1、PD CEN/TR14383-7:2009ICS 03.220.01; 13.310; 91.040.20NO COPYING WITHOUT BSI PERMISSION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY COPYRIGHT LAWPUBLISHED DOCUMENTPrevention of crime Urban planning andbuilding designPat 7: Design and management ofpublic transport facilitiesThis Published Documentwas published under theau
2、thority of the StandardsPolicy and StrategyCommittee on 31 July 2009 BSI 2009ISBN 978 0 580 64559 4Amendments/corrigenda issued since publicationDate CommentsPD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009National forewordThis Published Document is the UK implementation of CEN/TR14383-7:2009.The UK participation in its prep
3、aration was entrusted to TechnicalCommittee B/562, Security of buildings.A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained onrequest to its secretary.This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisionsof a contract. Users are responsible for its correct appl
4、ication.Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunityfrom legal obligations.PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009TECHNICAL REPORTRAPPORT TECHNIQUETECHNISCHER BERICHTCEN/TR 14383-7July 2009ICS 03.220.01; 13.310; 91.040.20English VersionPrevention of crime - Urban planning and building design - Part7: De
5、sign and management of public transport facilitiesPrvention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conceptiondes btiments - Partie 7: Conception et gestion desespaces ddis au transport publicVorbeugende Kriminalittsbekmpfung - Stadt- undGebudeplanung - Teil 7: Planung und Management vonAnlagen und Einric
6、htungen des ffentlichenPersonennahverkehrsThis Technical Report was approved by CEN on 21 March 2009. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 325.CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,France, Germ
7、any, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATIONCOMIT EUROPEN DE NORMALISATIONEUROPISCHES KOMITEE FR NORMUNGMana
8、gement Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels 2009 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reservedworldwide for CEN national Members.Ref. No. CEN/TR 14383-7:2009: EPD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 2 Contents Page Foreword 3Introduction .41 Scope 72 Normative refe
9、rences 73 Terms and definitions .74 Design and management processes for transport-dedicated areas 74.1 General 74.2 Organization of the contracting authority and the stakeholders 84.2.1 General 84.2.2 Contracting authorities .84.2.3 Contract partners .84.2.4 Specialists who bring their expertise to
10、the project 84.2.5 Customers, commercial partners and staff 94.2.6 The project managers .94.3 The core stages of a project .94.4 Creating a new location . 104.5 Location management 105 Analysis, actions and assessment: question-asking methods . 105.1 General . 105.2 Crime, antisocial behaviour and f
11、ear of crime . 115.3 General principles on security-related questioning 115.4 Design strategies 125.4.1 General . 125.4.2 Anticipation on location management 125.4.3 Space usage 125.4.4 Legibility 145.4.5 Location compatibility with security measures . 155.5 Management strategies 155.5.1 General . 1
12、55.5.2 Responsive location management policy 155.5.3 Regulating space usage . 165.5.4 Legibility and orientation . 175.5.5 Location compatibility with security measures . 17Annex A (informative) Types of crime against people (including staff) and buildings 19A.1 Offence against person 19A.1.1 Assaul
13、t with physical violence (without theft) . 19A.1.2 Assault without physical violence (without theft) . 19A.1.3 Sexual assault . 19A.1.4 Theft against person 19A.2 Assault against companies, properties and plants . 19A.2.1 Assault against properties and plants by damage and /or destruction 19A.2.2 Th
14、eft against companies 19A.2.3 Threat . 20A.2.4 Trespass 20A.3 Other offence relative to public transport rules and antisocial behaviour . 20A.3.1 Behavioural offence . 20A.3.2 Traffic offence . 20Annex B (informative) Summary of the process 21PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 3 Foreword
15、This document (CEN/TR 14383-7:2009) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 325 “Prevention of crime by urban planning and building design”, the secretariat of which is held by SNV. Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
16、rights. CEN and/or CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. The status of Technical Report (CEN/TR) was proposed to give all countries the opportunity to compare experiences and to harmonise procedures. This Technical Report is one of a series for the “Pre
17、vention of crime by urban planning and building design”, that consists of the following Parts: Part 1: Definition of specific terms Part 2: Urban planning Part 3: Dwellings Part 4: Shops and offices Part 5: Petrol stations Part 8: Protection of buildings and sites against criminal attacks with vehic
18、les PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 4 Introduction The public transport system has to meet the citizens mobility needs under the most advantageous economic, social and environmental conditions for the community. It is an instrumental factor in national unity and solidarity, national de
19、fence, economic and social development, in balanced strategic land use planning and sustainable development, and in driving international exchanges, particularly towards European partners. In meeting these needs, it is equally important to comply with objectives on minimising or reducing risks, acci
20、dents, nuisance (particularly sound pollution), pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions by implementing measures designed to reinforce the application of the legal right of all public transport users, including disabled or handicapped people, to move freely and to choose the means they wish to use,
21、and to exercise their legal entitlement to transport their property themselves or to commission the services of a company or institution of their choice to do so. The success if this kind of service hinges on: the strength of social ties in public transport areas, which are in fact a community resou
22、rce (respect for others, for community values, voluntary sharing of community resources, respect for rule of law, etc.); the efficiency of the production facilities (integrity of the technical and financial assets, the physical protection provided by the transport, a regular and reliable quality ser
23、vice, etc.), which are by definition a source of regular contact with the population and are thus embedded in the urban fabric. Any unruly, aggressive or assaultive behaviour will by its very nature have a negative knock-on effect on public trust in the service. More generally, public trust can be e
24、roded by an environment left to degrade (dirt, poor lighting, graffiti, etc.) and by repeated unruliness. The erosion of public trust can foster avoidance behaviour from customers (drop in traffic) and staff (strikes, skipping ticket checks, etc.) alike. Crime often also targets the production facil
25、ities (equipment, buildings, infrastructure, information systems, etc.), thus causing financial losses, equipment breakdowns, service delays, malfunctioning customer service devices, or even generating traffic safety risks (accidents, derailments, etc.). Hence, crime, whether carried out or perceive
