REG NASA-LLIS-1056--1999 Lessons Learned - X-33 Structural Test Article (STA) Tank Incident.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1056Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1056a71 Lesson Date: 1999-07-28a71 Submitting Organization: GRCa71 Submitted by: Manuel B. Dominguez/Eric RaynorSubject: X-33 Structural Test Article (STA) Tank Incident Description of Driving Event: The X-33 STA tank was sent from Marshall S

2、pace Flight Center (MSFC), Huntsville, Alabama, to NASA Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio via commercial ground carrier. The carrier and the project team at GRC planned the route and coordinated it with the Department of Transportation of every state the carrier was to pass through. The truck c

3、arrying the tank left on June 24, 1999. On Sunday, June 27, 1999 the truck failed to clear an underpass in West Virginia. The tank was hit on the upper corner on the drivers side. Some insulation was damaged and some bolts were sheared. At the time of the incident, the truck was following a lead tru

4、ck with a frame that simulated the configuration of the tank in the main truck. The vehicles were traveling at 5 miles per hour at the time of impact. This particular underpass was not considered a problem in the original plan. Based on the information collected by the investigation team, it is the

5、teams conclusion that the driver of the main truck failed to follow the lead vehicle in a manner that would allow it to clear the underpass safely.Lesson(s) Learned: Future planning for such trips must include emphasis on following the lead vehicle, especially on the approach to the bridge where the

6、 incident occurred.Recommendation(s): 1. A comprehensive engineering assessment of the damage shall be completed to determine the integrity of the STA.2. 3. A plan to qualify the tank for use at GRC shall be developed and concurred with by OSAT Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or network

7、ing permitted without license from IHS-,-,-and PDS project personnel4. The GRC Executive Safety Board shall approve the tank repair plan. The GRC Office of Safety and Assurance Technologies (OSAT) shall verify that all plan elements are successfully completed prior to GRC use.5. The planning for the

8、 return trip of the STA to MSFC should include increased emphasis on the following the lead vehicle, especially on the approach to the bridge where the incident occurred.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa7

9、1 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Flight Equipmenta71 Ground Operationsa71 Hardwarea71 Human Factorsa71 Logisticsa71 Parts Materials & Processesa71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 Spacecrafta71 Test Articlea71 TransportationAdditional Info: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2001-12-14a71 Approval Name: Bill Loewya71 Approval Organization: GRCa71 Approval Phone Number: 202-358-0528Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-

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