1、June 2013 Translation by DIN-Sprachendienst.English price group 29No part of this translation may be reproduced without prior permission ofDIN Deutsches Institut fr Normung e. V., Berlin. Beuth Verlag GmbH, 10772 Berlin, Germany,has the exclusive right of sale for German Standards (DIN-Normen).ICS 3
2、5.240.15!%_;“2026024www.din.deDDIN EN 419251-3Security requirements for device for authentication Part 3: Additional functionality for security targets;English version EN 419251-3:2013,English translation of DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06Sicherheitsanforderungen fr Gerte zur Authentisierung Teil 3: Zustzli
3、che Funktionalitten fr Sicherheitsziele;Englische Fassung EN 419251-3:2013,Englische bersetzung von DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06Profils de protection pour dispositif dauthentification Partie 3: Fonctionnalits additionnelles;Version anglaise EN 419251-3:2013,Traduction anglaise de DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06w
4、ww.beuth.deDocument comprises 81 pagesIn case of doubt, the German-language original shall be considered authoritative.06.13 DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06 2 A comma is used as the decimal marker. National foreword This document (EN 419251-3:2013) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 224 “Person
5、al identification, electronic signature and cards and their related systems and operations” (Secretariat: AFNOR, France). The responsible German body involved in its preparation was the Normenausschuss Informationstechnik und Anwendungen (Information Technology and selected IT Applications Standards
6、 Committee), Working Committee NA 043-01-17 AA Karten und persnliche Identifikation. EUROPEAN STANDARD NORME EUROPENNE EUROPISCHE NORM EN 419251-3 March 2013 ICS 35.240.15 English Version Security requirements for device for authentication - Part 3: Additional functionality for security targets Prof
7、ils de protection pour dispositif dauthentification - Partie 3: Fonctionnalits additionnelles Sicherheitsanforderungen fr Gerte zur Authentisierung - Teil 3: Zustzliche Funktionalitten fr Sicherheitsziele This European Standard was approved by CEN on 7 December 2012. CEN members are bound to comply
8、with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration. Up-to-date lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC Ma
9、nagement Centre or to any CEN member. This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation under the responsibility of a CEN member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the same
10、status as the official versions. CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, M
11、alta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION COMIT EUROPEN DE NORMALISATION EUROPISCHES KOMITEE FR NORMUNG Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels 2013 CEN All righ
12、ts of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members. Ref. No. EN 419251-3:2013: EEN 419251-3:2013 (E) 2 Contents Page Foreword . 5 1 Scope 6 2 Normative references . 6 3 Conformance 6 3.1 CC Conformance Claim . 6 3.2 PP Claim . 6 3.3 Package Claim 6 3.4 Confor
13、mance Rationale . 6 3.5 Conformance Statement 7 4 Terms and definitions 7 5 Symbols and abbreviations . 9 6 Overview of the target of evaluation . 9 6.1 TOE Type 9 6.2 TOE Usage 9 6.3 Security Features of the TOE . 10 6.4 Required non-TOE Hardware and Software 10 6.5 Protection Profile Usage 10 6.6
14、Groups 10 6.6.1 General . 10 6.6.2 Main groups 10 6.6.3 Environment groups 11 6.7 Configurations 13 6.7.1 General . 13 6.7.2 Rules . 13 6.7.3 Possible Configurations 14 6.8 TOE Environment . 15 6.8.1 Overall view 15 6.8.2 Personalisation application . 16 6.8.3 Administration application 17 6.8.4 Aut
15、hentication application . 18 6.8.5 Verifier 19 6.8.6 Key Generator 19 6.8.7 Certification Authority 20 6.8.8 Examples of applications. 20 6.9 Life Cycle 22 6.9.1 Overview . 22 6.9.2 Pre-Personalisation phase . 23 6.9.3 Personalisation phase . 23 6.9.4 Usage phase . 24 7 Security problem definition .