26、d, threatens the fundamental policy issues of any public transport system, i.e. public trust and efficient production facilities, with significant economic and social consequences. Crime problems require action, on the individuals involved, on the organizations and structures that manage community a
27、ctivity, and on the locations housing the activity. Pre-planning for, or “designing-out”, crime and disorder often adds little or no additional cost to the project, but can save large amounts of money in the long run. Returning to a location to “retro-fit” crime prevention measures is always more ex
28、pensive than designing the location properly in the first place. All public transport systems in industrialized countries face these same issues. There are numerous examples of where public transport companies have undertaken crime prevention actions, many of which have entailed heavy funding. We ca
29、n now draw upon a significant pool of experience and best practices. Indeed, public transport facilities are fast developing towards intermodal services and expanding out to European scale. This has prompted the need to draft a set of risk analysis procedures complete with guidelines. Developments i
30、n problem orientation Recent trends in mass transport project characteristic have to be taken in account, before identifying appropriate recommendations for the design, the management and the planning process. Below, four trends in mass transport project characteristic are discerned. PD CEN/TR 14383
31、-7:2009CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 5 Trend 1: More and more huge and multifunctional mass public transport projects Railway stations in big cities and at airports, in order to fulfil their desired function as “multiservice areas” often become “mega structures” where all kind of functions are integrated:
32、 transport, shopping and leisure. The transport function is just one of the other present functions of the whole structure. In order to emphasize its huge size and importance, architects of these mega structures often propose impressive, challenging forms and constructions. These structures become r
33、egional or even national icons. However, to structures of this kind, special points of attention apply for security design and management. These points are: their huge size make people feel get lost soon if the concept of the structure is complex, the orientation on passenger routes towards the goal
34、 is limited, and the signage is incomplete; different functions in the same structure mean different proprietors and different managers; if the demarcation of the areas (what belongs to whom) is not clearly defined, if managers use different rules for the public, different security systems (every fu
35、nction its own surveillants and CCTV system) the management of the total structure will not as effective as it could be and should be; big structures are more different to connect to their environment properly; there is a greater danger that they become and remain isolated, internally oriented block
36、s, which often make an unfriendly impression to their direct environment. From the outside, you mainly see blind walls and huge car parks; different functions mean different opening times when it is not possible to close off the not-in-service parts (for example the shopping mall in the late evening
37、) and offer alternative routes to transport passengers, the latter will have to walk long routes through scary, unsurveilled corridors different functions have different peak hours; but if more functions have a peak at the same time of the day and all corridors have to be designed on this maximum fl
38、ow of visitors, these corridors will be far too big for the silent hours and the visitors will feel lost there. This document give recommendations for not only regular and simple transport facilities, but also recommendations that take into account the specific design and management attention points
39、 as mentioned for the complex multifunctional mega structures. Trend 2 : More and more underground structures In former times, underground structures formed a minority and existed only in huge metropoles. Nowadays, underground projects become more and more common. In existing urban areas, only very
40、little space is available for expansion of buildings and railway facilities. The space required is only available under the surface. Engineers and architects have to look more and more to underground solutions. Underground structures, however, are critical to safety. This applies to fire safety (esc
41、ape routes are longer and carry on more in the vertical dimension) but also to security. Especially the perception of security is at stake: “the deeper, the more sensitive” one could say. To reach the same level of security perception in underground structures, designers have to perform twice as wel
42、l as in normal buildings. Trend 3 : More and more stations and transfer points in the outskirts of town With the expansion of the public transportation networks in urban areas (train, metro, tramway, buses) more and more stations, not only simple metro stations but also important regional transfer p
43、oints, are being located in the outskirts of town. These are often unpleasant areas: in the middle of an industrial zone and/or near a noisy highway. Designers have to look to special solutions to make people feel comfortable in these kind of places, when walking to and from the station/bus station,
44、 or when waiting for the connecting train/bus. PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 6 Trend 4 : More and more separation between public and private space Historically, the spaces devoted to transport facilities have been open spaces: train and bus stations, regular lines for road, maritime
45、stations, etc. In practice, all those facilities that did not have the role of international border were of an open and public character. Today, some of these spaces still belong to the field of the public space, but the standard becomes more and more to establish two distinguished spaces: the publi
46、c area and the private area. The public area serves as an area of access for the control (public space) and the private area serves as safe area. From a point of view of formal surveillance and effective support in emergency cases, this separation may be a favourable condition. The separation betwee
47、n public and private areas has, however, also negative consequences. The most important consequence is the limitation of the individual rights of the users. Only allowed persons (in the possession of the travel ticket) have right to the restricted safe areas. Thus, these private spaces are not contr
48、ibuting any more to urban integration (= all spaces for all functions for all people). From this former consequence, another consequence, very relevant for the crime prevention subject, follows: persons without allowance to enter the private zones, all have to be concentrated in the (little) space r
49、emaining public. In addition, a third consequence, related to the former: not all functions, like restaurants and shops, are suitable for both types of space (the private or the public). That means: separation of functions has to be made. This separation may lead to a lower degree of urban integration. The fact that spaces become more and more separated, influence
