the preparedness process by reaching detailed organizational agreements among members of the response community on how organizations will respond together, and then reinforcing and/or modifying those agreements a
20、t the outset of a response. This paper is intended to stimulate thoughtful discussion within the spill response community on how to better address these problems associated with managing response operations. 8 TECHNICAL REPORT IOSC-001 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVESUMMARY 13 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND APPRO
21、ACH 15 1.1 Project Objectives 15 1.2 Response Management Systems: Definition and Context . 15 1.3 Organization of this Report 16 1.4 UseofthisRepo rt . 16 1.5 Scope and Limitations 17 1.6 Approach . 17 Literature Search 17 Opinions of Response Specialists and Organizations . 18 2.0 BACKGROUND . 19 2
22、.1 Overview of the Oil Spill Response Problem . 19 2.2 Goals and Objectives of Oil Spill Response Operations 20 ResponseGoals 20 Event-specific Objectives 21 Effectiveness versus Efficiency 21 2.3 Practical Views on Response Management Systems . 22 2.4 Historical Perspective 23 Evolution of Oil Spil
23、l Response . 23 Evolution of Response Management Systems 23 Military (Command and Control) Model . 23 US Model for Oil Spill Response 24 The National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) Incident Command System (ICs) . 25 2.5 The Relationship of RMS and Spill Significance 28 RoutineSpill 3
24、0 Significant Spills 30 Catastrophic Spills . 30 2.6 Oil Spills as Disasters 31 2.7 The Phenomena of Emerging Organizations . 32 3.0 SYSTEMS VIEW OF RESPONSE MANAGEMENT . 35 3.1 A Systems View of Response Management 35 35 The Organization as a System of Inter-relationships . 36 3.2 The Influence of
25、Technology . 36 3.3 The Influence of the Socio-Economic Environment . 37 Political Factors . 37 The Organization as a Purposeful System i995 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 9 . Economic Factors 38 Socio-cultural Factors 39 3.4 Organizational Relationships in Transition 39 Types of Response Manage
26、ment Systems : 42 Closed Systems . 42 Open Systems 43 4.0 CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 47 4.1 Critical Success Factors . 47 4.2 Organizational Capabilities and Design Requirements for RMSs . 48 Organizational Capab es 48 Organizational Design Requirements 50 4.3 International RMSs . : 51 4.4 Domestic
27、RMSs 53 . . 3.5 Incident Command System . 53 Government Systems . 54 The National Response System 54 Unified Command Structure under the NRS . 57 Area Contingency Plans and Response Plans 58 State Systems . 61 Industry Systems . 65 5.0VIEWOFTHEFTRE . 71 5.1 Implications for Implementing an Effective
28、 RMS . 71 Organizational Design 71 Information Management 72 Decision Making 72 Management Process . 72 5.2 Conclusions . 73 6.0UNRESOLVEDISSUES 75 REFERENCES 79 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 83 APPENDICES A Sample Questionnaire Used to Solicit Views on RMS . 85 B Summary of Views of Oil Spill Response Professiona
29、ls . 91 C Glossary 99 D Acronyms . 103 10 TECHNICAL REPORT IOSC-001 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE TITLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Geographical boundaries of EPA and USCG 25 The five principal components of the incident command system (ICs) . 26 Percentage of spills by average size (1974-1991) . 27 Cumulative perce
30、ntage of spills vs . spill size 28 Major causes (spills 700 tons) 1974-1990 . 29 Organizational adaptions in crisis situations 32 The organization as a set of relationships in equilibrium . 36 10 Stages of a spill response . 40 11 Transition through the stages . 40 12 Overview of the overlapping pha
31、ses of a significant oil spill incident 41 13 Modified version of the ICs command staff in effect prior to the American Trader spill . 43 14 Structure of the operations section as expanded for the Amencan Trader spill response . 44 Structure of the environmental unit established after American Trade
32、r spill 45 17 Diagram of the response organization for the American Trader 46 18 NRS structure for planning 55 19 NRS structure for response 56 Unified Command Structure . 58 21 Company 1 - RMS organization diagram 66 22 Company 2 - RMS organization diagram 67 23 Company 3 - RMS organization diagram
33、 67 24 Company 4 - RMS organization diagram 68 25 Company 5 - RMS organization diagram 68 26 Company 6 - RMS organization diagram 69 15 Structure of the planning, logistics, and finance sections as expanded for the American Trader spill response . 44 16 20 1995 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 11
34、LIST OF TLES TABLE TITLE PAGE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Summary of survey responses 18 Indicators of successful spill response 22 Objectives of spill response 22 Comparison of survey responses 22 Comparison of event categories . 30 Oil spill size implications for response management 30 Comparison of Amer