16、 26 7.1 Assets . 26 7.1.1 General . 26 7.1.2 Core group 26 7.1.3 KeyGen group 26 7.1.4 Admin group . 27 7.2 Users . 27 7.2.1 Core group 27 7.2.2 KeyImp group . 28 DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06 EN 419251-3:2013 (E) 3 7.2.3 KeyGen group 28 7.2.4 Admin group . 28 7.3 Threats 28 7.3.1 General . 28 7.3.2 Core
17、group 29 7.3.3 KeyGen group 30 7.3.4 Admin group . 30 7.4 Organisational security policies 30 7.4.1 Core group 30 7.4.2 KeyGen group 31 7.4.3 Admin group . 31 7.5 Assumptions 31 7.5.1 Core group 31 7.5.2 KeyGen group 32 7.5.3 Admin group . 32 8 Security objectives . 32 8.1 General Transfer of sensit
18、ive data . 32 8.2 Security objectives for the TOE . 33 8.2.1 Core group 33 8.2.2 KeyImp group . 34 8.2.3 KeyGen group 34 8.2.4 Admin group . 34 8.2.5 Untrusted PersoAppli . 35 8.2.6 Untrusted AuthAppli 35 8.2.7 Untrusted Verifier . 35 8.2.8 Untrusted CA 35 8.2.9 Untrusted AdminAppli 35 8.3 Security
19、objectives for the operational environment 36 8.3.1 Core group 36 8.3.2 KeyImp group . 36 8.3.3 Admin group . 37 8.3.4 Trusted PersoAppli 37 8.3.5 Trusted AuthAppli 37 8.3.6 Trusted Verifier . 37 8.3.7 Trusted CA 37 8.3.8 Trusted AdminAppli . 37 8.4 Rationale for Security objectives . 38 9 Extended
20、component definition Definition of the Family FCS_RNG . 43 10 Security requirements 43 10.1 General . 43 10.2 Introduction 44 10.2.1 Subjects Objects and security attributes 44 10.2.2 Operations 45 10.3 Security functional requirements 46 10.3.1 General . 46 10.3.2 Core group 47 10.3.3 KeyImp group
21、. 55 10.3.4 KeyGen group 58 10.3.5 Admin group . 61 10.3.6 Untrusted PersoAppli . 65 10.3.7 Untrusted AuthAppli 66 10.3.8 Untrusted Verifier . 66 10.3.9 Untrusted CA 67 10.3.10 Untrusted AdminAppli 68 10.4 Security assurance requirements 68 10.5 SFR / Security objectives . 69 10.6 SFR Dependencies .
22、 74 10.7 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements 76 DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06 EN 419251-3:2013 (E) 4 Bibliography 78 Index 79 Figures Figure 1 TOE Security Features . 15 Figure 2 Personalisation application environment . 16 Figure 3 Administration application environment . 17 Figure 4 Authentication
23、application environment . 18 Figure 5 TOE Life Cycle . 22 Tables Table 1 Basic configurations . 14 Table 2 IdTrusted configurations 14 Table 3 Protection of sensitive data 33 Table 4 Security objectives vs problem definition rationale 38 Table 5 Security attributes 45 Table 6 Core security attribute
24、s 50 Table 7 Core operations . 50 Table 8 Core security attributes Operation . 51 Table 9 Core security attributes - initial value 52 Table 10 Core security attributes Updates . 53 Table 11 TSF data updates . 53 Table 12 KeyImp security attributes 55 Table 13 KeyImp security attributes - operations
25、. 56 Table 14 KeyImp security attributes update authorised roles 57 Table 15 KeyImp security attributes update values 58 Table 16 KeyGen operations 59 Table 17 KeyGen security attributes . 59 Table 18 KeyGen operation rules . 60 Table 19 KeyGen security attributes update authorised roles . 60 Table
26、20 KeyGen security attributes initial values 61 Table 21 KeyGen security attributes update values 61 Table 22 Admin security attributes update authorised roles 64 Table 23 Admin security attributes initial values . 64 Table 24 Admin security attributes update values 64 Table 25 Admin TSF data operat
27、ions . 65 Table 26 SFR vs Security objectives retionale 69 Table 27 SFR dependencies 74 DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06 EN 419251-3:2013 (E) 5 Foreword This document (EN 419251-3:2013) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 224 “Personal identification, electronic signature and cards and their rela
28、ted systems and operations”, the secretariat of which is held by AFNOR. This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by September 2013, and conflicting national standards shall be withdrawn at the
29、 latest by September 2013. Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN and/or CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. EN 419251 contains the following parts: EN 419251-1, Securi
30、ty requirements for device for authentication Part 1: Protection profile for core functionality; EN 419251-2, Security requirements for device for authentication Part 2: Protection profile for extension for trusted channel to certificate generation application; EN 419251-3, Security requirements for
31、 device for authentication Part 3: Additional functionality for security targets (the present document). The present document was submitted to the Enquiry under the reference prEN 16248-3. According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the following countr
