1、Lessons Learned Entry: 0332Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 0332a71 Lesson Date: 1993-08-16a71 Submitting Organization: MSFCa71 Submitted by: Baggs, EllisSubject: Quality Assurance Access to Critical Areas, Management Description of Driving Event: The Hubble Space Telescope did not perform to the requ
2、irements of the contract. A spherical aberration was attributed to the spacing between the field lens and the lower mirror of the reflective null corrector. Note that the reflective null corrector is not a part of the HST but is special test equipment used to verify the curvature of the primary mirr
3、or, and to aid in the shaping of the telescope mirrors. It was concluded that the problems would likely have been discovered by quality assurance and design oversight if these functions had been conducted in acccordance with the product assurance plan. It was decided to depart from the plan and excl
4、ude quality oversight (with the consent of QA) in some areas. There were other problems, which were not as drastic as the spherical aberration which probably would have been discovered also. These problems led to considerable embarrassment to NASA, expenditure of additional funds to determine the ca
5、use and plan for on-orbit repair, and a reduced scientific return.Lesson(s) Learned: If program or engineering management exercises the authority to deny QA access to critical areas, QA oversite will be severely compromized.Recommendation(s): The quality assurance oversight function should be a sepa
6、rate function from program and engineering management.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: Collective wisdom * Memorandum and Report from George Rodney, Associate Administrator, Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Office of Safet
7、y and Mission Quality, NASA. Report entitled “SRM & QA OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED“.Documents Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Sciencea71 Space Operationsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Safety & Mission AssuranceAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 1994-08-31a71 Approval Name: Baggs, Ellisa71 Approval Organization: EL01a71 Approval Phone Number: 205-544-3293Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-
