1、 ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04) Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 3G Security; Network Domain Security (NDS); Transaction Capabilities Application Part (TCAP) user security (3GPP TS 33.204 version 14.0.0 Release 14
2、) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ETSI ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04)13GPP TS 33.204 version 14.0.0 Release 14Reference RTS/TSGS-0333204ve00 Keywords GSM,LTE,SECURITY,UMTS ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 56
3、2 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N 7803/88 Important notice The present document can be downloaded from: http:/www.etsi.org/standards-search The present document may be made available in electronic versions and/or in print. The content of a
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7、ncluding photocopying and microfilm except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. The content of the PDF version shall not be modified without the written authorization of ETSI. The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. European Telecommunications Standar
8、ds Institute 2017. All rights reserved. DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTMand the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM and LTE are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. oneM2M logo is protected f
9、or the benefit of its Members GSM and the GSM logo are Trade Marks registered and owned by the GSM Association. ETSI ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04)23GPP TS 33.204 version 14.0.0 Release 14Intellectual Property Rights IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been de
10、clared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards“, whi
11、ch is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (https:/ipr.etsi.org/). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced i
12、n ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document. Foreword This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The present document may refer to technical specifications
13、 or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables. The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http:/webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp. Modal verbs
14、terminology In the present document “shall“, “shall not“, “should“, “should not“, “may“, “need not“, “will“, “will not“, “can“ and “cannot“ are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions). “must“ and “must not“ are NOT allow
15、ed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation. ETSI ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04)33GPP TS 33.204 version 14.0.0 Release 14Contents Intellectual Property Rights 2g3Foreword . 2g3Modal verbs terminology 2g3Foreword . 5g3Introduction 5g31 Scope 6g32 References 6g33 Definitions, symbol
16、s and abbreviations . 6g33.1 Definitions 6g33.2 Symbols 7g33.3 Abbreviations . 7g33.4 Conventions 8g34 Principles of TCAP user security . 8g34.1 Overview 8g34.2 Network architecture 8g34.2.1 General 8g34.2.2 End-to-end architecture . 9g34.2.3 Hub-and-Spoke architecture . 9g35 TCAP user security (TCA
17、Psec) . 10g35.1 Security services provided by TCAPsec 10g35.2 Properties and tasks of an SS7-SEG . 10g35.3 Policy requirements for the TCAPsec Security Policy Database (SPD) 11g35.4 TCAPsec security association attribute definition 11g35.5 TCAPsec structure of protected messages 12g35.5.1 TCAPsec se
18、curity header 13g35.5.2 Protected payload 13g35.5.2.1 Protection Mode 1 . 13g35.5.2.2 Protection Mode 2. 14g35.6 TCAPsec algorithms. 14g35.6.1 Mapping of TCAPsec SA encryption algorithm identifiers 14g35.6.1.1 Description of SEA-0 14g35.6.2 Mapping of TCAPsec SA integrity algorithm identifiers . 14g
19、35.6.2.1 Description of SIA-0 . 15g35.6.3 Construction of IV 15g3Annex A (informative): Guidelines for manual key management . 16g3A.1 Inter-domain Security Association and Key Management Procedures 16g3A.2 Local Security Association Distribution 16g3Annex B (normative): TCAPsec message flows . 17g3
20、Annex C (informative): High level migration strategy 19g3C.1 Transition phase from unprotected to protected message transfer . 19g3C.2 Transition phase from protected message transfer to unprotected message transfer. . 20g3C.3 Transition phase from protected mode to another protected mode 20g3Annex
21、D (normative): Using TCAP handshake for SMS transfer 21g3D.1 Mobile Terminated SMS 21g3D.2 Mobile Originated SMS . 22g3ETSI ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04)43GPP TS 33.204 version 14.0.0 Release 14Annex E (informative): Change history . 24g3History 25g3ETSI ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04)53GPP TS
22、 33.204 version 14.0.0 Release 14Foreword This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rdGeneration Partnership Project (3GPP). The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the content
23、s of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: Version x.y.z where: x the first digit: 1 presented to TSG for information; 2 presented to TSG for approval; 3 or greater indicates TSG approved docum
24、ent under change control. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. Introduction The absence of security in Signalling Sy
25、stem No. 7 (SS7) networks is an identified security weakness in 2G systems. This was formerly perceived not to be a problem, since the SS7 networks were the provinces of a small number of large institutions. This is no longer the case, and so there is now a need for security precautions. For 3G syst
26、ems it is a clear goal to be able to protect the core network signalling protocols, and by implication this means that security solutions shall be found for both SS7 and IP based protocols. Various protocols and interfaces are used for control plane signalling within and between core networks. The s
27、ecurity services that have been identified as necessary are confidentiality, integrity, authentication and anti-replay protection. These will be ensured by standard procedures, based on cryptographic techniques. ETSI ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04)63GPP TS 33.204 version 14.0.0 Release 141 Scope T
