1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1468Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1468a71 Lesson Date: 2003-08-31a71 Submitting Organization: JSCa71 Submitted by: David LengyelSubject: Accident Investigations/Software Tool Selection Abstract: A criteria-based software tool selection process should have been implemented. Ad
2、vanced software tools with which most people are unfamiliar delay investigation initiation.Description of Driving Event: A criteria-based software tool selection process was not used for support of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). As a result, the primary Board and Task Force users
3、procured a software tool without fully understanding the capabilities and limitations of the software. In addition, investigation personnel were required to learn new software tools (e.g., databases), adding inefficiencies in Board and Task Force startup time.Lesson(s) Learned: A criteria-based tool
4、 selection process should have been implemented, and it should have been kept in mind that advanced software tools that most people are unfamiliar with, such as databases, cause delays in initiating an investigation. Further, the use of multiple software tools implemented to satisfy specific needs c
5、ause additional startup delays and tax the IT support staff.Recommendation(s): a71 Develop an appendix/annex to the Contingency Action Plan (CAP) and annually update the definition of critical tool requirements based on established selection criteria.a71 Develop a clear set of functional requirement
6、s for use in the criteria-based tool selection. In particular, consider early on that all investigation data will have to be archived.a71 (NASA should) identify in advance software tools for data management that can be Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without lice
7、nse from IHS-,-,-implemented quickly to support future investigations. Factors to consider include meeting anticipated software system availability, data security, firewall requirements, data capacity, and on-site/off-site access requirements for supporting a major mishap investigation.a71 Implement
8、 software solutions that are proven and that local Center IT and CM personnel are familiar with to minimize coordination, expedite implementation, and reduce potential system/transmission interface issues.a71 Avoid significant modification or customized software development. When necessary, develop
9、specific software system requirements so that support contractors have clear guidance and can implement requirements appropriately.a71 Separate database administration and general Task Force IT support functions (e.g., service requests, user configuration and set-up, etc.).a71 Avoid multiple softwar
10、e solutions and multiple data repositories as data will diverge making configuration management difficult.a71 Provide a start up kit and appropriate training for the Board Chairman and Board members upon arrival.a71 Discourage investigation board and support staff recommendations from implementing n
11、ew software solutions that have to be “force-fit” with systems defined in the CAP that have been approved, tested, and accepted by NASAs IT administration. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: TBD NASA ResponseDocuments Related to Lesson: Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Oper
12、ationsMission Directorate(s): a71 Space Operationsa71 Exploration SystemsAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Accident Investigationa71 Administration/Organizationa71 Computersa71 Configuration Managementa71 Information Technology/Systemsa71 NASA Standardsa71 Policy & Planninga71 Safety & Mission Assurance
13、Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-a71 SecurityAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2004-06-16a71 Approval Name: Ronald Montaguea71 Approval Organization: JSCa71 Approval Phone Number: 281-483-8576Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-
