1、 ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06)Group Specification Quantum Key Distribution;Use CasesETSI ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06) 2Reference DGS/QKD-0002_UserReqs Keywords quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, use case ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +3
2、3 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N 7803/88 Important notice Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded from: http:/www.etsi.org The present document may be made avail
3、able in more than one electronic version or in print. In any case of existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions, the reference version is the Portable Document Format (PDF). In case of dispute, the reference shall be the printing on ETSI printers of the PDF version kept on a
4、specific network drive within ETSI Secretariat. Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status. Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at http:/portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp If you find er
5、rors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services: http:/portal.etsi.org/chaircor/ETSI_support.asp Copyright Notification No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in
6、all media. European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2010. All rights reserved. DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTM, TIPHONTM, the TIPHON logo and the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members a
7、nd of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. LTE is a Trade Mark of ETSI currently being registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. GSM and the GSM logo are Trade Marks registered and owned by the GSM Association. ETSI ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06) 3Contents Int
8、ellectual Property Rights 5g3Foreword to the Present 1stEdition 5g31 Scope 7g32 References 7g32.1 Normative references . 7g32.2 Informative references 8g33 Definitions and abbreviations . 9g34 QKD - A Security Technology Innovation 10g34.1 Classification of QKD as cryptographic primitive . 10g34.1.1
9、 Encryption primitives . 10g34.1.2 Key distribution primitives . 10g34.1.3 Message authentication primitives 11g34.1.4 Synopsis 11g35 ISG-QKD Work Plan . 12g35.1 QKD Security Certification 12g35.1.1 QKD; Ontology, Vocabulary, Terms of Reference 13g35.1.2 QKD; Assurance requirements . 13g35.1.3 QKD;
10、Module security specification 13g35.1.4 List of approved QKD technologies . 14g35.1.5 QKD; Threats and Attacks 14g35.1.6 QKD; Security Proofs . 14g35.1.7 QKD; Components and Internal Interfaces . 14g35.2 QKD Integration into Existing Infrastructures . 14g35.2.1 QKD; Use Cases . 15g35.2.2 QKD; Applic
11、ation Interface 15g35.2.3 QKD devices integration within standard optical networks 15g35.3 Complementary Research . 15g35.3.1 Promoters and Inhibitors for QKD . 15g35.3.2 Prospects of QKD in Europe. 15g36 Application scenarios for QKD 16g36.1 Data Link Layer . 16g36.2 Network Layer 16g36.3 Transport
12、 Layer 17g36.4 Application Layer . 17g37 Use Cases . 17g37.1 Use Case 1: Offsite Backup / Business Continuity 17g37.1.1 Goal 17g37.1.2 Description 17g37.1.3 Concept of Operation 18g37.1.4 Actors 18g37.1.5 Actor Specific Issues 18g37.1.6 Actor Specific Benefits . 19g37.1.7 Operational and Quality of
13、Service Considerations 19g37.1.8 Functional Characteristics. 19g37.2 Use Case 2: Enterprise Metropolitan Area Network 19g37.2.1 Goal 19g37.2.2 Description 19g37.2.3 Concept of Operation 20g37.2.4 Actors 20g37.2.5 Actor Specific Issues 20g37.2.6 Actor Specific Benefits . 20g37.2.7 Operational and Qua
14、lity of Service Considerations 20g3ETSI ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06) 47.2.8 Use Case Variant: QKD Secured Key Server . 21g37.2.9 Functional Characteristics . 21g37.3 Use Case 3: Critical Infrastructure Control and Data Acquisition . 21g37.3.1 Goal 21g37.3.2 Description 22g37.3.3 Concept of Opera
15、tion 22g37.3.4 Actors 23g37.3.5 Actor Specific Issues 23g37.3.6 Actor Specific Benefits . 23g37.3.7 Operational and Quality of Service Considerations 24g37.3.8 Functional Characteristics. 24g37.4 Use Case 4: Backbone Protection . 24g37.4.1 Goal 24g37.4.2 Description 24g37.4.3 Concept of Operation 25
16、g37.4.4 Actors 25g37.4.5 Actor Specific Issues 25g37.4.6 Actor Specific Benefits . 25g37.4.7 Operational and Quality of Service Considerations 25g37.4.8 Functional Characteristics. 25g37.5 Use Case 5: High Security Access Network. 26g37.5.1 Goal 26g37.5.2 Description 26g37.5.3 Concept of Operation 2
