1、1999 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE MYTHS AND REALITIES OF OIL SPILL PLANNING AND RESPONSE: THE CHALLENGES OF A LARGE SPILL USCG USEPA API IPIECA IMO MYTHS AND OF OL SPILL THE CHALLENGES OF A LARGE SPILL PLANNING AND RESPONSE: AN ISSUE PAPER PREPARED FOR THE 1999 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPU CONFFXENCE
2、 Prepared by: Robin Perry Principal Robin Perry and Associates. Eastdown House, Eastdown, Nr. Totnes, Devon, TQ9 7AP UK TECHNCAL REPORT IOSC-007 11 STD.API/PETRO PUBL 9bA7-ENGL 1999 0732290 Ob27951 7q5 D American 1220 L Street, Northwest Petroleum Washington, DC 20005 Institute Printed in the United
3、 States of America API Publication No. 4687A O 1999 STD*API/PETRO PUBL qb87-ENGL L997 0732270 Ob27952 bBL PREFACE T he 1999 International Oil Spill Conference sponsors - American Petroleum Institute, US Coast Guard, US Environmental Protection Agency, International Maritime Organization, and Interna
4、- tional Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association - commissioned issue papers covering two topics of special importance to the oil spill community. The sponsors assigned responsibility for general management and oversight, scope definition, peer review, and publication of these issu
5、e papers to the Program Committee. The goals of these papers are to stimulate open discussion of complex and controversial issues and bal- ance diverse positions of stakeholders. Each topic addresses varying scientifichechnical and socio-political concerns. Therefore, each paper differs as to depth
6、of study and breadth of conclusions. The views and opinions presented are those of the authors solely and do not represent the views, opinions, or policies of the International Oil Spill Conference or its sponsors. During the 1999 Conference, each of these issue paper topics will be the subject of a
7、 special panel ses- sion. Publication of these issue papers as separate companion documents to the Conference Proceedings continues the International Oil Spill Conference Technical Report Series. The Technical Reports are pub- lished biennially in conjunction with the International Oil Spill confere
8、nce. It is the Program Committees hope that each issue paper topic furthers substantive discussion and serves as a catalyst for solutions to the topics discussed. William Whitson CDR, United States Coast Guard Chairman, Program Committee 1999 INTERNATIONAL Om SPILL CONFERENCE 3 1999 INTERNATIONAL On
9、, SPILL CONFERENCE ISSUE PAPER WORKGROUP Co-CHAIRS Alexis Steen Joseph Mullin American Petroleum Institute US Minerals Management Service John Ostergarrd Gail Thomas William Lerch International Maritime Organization US Environmental Protection Agency Exxon Company International Roger Laferriere US C
10、oast Guard Mark Weller Texaco, Inc. David C. Stalfort US Coast Guard EDITORIAL, ADMJNISTRAlIVE, AND PUBLISHING sUPFORT Robert G. Pond, Soza . AM) PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS? 33 POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF OIL SPILLS? 33 4.1 khS hPROVED hRF0RMANCE HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON 4.2 HAS IMPROVED PERFORMANCE HAD A Posm
11、 EFFECT ON MEDIA PERCEPTIONS OF OIL SPILLS? . 34 4.3 HAS IMPROVED PERFORMANCE HAD A Pmm EFFECT ON ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS GROUPS PERCEPTIONS OF OIL Sm? . 34 4.4 HAS IMPROVED PERFORMANCE HAD A Posm EFFECT ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF OIL SPILLS? 35 4.5 Posm PERCEPTION CONCLUSIONS . 35 5 . CONCLUSIONS AND
12、 RECOMMENDATIONS . 37 5.1 CONCLUSIONS 37 Is it a Myth or Reality That Response Capabilities to Clean Up Large Spills Have Improved Over the Last 20 Years? . 37 Is it a Myth or Reality That Increased Response Capabilities Have Resulted in Improved Performance?. 37 Is it a Myth or Reality That Improve
13、d Performance Has Had a Positive Effect on Political, Media, Environmental. and Public Perceptions? . 38 5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS . 38 The Problems That Remain 38 Factors That Contribute to the Solution 39 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . 41 REFERENCES . 43 ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS 47 APPENDIX A. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
14、 FOILOWING MAJOR SPILLS 49 B . SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANTSPILLEVENTS 51 LIST OF TABLES 1 . Synopsis of Tiered Response Concept . 18 2 . Dispersant Effectiveness in Large-Scale Applications 27 3 . Costs of Selected Large Spills 29 IST OF FIGURES 1 . The Evolution of a Response 25 STD.API/PETRO PUBL 4b87-
15、ENGL L797 m 0732270 Ob27458 OTT W EXECUTIVE SUMMARY O ver the past 20 years, there has been massive invest- ment in oil spill response capability around the world. Considerable efforts have been made in many countries to improve the general level of preparedness by developing or updating National Co
16、ntingency Plans and by examining the issues of spill management, spill risk, priorities for protection, and strategies to be employed, as well as equipment and personnel requirements. National laws, together with bi-lateral and international agreements, have introduced compensation arrangements and