32、ies are bound to implement this European Standard: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Pola
33、nd, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06 EN 419251-3:2013 (E) 6 1 Scope This European Standard contains packages that define security requirements for an authentication device. This document is Part 3. Part 1 and Pa
34、rt 2 are Protections Profiles PP based on the packages defined in this document. Packages contained in this document can be added in a Security Target ST- claiming PP of Part 1 or Part 2. 2 Normative references The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document
35、 and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996, Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Security frameworks fo
36、r open systems: Authentication framework ISO/IEC 15408-1:20091), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 1: Introduction and general model ISO/IEC 15408-21), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 2: Security fu
37、nctional components ISO/IEC 15408-31), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 3: Security assurance components ISO/IEC 18045, Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT security evaluation 3 Conformance 3.1 CC Conformance Claim These pa
38、ckages are CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant and written according to ISO/IEC 15408-1, -2, -3 and ISO/IEC 18045. 3.2 PP Claim These packages do not claim conformance to any other Protection Profile. 3.3 Package Claim The evaluation assurance level for these packages is EAL4-augmented with
39、the assurance components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2. 3.4 Conformance Rationale Since these packages do not claim conformance to any other protection profile, no rationale is necessary here. 1) ISO/IEC 15408-1, -2 and -3 respectively correspond to Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval
40、uation, Parts 1, 2 and 3. DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06 EN 419251-3:2013 (E) 7 3.5 Conformance Statement The conformance required by these packages is the demonstrable-PP conformance. This would facilitate conformance claim to both the PP “Authentication device” and other PPs for Security Target (ST) auth
41、ors. 4 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. 4.1 Administrator person who is allowed administration operations on the authentication device Note 1 to entry: See 7.2 for more details. 4.2 Authentication Protocol sensitive data data used in
42、 the process of authentication of the TOE by the external entity Note 1 to entry: These data are linked to the Authentication private key, e.g. Authentication Certificate or APuK. Note 2 to entry: Authentication Protocol sensitive data may be empty if the environment is trusted, and the holder publi
43、c key known to the system. 4.3 Certificate attestation, which links the APuK to a person and confirms the identity of that person (as defined in the Directive 8, article 2, Clause 9) 4.4 Certificate Info information associated with an Authentication key pair that consists either: a signers public ke
44、y certificate; or one or more hash values of a signers public key certificate together the identifier of the hash function used to compute these hash values, and some information which allows the signer to disambiguate between several signers certificates 4.5 Configuration set of groups Note 1 to en
45、try: Each configuration corresponds to one PP. It has its own rationale. See the rest of the document. 4.6 Group set Assets, threats, objectives, and Requirements, addressing a specific function Note 1 to entry: See the rest of the document. 4.7 Holder legitimate holder of the authentication device
46、Note 1 to entry: See 7.2 for more details. DIN EN 419251-3:2013-06 EN 419251-3:2013 (E) 8 4.8 Issuer user of the authentication device during personalisation Note 1 to entry: See 7.2 for more details. 4.9 Protection Profile PP implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE SOURCE:
47、ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, Clause 4 “Terms and definitions“, modified in ISO/IEC 15408-1, the protection profile refers to a TOE type instead of a TOE in this document 4.10 PP collection document defining groups and configurations 4.11 Reference Authentication Data usually called RAD, data stored inside
48、the TOE and used as a reference to which the VAD will be compared Note 1 to entry: This RAD can be biometrics data, a PIN, or a symmetric key. It can also be a combination of these factors. The RAD is not an Asset, it is TSF data. 4.12 Trusted channel means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can communicate with necessary confidence SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, Clause 4 “Terms and defi