17、6g37.5.4 Actors 26g37.5.5 Actor Specific Issues 27g37.5.6 Actor Specific Benefits . 27g37.5.7 Operational and Quality of Service Considerations 27g37.5.8 Use Case Variant: QKD Authenticated Sensor Network 27g37.5.9 Functional Characteristics . 27g37.6 Use Case 6: Long-Haul Service . 28g37.6.1 Goal 2
18、8g37.6.2 Description 28g37.6.3 Concept of Operation 28g37.6.4 Actors 29g37.6.5 Actor Specific Issues 29g37.6.6 Actor Specific Benefits . 29g37.6.7 Operational and Quality of Service Considerations 29g37.6.8 Use Case Variant: Flying QKD Node . 29g37.6.9 Functional Characteristics . 29g38 Requirements
19、 29g3Annex A (informative): Authors and Contributors . 30g3Annex B (informative): Bibliography . 31g3History 32g3ETSI ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06) 5Intellectual Property Rights IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The information pertain
20、ing to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards“, which is available from the ETSI Secretari
21、at. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (http:/webapp.etsi.org/IPR/home.asp). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the
22、 updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document. Foreword to the Present 1stEdition This Group Specification (GS) has been produced by ETSI Industry Specification (ISG) Group Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). This is the first edition of the Quan
23、tum Key Distribution; Use Cases Group Specification. For that reason, the present document contains introductory clauses not common to typical use cases Group Specifications. These parts shall at the present time provide to the reader an introduction on QKD as cryptographic primitive, as well as an
24、introduction to the work program of the ISG-QKD. These clauses shall be removed (or moved to other Group Specifications) in future releases. At the same time, the present document lacks clauses which are common to typical use cases Group Specifications. This reflects the fact that QKD as technology
25、on the whole is subject to ongoing scientific research and development. Yet, these parts are properly identified and shall be supplied in future releases of the present document. According to the implementation plan, the present document will be superseded with a new revision in November 2010. In de
26、tail the aforementioned clauses are: The introduction 1.2 QKD versus Other Solutions: This clause provides an introduction to the technology used in QKD, as well as a classification of QKD as cryptographic primitive. Moreover, the security which can be achieved with QKD is discussed. This clause wil
27、l later be moved to the Group Specification QKD; Ontology, vocabulary, and terms of reference, which is currently under development in work item WI7 of the ISG_QKD. The overview 1.1 QKD Evaluation Context: This overview, including the work item numbers in Figure 1, is not exactly appropriate for a G
28、roup Specification. Yet, the additional information presented in this clause is essential for understanding the overall context of the work towards a framework for security certification of QKD systems, as it is performed by the ETSI ISG-QKD. Future releases of the present document will have this cl
29、ause removed (and moved to the Group Specification QKD; Ontology, vocabulary, and terms of reference). The present document lacks the Definitions as well as the Abbreviations clause (clause 3). These clauses were completely removed from the document as they are not necessary since all terminology ha
30、s been harmonized to the vocabulary in the “QKD: Ontology, Vocabulary, Terms of Reference“ group specification (GS), which is currently under development. These clauses are not crucial for the understanding of the present document as particular attention was paid to explain technical terms and abbre
31、viations whenever they appear first in the text. Although the ultimate goal of the QKD; Use Cases Group Specification is to derive functional requirements from the listed use cases, the Requirements clause of clause 7 is completely left blank for the present first issue of the GS. This is owed to th
32、e fact that the present document is the first effort towards a systematic collection of use cases for QKD and will likely be strongly revised until its next release in November 2010. ETSI ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06) 6 A scenario workshop with representatives from potential users, customers, sys
33、tem integrators, as well as policy and decision makers shall be organized for June 22, 2010. One of the main goals of the scenario workshop is to discuss and revise the six use cases presented in the present document. The use cases shall subsequently be adapted according to the findings of the works