35、ican Trader and Rosebay oil spills 31 RMS categories for open ocean spills . 52 RMS categories for nearshore/harbor spills . 52 Unified command functions in California 61 11 ICs components review matrix . 62 12 Critical success factors (CSF) components review matrix . 64 12 TECHNICAL REPORT IOSC-001
36、 EXECUTIVE SUMMY anagement of oil spill response operations through- out the world is the subject of continuing discus- M sion, particularly in light of the high visibility of oil spills and evolving requirements for a unified command form of spill management resulting from the Oil Pollution Act of
37、1990. This paper considers response management systems (RMSs) in terms of theoretical research and the practical experience of response specialists. As used in this paper, a response management system (RMS) is the combination of organizational structure, management processes, indi- vidual roles, and
38、 operational strategy employed during an oil spill response. The focus of this paper is on the design and implementation of an RMS which brings together the organizational entities in spill response, that is, the overall system that connects the individual RMSs of responding orga- nizations. This pa
39、per is intended to stimulate thoughtful discussion within the spill response community on how to better address the problems associated with managing response operations. This paper: Reviews the background, including the historical per- spective, of RMSs used for oil spill response; Presents a syste
40、ms view of response management based on theoretical research and field studies in various crises and disasters, including oil spills; Identifies types of RMS applicable to oil spill response operations; Presents Critical Success Factors and system design requirements for effective RMS; Describes gen
41、eral types of RMS in use worldwide; Presents a view of future actions that could improve response management; and, Proposes unresolved issues in RMSs. The general conclusion reached in this paper is that the types of RMSs comprise a continuum, with no system exhibit- ing characteristics of a single
42、system type. Towards one end of the organizational spectrum is the open, problem solving sys- tem, characterized by a reliance on flexibility and improvisa- tion by team members, decentralized or distributed decision making (often by ad hoc functional groups) and a high degree of both internal and e
43、xternal communication and feedback. These types of organizations have proven to be very adaptive, learning quickly and using a wide range of resources from both the internal and external environments. Such a system tends to lose effectiveness when the various components, either individuals or groups
44、, are “strangers,” that is, they do not work together regularly. In that case, the lack of common culture and shared goals can lead to dissolution and lack of purpose. The recent revision of the US National Contingency Plan calls for a system that is to operate in an open manner, one that integrates
45、 the organizations of the On-Scene Coor- dinator, state representative and responsible party into a sin- gle, highly interactive and purposeful organization. Towards the other end of the continuum are closed types of RMSs, typical throughout the world and characterized by structured, hierarchical, c
46、ommand and control design. Closed systems work quite well in managing spills with little or no interaction with outside influences or organizations; usually these are routine spills, which comprise the majority of inci- dents. The success in these relatively controlled circumstances can be attribute
47、d to the emphasis on centralized decision making and direction of operations by a single person and execution of pre-spill planned actions. Closed systems tend to fall short of their ability to achieve success as perceived by external organizations, including the public. Closed systems have difficul
48、ty in the complex, highly turbulent environment of significant oil spills. The two typical weakness in the closed system design are the inability to adequately address the con- cerns of emergent groups and the inadequacy of feedback mechanisms to enable the organization to determine how the response
49、 as a whole is progressing, and to make the neces- sary adjustments. The closed system typically does not respond well when, as the significance of an operation increases, the organization must get not only bigger, but different - when the fundamental nature of the response changes. The Incident Command System, which is being widely adapted for use as an RMS for oil spill response, is based on a closed system design but offers the potential to be imple- mented as an open type of system. The challenge for government and private industry oil spill r