28、his technical specification covers the security mechanisms and procedures necessary to protect all TCAP user messages which are sent between different security domains. The complete set of enhancements and extensions to facilitate security protection for the TCAP protocol is termed TCAPsec and it co
29、vers transport security in the TCAP protocol itself and the security management procedures. This technical specification contains the stage 2 specification for security protection of the TCAP protocol. The actual implementation (stage 3) specification can be found in TS 29.204 9. 2 References The fo
30、llowing documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not a
31、pply. For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. 1 3GPP TR 21.905: “Vocabulary for 3
32、GPP Specifications“. 2 3GPP TS 29.002: “Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification“. 3 NIST Special Publication 800-38A “Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation“ December 2001. 4 ISO/IEC 9797: “Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: M
33、echanisms using a block cipher“, Ed.1, 1999-12-16. 5 FIPS Publication 197: “Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)“, November 26, 2001. 6 3GPP TS 33.210: “3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security“. 7 W3C DTF profile of ISO 8601: 2000 - Data Elements and
34、 Interchange Formats - Information Interchange - Representation of Dates and Times. International Organization for Standardization. http:/www.w3.org/TR/1998/NOTE-datetime-19980827. 8 3GPP TS 23.003: “Numbering, addressing and identification“. 9 3GPP TS 29.204: “Signalling System No. 7 (SS7) security
35、 gateway; Architecture, functional description and protocol details “ 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations 3.1 Definitions In addition to the definitions included in TR 21.905 1, for the purposes of the present document, the following definitions apply: Anti-replay protection: Anti-replay protec
36、tion is a special case of integrity protection. Its main service is to protect against replay of self-contained packets that already have a cryptographic integrity mechanism in place. ETSI ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04)73GPP TS 33.204 version 14.0.0 Release 14Confidentiality: The property that in
37、formation is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes. Data integrity: The property that data has not been altered in an unauthorised manner. Data origin authentication: The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed. Entity authentication:
38、 The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity. Key freshness: A key is fresh if it can be guaranteed to be new, as opposed to an old key being reused through actions of either an adversary or authorised party. Security Association: A logical connection created for security purpose
39、s. All traffic traversing a security association is provided the same security protection. The security association specifies protection levels, algorithms to be used, lifetimes of the connection etc. SS7 Carrier: An SS7 network that is not a PLMN. SS7 Security Gateway: A Network Node that terminate
40、s and initiates TCAPsec. Similar to a SEG (see TS 33.210 6), the SS7 security Gateway is used for communication between two SS7 security domains. TCAPsec: The complete collection of protocols and procedures needed to protect TCAP user messages. 3.2 Symbols For the purposes of the present document, t
41、he following symbols apply: f6 TCAPsec encryption algorithm.f7 TCAPsec integrity algorithm. Zf TCAPsec reference point between SS7-SEGs engaged in security protected signalling. 3.3 Abbreviations In addition to the abbreviations included in TR 21.905 1, for the purposes of the present document, the
42、following abbreviations apply: AES Advanced Encryption Standard FALLBACK Fallback to unprotected mode indicator IP Internet Protocol IV Initialisation VectorMAC Message Authentication Code MAC-M MAC used for TCAP user MAP Mobile Application Part NDS Network Domain Security NE Network Entity PROP Pro
43、prietary field SA Security Association SAD Security Association Database SEA SS7 security gateway Encryption Algorithm identifier SEK SS7 security gateway Encryption Key SIA SS7 security gateway Integrity Algorithm identifier SIK SS7 security gateway Integrity Key SPD Security Policy Database SPI Se
44、curity Parameters Index SS7-SEG SS7 security gateway TCAPsec TCAP user security the SS7 security gateway security protocol suite TCAP user Application Part identified by the SCCP Subsystem Numbers of TS 23.003 8 TVP Time Variant Parameter ETSI ETSI TS 133 204 V14.0.0 (2017-04)83GPP TS 33.204 version
45、 14.0.0 Release 143.4 Conventions All data variables in this specification are presented with the most significant substring on the left hand side and the least significant substring on the right hand side. A substring may be a bit, byte or other arbitrary length bitstring. Where a variable is broke
46、n down into a number of substrings, the leftmost (most significant) substring is numbered 0, the next most significant is numbered 1, and so on through to the least significant. 4 Principles of TCAP user security 4.1 Overview This technical specification defines mechanisms for protecting all TCAP us
47、er messages called TCAPsec. Another approach which could partially achieve the same goal as TCAPsec is the use of NDS/IP 6 at the network layer when IP is used as the transport protocol. However, whenever inter-working with networks using SS7-based transport is necessary, protection with TCAPsec sha
48、ll be used. The benefit for an operator applying TCAPsec will gradually increase when more interconnected operators also apply TCAPsec. TCAPsec can be used together with TCAP handshake solutions, however when using TCAPsec for MAP SMS transfers between two PLMNs, running TCAP handshake in addition d
49、oes not add more security. NOTE 1: A limited level of MAP message authenticity can be achieved without the use of SS7-SEGs by using a TCAP handshake prior to the MAP payload exchange. Annex D describes the use of the TCAP handshake for MAP SMS transfers. NOTE 2: TCAPsec does not validate the TCAP user payload content (e.g. SMS payload address correlation as described for TCAP handshake in Annex D). Message screening functions for particular message types may be needed on top of TCAPsec. NOTE 3: In order to prevent all active attacks
