1、 International Telecommunication Union ITU-T D.156TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU Amendment 1(05/2010) SERIES D: GENERAL TARIFF PRINCIPLES General tariff principles Charging and accounting in the international telephone service Network externalities Amendment 1: New Annex A Practical
2、 implementation of Recommendation ITU-T D.156Recommendation ITU-T D.156 (2008) Amendment 1 ITU-T D-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS GENERAL TARIFF PRINCIPLES TERMS AND DEFINITIONS D.0 GENERAL TARIFF PRINCIPLES Private leased telecommunication facilities D.1D.9 Tariff principles applying to data communication
3、services over dedicated public data networks D.10D.39 Charging and accounting in the international public telegram service D.40D.44 Charging and accounting in the international telemessage service D.45D.49 Principles applicable to GII-Internet D.50D.59 Charging and accounting in the international te
4、lex service D.60D.69 Charging and accounting in the international facsimile service D.70D.75 Charging and accounting in the international videotex service D.76D.79 Charging and accounting in the international phototelegraph service D.80D.89 Charging and accounting in the mobile services D.90D.99 Cha
5、rging and accounting in the international telephone service D.100D.159Drawing up and exchange of international telephone and telex accounts D.160D.179 International sound- and television-programme transmissions D.180D.184 Charging and accounting for international satellite services D.185D.189 Transm
6、ission of monthly international accounting information D.190D.191 Service and privilege telecommunications D.192D.195 Settlement of international telecommunication balances of accounts D.196D.209 Charging and accounting principles for international telecommunication services provided over the ISDN D
7、.210D.269 Charging and accounting principles for next generation networks (NGN) D.270D.279 Charging and accounting principles for universal personal telecommunication D.280D.284 Charging and accounting principles for intelligent network supported services D.285D.299 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGIONAL APPL
8、ICATION Recommendations applicable in Europe and the Mediterranean Basin D.300D.399 Recommendations applicable in Latin America D.400D.499 Recommendations applicable in Asia and Oceania D.500D.599 Recommendations applicable to the African Region D.600D.699 For further details, please refer to the li
9、st of ITU-T Recommendations. Rec. ITU-T D.156 (2008)/Amd.1 (05/2010) i Recommendation ITU-T D.156 Network externalities Amendment 1 New Annex A Practical implementation of Recommendation ITU-T D.156 Summary Annex A to Recommendation ITU-T D.156 concerns the practical implementation of Recommendation
10、 ITU-T D.156. History Edition Recommendation Approval Study Group 1.0 ITU-T D.156 2008-10-30 3 1.1 ITU-T D.156 (2008) Amend.1 2010-05-21 3 ii Rec. ITU-T D.156 (2008)/Amd.1 (05/2010) FOREWORD The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of tele
11、communications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing teleco
12、mmunications on a worldwide basis. The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the pr
13、ocedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-Ts purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. NOTE In this Recommendation, the expression “Administration“ is used for conciseness to indicate both a te
14、lecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of
15、these mandatory provisions are met. The words “shall“ or some other obligatory language such as “must“ and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
16、ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU me
17、mbers or others outside of the Recommendation development process. As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may
18、not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at http:/www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/. ITU 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU. Rec. ITU-T D.15
19、6 (2008)/Amd.1 (05/2010) iii CONTENTS Page 1 Does the externality premium constitute a cost element that should be added to the other cost elements included in Recommendations D.93 and D.140? . 1 2 To which networks does the network externality premium apply? 1 3 How will it be guaranteed that the e
20、xternality premium will be paid and then used for network development? 1 4 Who receives externality premiums? 2 5 What is the procedure for collecting the externality premium and controlling the use to which it is put? . 2 6 How to define developed countries and developing countries? . 2 7 What mech
21、anism can be used to prevent the funding of original licence obligations and universal service obligations with funds received from payment of the externality premium? 2 8 What mechanism can be used to prevent the conclusion of discriminatory agreements between the main telecommunication companies i
22、n the developed countries and their subsidiaries in the developing countries, as well as abuses in the calculation of the premium in bilateral agreements? 3 9 Do the provisions of Recommendation D.156 violation provisions of WTO agreements? 3 Rec. ITU-T D.156 (2008)/Amd.1 (05/2010) 1 Recommendation
23、ITU-T D.156 Network externalities Amendment 1 New Annex A Practical implementation of Recommendation ITU-T D.156 (This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation) 1 Does the externality premium constitute a cost element that should be added to the other cost elements included in Recommendat
24、ions ITU-T D.93 and ITU-T D.140? The externality premium is not a cost element but is rather the financial expression and the evaluation of an economic benefit (network externality) enjoyed by an economic agent, in this case the subscribers to a telecommunication network. The premium is additional t
25、o the service cost and must be seen as an element involved in service pricing in the same way that the profit margin is added to the service cost to obtain the price. 2 To which networks does the network externality premium apply? The externality premium is the financial expression and the evaluatio
26、n of an economic benefit enjoyed by an economic agent as a consequence of the benefits created by the expansion of a network that presents a strong potential for expansion in terms of subscribers. The premium would only apply to networks which have a potential for expansion in terms of subscribers1.