17、have attempted to ensure a higher standard of preparedness and international co-operation. This paper attempts to assess whether these investments have been successful using two criteria for post- improvement responses: Were they technically more effective, or were they perceived to be more effectiv
18、e? There is a danger that the latter may be compromising the former. Using these criteria, the paper asks the following questions: Have improvements in preparedness and response capabilities been worthwhile? Have the policy and infrastructure changes made a real improvement in the response community
19、s ability to reduce the adverse impacts of a spill? Do these improve- ments matter outside the context of an incident? This paper examines whether improved response capabilities and perfor- mance over the past 20 years are myths or realities. Specifi- cally: Have response capabilities to clean up la
20、rge spills Have increased response capabilities resulted in Has improved performance had a positive effect on improved over the last 20 years? improved performance? political, media, environmental, and public perceptions? Information was gathered from a number of major oil spills (10,000 tonnes or 7
21、0,000 bbls) around the world. Smaller spills also were used where they would usefully illustrate a key point. This spill information was combined with the practi- cal experience and personal observations of the author and many oil spill response professionals from around the world, thus providing a
22、well-reasoned basis for concluding whether the critical issues listed above are myths or realities. The paper concludes that it is impossible to make a general statement about improvements to oil spill response capabilities and performance on a worldwide basis. Rather, specific changes must be exami
23、ned regionally or nationally to deter- mine if increased capabilities and improved performance occurred. There have been huge increases in the quantity of oil spill response equipment in many parts of the world. In co- operation with other countries as well as industry, many gov- ernments have impro
24、ved contingency planning and equipment capabilities. In other parts of the world, there may have been little improvement because of more pressing national priorities. Evidence shows that international, national, and industrial determination to improve spill response capabilities is cyclical, increas
25、ing immediately following a major spill event and wan- ing as time progresses. Some measures of success are difficult to quantify, such as the spill management teams efficiency and effectiveness, ves- sel salvage plan, or shoreline protection strategy. Other indica- tors are easier to measure, such
26、as amount of oil spilled versus amount recovered at sea or from the shoreline. The lack of accurate historical information about major oil spills also makes it difficult to identify precise performance improve- ments. Nonetheless, conclusions can be made about the myths and realities of improvements
27、 in a number of areas. It is a reality that international conventions and agreements have improved the commitment to preparedness planning; however, many provisions of these conventions and agree- ments have yet to be implemented. It is a reality that the inter- national oil industry has invested co
28、nsiderably in the establishment of local, regional, and international stockpiles of equipment. Another reality is that the international response community now accepts that contingency planning is the essential prerequisite to a successful response. The scope of contingency plans has improved over t
29、he years to include risk analysis, forecasts of oil movement, identification and prioriti- sation of resources at risk, and selection of suitable response techniques. It also is recognised that plans must be constantly tested and updated through regular exercises. There are still far too many places
30、 in the world, however, where satisfactory planning has not been conducted, and, in some cases, inap- propriate equipment purchases have been made. In most countries where major spills have occurred, lessons learned from those spills have been incorporated into national response plans. In many count
31、ries, there is an increased awareness of the critical role of salvage in improving spill response. There are ample stockpiles of mechanical contain- ment and recovery equipment in most parts of the world. 1999 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 11 12 Dispersant use is still controversial, but is slo
32、wly gaining acceptance as the benefits become more widely accepted, and limitations become better understood. Where responders have become experienced at working together during exercises and responses, spill management has improved significantly. Unfortunately, in those regions of the world where m
33、echan- ical containment and recovery for major offshore spills remains the only or primary response method, there is unlikely to be any significant improvement in response operations because of the well-known, and to date insurmountable, limitations of this technique. In some parts of the world, spi