34、hop and requirements derived for the November 2010 2ndissue of the QKD; Use Cases Group Specification. ETSI ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06) 71 Scope The Use Cases Document shall provide an overview of possible application scenarios in which Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems (i.1) can be used a
35、s building blocks for high security Information and communication technology (ICT) systems. QKD systems are commercially available today - there are a handful of small enterprises producing and selling QKD systems. Even more QKD systems are being developed in research laboratories of big enterprises
36、 and at research centers and universities. All these systems have in common, that they consist of two units, usually for 19“ rack mount, connected by a quantum channel of up to 100 km - either optical telecom fiber, or a free space channel through-the-air between two telescopes. They use quantum phy
37、sical properties of light to generate and simultaneously output identical but random bit strings in the two units on both ends of the quantum channel. The output of a QKD system can serve as a shared secret in any computer security system from which cryptographic key can be generated. The laws of qu
38、antum physics ensure that it is virtually impossible to eavesdrop on this key distribution process on the quantum channel without the two stations immediately noticing it (i.3 and i.4). More precisely, QKD systems never output insecure key. The net effect of eavesdropping is a decrease, or eventuall
39、y, a stop in the key output. The degree of security of the keys is cryptographically denoted as “information-theoretical security“. In broad terms this implies that the key is almost perfectly random, while the state of knowledge of the eavesdropper is almost zero. The deviations of these “ideal pro
40、perties“ are measurable and it is in the hand of the legitimate operators to make them arbitrarily small at the expense of a small reduction in the key generation rate. The actual implementations of the QKD devices vary strongly and belong to a number of broad technological realization classes: disc
41、rete variable realizations, continuous variable realization, and distributed phase-reference realizations (for a detailed technical description of QKD, see i.2, i.12 and the documents referenced therein). However, the basic functionality of a QKD system as an information-theoretically secure key-dis
42、tribution facility is universal. All these implementations have an optical subsystem with components used for the preparation and measurement of quantum information in photons of light, as well as complex computer systems for transforming measured results into digital data. These implementations are
43、, like any security system, subject to several side channels through which information may eventually leak out of a secure boundary. Besides the showcase “use cases“, the present document presents the specifications and mechanisms for driving development towards a security certification of QKD syste
44、ms - an indispensable requirement for their qualified and dependable use. 2 References References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references,only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the
45、latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http:/docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of pub
46、lication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. 2.1 Normative references The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. Not applicable. ETSI ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 (2010-06) 82.2 Informative references The following referenced documents are not
47、 necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. i.1 “Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution and Coin Tossing, Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers Systems and Signal Processing“, Bangalore India, C.
48、H. Bennett and G. Brassard, December 1984, pp 175-179. NOTE: Online at http:/ i.2 “Quantum cryptography, Reviews of Modern Physics“, Nicolas Gisin, Grgoire Ribordy, Wolfgang Tittel and Hugo Zbinden, Vol 74, 145-195 (2002). NOTE: Online at http:/www.gap-optique.unige.ch/Publications/PDF/QC.pdf. i.3 “
49、The security of practical quantum key distribution“, Valerio Scarani, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci, Nicolas J. Cerf, Miloslav Duek, Norbert Ltkenhaus, and Momtchil Peev, Vol. 81, 1301-1351 (2009). NOTE: Online at http:/arxiv.org/abs/0802.4155. i.4 “Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices“, D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Ltkenhaus, and J. Preskill,Vol. 5, 325-360) (2004). NOTE: Available at http:/arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212066. i.5 “White Paper