27、 3 How will it be guaranteed that the externality premium will be paid and then used for network development? Payment of the externality premium and its use for network expansion in terms of subscribers will be guaranteed by the parties to the relationship and may be overseen by national regulators
28、as appropriate: 1) Payment of the premium is recorded by the regulators following its payment and receipt by the two operators in the relationship. 2) At the beginning of each year, the operator receiving the premium must draw up a plan for expanding its network in terms of subscribers using those f
29、unds. The plan must be sure to specify the investment needed for the proposed expansion and the corresponding financial assessments. A copy of the plan is submitted to the regulator and to the other party. 3) Execution of the plan is verified by the regulator, which reports the results of its verifi
30、cation to the national operators and to the foreign operators paying the premium. The latter operators have the right to send a verification mission to the regulator. Charging of the premium must be effected at the beginning of each period. National regulators may take actions as appropriate should
31、the expansion fail to take place. For example, the regulator could submit an expansion programme by way of the operators regulatory obligation, and that operator would at the same time be barred from receipt of the externality premium for a period of three years. In the interests of transparency, re
32、gulatory bodies may publish _ 1South Africa stated that network externalities, in principle, are not only applicable for the expansion of networks in terms of subscriber numbers, but also for the retention of marginal subscribers. 2 Rec. ITU-T D.156 (2008)/Amd.1 (05/2010) the levels of externality p
33、remiums and the amounts involved in expansion activities financed from the premium, together with any other statistical data called for by ITU. 4 Who receives externality premiums? The externality premium is received by a developing country operator whose network shows potential for expansion in ter
34、ms of subscriber numbers. Such a network is a source of value for mature and in many cases saturated networks. The level of the premium is proportional to the volume of traffic originating in a developed country and terminated on the developing country operators network. It is important to note that
35、 payment of the premium will take place only where there is a genuine network externality. 5 What is the procedure for collecting the externality premium and controlling the use to which it is put? The collection procedure will be the same as is used for the accounting rate. The means of control wil
36、l be the audits carried out by regulatory bodies, which may also take the following steps: 1) Submission, at the beginning of the financial period, of a network expansion in terms of subscribers to be financed from externality premiums. 2) Verification by the regulator of adherence to the financial
37、estimate for the expansion and of consistency between the use of the funds and the premium received or to be received. 3) Evaluation of the expansion work done, or to be done, under financing from the externality premium. 4) In the event of non-consistency, the regulator may impose an obligation to
38、expand or a reduction in the amount to be paid by the paying party in subsequent exchanges. 5) Failure to abide by the relevant provisions may result in action by the regulator as appropriate, for example suspension of payment of the premium for a period of three years. 6 How to define developed cou
39、ntries and developing countries? This definition has already been made by UNDP. 7 What mechanism can be used to prevent the funding of original licence obligations and universal service obligations with funds received from payment of the externality premium? This mechanism will form part of the cont
40、rol function to be exercised by the regulatory body in the country of the operator receiving the externality premium. The regulatory obligations associated with licences and universal service are set out in each operators terms of reference and are subject to ongoing verification by the regulator, w
41、hich ensures that regulatory obligations in regard to coverage are fully complied with and that externality premiums received by its operators have actually been used for network expansion in terms of subscribers. The regulator may also draw up and publish a verification report, thereby ensuring tra
42、nsparency in implementation of the network externality premium. Rec. ITU-T D.156 (2008)/Amd.1 (05/2010) 3 8 What mechanism can be used to prevent the conclusion of discriminatory agreements between the main telecommunication companies in the developed countries and their subsidiaries in the developi
43、ng countries, as well as abuses in the calculation of the premium in bilateral agreements? Just as the regulatory bodies seek to ensure adherence to transparency, non-discrimination and equity in interconnection agreements, which constitute bilateral agreements between operators, they may also seek
44、to ensure that those same principles are upheld when it comes to calculation of the network externality premium and its payment to operators. To this end, the same level of premium is paid, per minute of terminated call, to each recipient operator within a given national territory. 9 Do the provisio
45、ns of Recommendation ITU-T D.156 violate provisions of WTO agreements? No. The WTO provisions apply only to actions of governments who are members of WTO. The operative part of Recommendation ITU-T D.156 is addressed to operators, not to governments. As a consequence, this Recommendation cannot viol
46、ate provisions of the WTO agreements. Further, individual decisions taken by operators in developed countries in accordance with Recommendation ITU-T D.156 could not be considered to be discriminatory measures in the sense of WTO provisions, because the decisions in question are within the economic
47、freedom of operators and do not fall within the mandate of WTO provisions, which forbid discriminatory actions on the part of the WTO Member States and oblige the said States to ensure that their major suppliers offer interconnection on a non-discriminatory basis. It cannot be said that an operators
48、 decision to pay an externality premium to a given operator in order to finance a likely increase in its revenue would be a discriminatory measure, because clearly the operator who is paying would likely be ready to pay the same premium to any other operator whose network could experience strong gro
49、wth in terms of subscriber numbers. Printed in Switzerland Geneva, 2010 SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS Series A Organization of the work of ITU-T Series D General tariff principles Series E Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors Series F Non-telephone telecommunication services Series G Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks Series H Audiovisual and multimedia systems Series I Integrated services digital network Series J Cable networks and transmission of tel
