REG NASA-LLIS-1157--2000 Lessons Learned Aerospace Technology Management Oversight Flight Operations.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1157Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1157a71 Lesson Date: 2000-02-01a71 Submitting Organization: HQa71 Submitted by: David M. LengyelSubject: Aerospace Technology/Management Oversight/Flight Operations Description of Driving Event: Poor Flight Operations Definition of Roles and

2、Responsibilities for Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) ProgramLesson(s) Learned: The chain of safety responsibility for the operation of the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) aircraft is complex and unclear.Recommendation(s): Sort out and clear up the SO

3、FIA chain of flight operations safety responsibility.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: The chain of flight operations safety responsibility of SOFIA is as follows: Within NASA, the Center Director at the Ames Research Center (ARC), the designated Lead Center for SOFIA, has the responsibi

4、lity to ensure the safety of SOFIA, including flight operations. The Center Director has a Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Office, which ensures that Agency policies for safety are followed, as well as an Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Board (AFSRB), which provides specific oversight for

5、 aircraft airworthiness. These two mechanisms for safety oversight report directly to the Center Director and work closely and regularly with the SOFIA Program Office at ARC, which directs the SOFIA contractor team. An experienced NASA Flight Operations Manager for SOFIA carries the responsibility w

6、ithin the SOFIA Program Office to ensure that safety of flight operations receives the utmost attention in contractor activities.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Further details follow, starting from the lowest level to show the founda

7、tion of flight operations safety embodied in the SOFIA program wherein aircraft operations will be performed by United Airlines (UAL).The first level of aircraft operational safety responsibility, working from the bottom-up, is that SOFIA aircraft operations and maintenance will be accomplished by U

8、AL, the SOFIA contractor for aircraft operations, under UAL Operations/Specifications, which meet or exceed the operations rules established by appropriate Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), Airworthiness Directives, and Service Bulletins. The program will be overseen and certified by the FAA for F

9、AR compliance. Appropriate clearance and signoffs, as mandated by UAL Operations/Specifications, will be the responsibility of UAL.NASA policy also requires effective NASA oversight for safety. This is accomplished by NASAs Ames Research Center (ARC) as the designated Lead Center within NASA for SOF

10、IA. At ARC, as with programs at other NASA Centers, the Center Director delegates overall program management for SOFIA to the SOFIA Program Manager, reporting directly to the Center Director to ensure visibility.Directly supporting the SOFIA Program Manager is the NASA Flight Operations Manager for

11、SOFIA, experienced in aircraft flight operations and qualified to make routine SOFIA flight operations approval decisions. This individual, a senior experienced operations expert and pilot, also has the current responsibility for ensuring that that appropriate expertise in flight operations and flig

12、ht safety is incorporated into the current design and development of SOFIA and into the planning for SOFIA flight operations.In addition, to ensure matters of safety and airworthiness receive the utmost attention and visibility, the ARC Center Director has in place two other mechanisms. First, there

13、 is an independent Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Office at ARC that works closely with the SOFIA Program Office, but reports directly to the Center Director and has direct ties to the NASA Headquarters S&MA Office to ensure overall Agency policy on safety is followed. This ARC S&MA Office has

14、direct and on-going access to the ground and flight operations activities of the SOFIA contractor team.Second, the ARC Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Board (AFSRB) provides airworthiness oversight for SOFIA aircraft modifications and mission equipment installations. The AFSRB reviews the SOF

15、IA aircraft design, related technical analysis, development testing and all associated documentation, and provides airworthiness recommendations to the Center Director for conduct of test flights, for initiating routine flight operations, and for reinitiating flight operations following any subseque

16、nt, significant aircraft modifications.Concurrence in the approval of development and checkout flights will be required from both the AFSRB and the Head of the ARC S&MA Office.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Safety oversight as struct

17、ured above by ARC management was previously agreed to by the NASA Headquarters Office of Management Systems (Code J), with the cognizance and concurrence of the NASA Headquarters Offices of Space Science (Code S) and S&MA (Code Q).In a more recent organizational change prompted by an internal NASA r

18、eview, ARC is establishing an Aviation Management Office to have certain management responsibilities for all aircraft operations at ARC, recognizing that two non-NASA organizations (U.S. Army and U.S. Forest Service) also conduct flight operations at ARC. The details of these responsibilities, and i

19、n particular their inter-relationship with the previously approved oversight structure for SOFIA outlined above, are under development at this time.Documents Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Administration/Orga

20、nizationa71 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panela71 Aircrafta71 Policy & Planninga71 Safety & Mission AssuranceAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2002-03-18a71 Approval Name: Bill Loewya71 Approval Organization: HQa71 Approval Phone Number: 202-358-0528Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-

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