34、ll costs have esca- lated significantly. Media, environmental interest group, and public pressure undoubtedly has contributed to gross over- reaction or inappropriate actions being taken. This is exacer- bated by the lack of an independent, effective mechanism to determine technical reasonableness,
35、and there being no means of penalising unreasonable or ineffective decisions or activities that may have contributed to excessive costs by refusing to reimburse them. Generally, the factors that contribute to improved perfor- mance during oil spill response do not match those that are perceived as i
36、mproved by politicians, the media, environmen- tal interest groups, and the public. The media rarely report on the technical successes of a response and, on most occasions, dramatise potential disaster, which contribute to public out- rage. It is unlikely that this will change. Environmental interes
37、t groups continue to use oil spills to promote their own agen- das, despite evidence that spills are not the permanent envi- ronmental disasters that these groups prefer to portray. This also is unlikely to change. In some areas of the world, how- TECHNICAL REPORT IOSC-007 ever, some success has bee
38、n achieved in creating a climate of trust and co-operation, which tempers political reactions. Politicians, however, remain responsive to their constituents and follow public reaction to oil spill response performance, whether real or perceived. There is a need for the oil industry to make strenuous
39、 efforts to improve its image, attempt to educate the public about the realities of oil spill response, and reduce the public expectations of what can be achieved. The problems that currently inhibit improved performance are not ones that massive increases in equipment will fE. Some problems are ins
40、oluble with present-day technology. Organisational problems can be overcome by better planning, acceptance of alternative response techniques, training, exer- cising, spill management, and cost management, with govern- ment and industry working in co-operation to plan, respond, and involve all poten
41、tially affected parties. In some countries, their current state of development may well mean that they are not ready to devote scarce national resources to the problem and will need external assistance for some years to come. The answers to the three critical issues are yes - in some ways and in som
42、e places. In most areas, investment has not been just an expensive public relations exercise, but there are worrisome signs that some responders are beginning to think that it is. There have been major improvements in many parts of the world, and many countries are now much better pre- pared than th
43、ey were 20 years ago. It is still unfortunately the case that in many places, there has been little or no improve- ment, either because of lack of resources, understanding of the requirements, or will. In the last two cases, many of the myths remain, and the realities are not yet understood. STD-API
44、/PETRO PUBL 4b87-ENGL 1779 m 073227U Ub274b0 758 SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION O ver the past 20 years, especially in the past 10 years an extensive literature review. Because of the scarcity of reli- since the Exlon Vuldez spill, there has been a able information on many spills, the author has relied on t
45、he tremendous investment in equipment and resources judgment, perceptions, and opinions of response professionals to respond to a large oil spill in both the open sea and and regulators, as well as on personal observations and neces- nearshore environments. This paper examines whether the sarily sub
46、jective opinions. investment of money, time, and effort has been worthwhile: Have real improvements occurred, or has it been the worlds most expensive public relations exercise? L2 ORGANISATION OF THIS REPORT This paper has been written to encourage discussion and analysis in the international respo
47、nse community about changes in oil spill capabilities and performance that have occurred during the past 20 years, and to critically challenge some of the current thinking. Using opinions of many profes- sionals within the response community as a basis, this paper is intended to generate a dialogue
48、within this community with the intent of identifying strengths and weaknesses in response capabilities and ultimately to initiate performance improve- ments. This paper also can be used to provide feedback to the research community on capability issues that warrant further examination. To determine
49、what is reality and what is myth, this paper asks the following questions concerning oil spill response over the past 20 years: Have response capabilities to clean up large spills Have increased response capabilities resulted in Has improved performance had a positive effect on improved over the last 20 years? improved performance? political, media, environmental, and public perceptions? The answers are intended to challenge existing national or international philosophies and encourage a critical review of these perspectives. To achieve this objective, information from ma
