1、_ SAE TechnicDO6WDQGDUGV%RDUG5XOHVSURYLGHWKDW7KLVUHSRUWLVSXEOLVKHG E6$(WRDGYDQFHWKHVWDWHRIWHFKQLFDODQGHQJLQHHULQJVFL ences. The use of this report is entirely voluntary, and its applicability and suitability for any particular use, including any SDWHQWLQIULQJHPHQWDULVLQJWKHUHIURPLVWKHVROHUHVSRQVLELO
2、LWRIWK HXVHU SAE reviews each technical report at least every five years at which time it may be revised, reaffirmed, stabilized, or cancelled. SAE invites your written comments and suggestions. Copyright 2016 SAE International All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stor
3、ed in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of SAE. TO PLACE A DOCUMENT ORDER: Tel: 877-606-7323 (inside USA and Canada) Tel: +1 724-776-4970 (outside USA) Fax: 724-776-0790
4、Email: CustomerServicesae.org SAE WEB ADDRESS: http:/www.sae.org SAE values your input. To provide feedback on this Technical Report, please visit http:/standards.sae.org/J3114_201612 SURFACE VEHICLE INFORMATION REPORT J3114 DEC2016 Issued 2016-12 Human Factors Definitions for Automated Driving and
5、Related Research Topics RATIONALE This Information Report covers the human factors issues involving the integration of driving automation system features into the vehicle, focusing on issues that affect driver/user performance and experience through the driver/user-vehicle-interface (DVI). This repo
6、rt is intended to aid research and facilitate improved DVI design and usability by establishing working definitions for key concepts of levels 2 through 4 driving automation system features (SAE J3016), and to provide references to relevant research. This report serves as a complementary document to
7、 SAE J3016. INTRODUCTION This Information Report provides a summary of the activities to date of Task Force #5 - Automated Vehicles and DVI Farid, M.; Tnert, L.; Bengler K. (2012a). bernahmezeiten beim hochautomatisierten Autofahren. 5. Tagung Fahrerassistenz 2012. Mnchen. Germany. 3. DEFINITIONS 3.
8、1 Terms defined in SAE J3016 and/or SAE J3063: 3.1.1 Active Safety System (SAE J3063) 3.1.2 Automated Driving System (ADS) 3.1.3 ADS-Dedicated Vehicle (ADS-DV) 3.1.4 Driving Automation 3.1.5 Driving Automation System or Technology 3.1.6 Driving Automation System Feature or Application 3.1.7 Driving
9、Mode 3.1.8 Dynamic Driving Task (DDT) 3.1.9 (DDT) Fallback 3.1.10 (DDT Performance-Relevant) System Failure 3.1.11 Lateral Vehicle Motion Control 3.1.12 Longitudinal Vehicle Motion Control 3.1.13 Minimal Risk Condition 3.1.14 Monitor 3.1.14.1 Monitor the Driver 3.1.14.2 Monitor the Driving Environme
10、nt 3.1.14.3 Monitor Vehicle Performance (for Vehicle Conditions that Adversely Affect DDT Performance) 3.1.14.4 Monitor Driving Automation System Performance 3.1.15 Object and Event Detection and Response (OEDR) 3.1.16 Operate a Motor Vehicle SAE INTERNATIONAL J3114DEC2016 Page 3 of 60 3.1.17 Operat
11、ional Design Domain (ODD) 3.1.18 Receptivity (of the User) 3.1.19 Request to Intervene 3.1.20 Supervise (Driving Automation System Performance) 3.1.21 Sustained (Operation) 3.1.22 (Human) User 3.1.22.1 Driver 3.1.22.1.1 (Conventional) Driver 3.1.22.1.2 Remote Driver 3.1.22.2 Passenger 3.1.22.3 (DDT)
12、 Fallback-Ready User 3.1.22.4 Dispatcher 3.1.23 Trip 3.1.24 Usage Specification 3.1.25 Vehicle 3.1.26 Level 2 Partial Driving Automation 3.1.27 Level 3 Conditional Driving Automation 3.1.28 Level 4 High Driving Automation 4. TERMS RELATED TO USER INTERACTION WITH DRIVING AUTOMATION 4.1 Driving Autom
13、ation Abuse The intentional mis-XVHRIDGULYLQJDXWRPDWLRQVVWHPIHDWXUHLQDPDQQHUFRQWUDUWRWKHPDQXIDFWXUHUVLQVWUXFWLRQ V EXAMPLE: The driver of a vehicle equipped with and engaged level 2 driving automation system straps a weight to the steering wheel in order to defeat the feature designed to ensure that
14、 the driver is paying attention to the driving task by requiring frequent or consistent steering wheel torque. S/he then uses both hands to browse the internet on a tablet comSXWHU*LYHQWKDWOHYHOIHDWXUHVUHTXLUHWKHGULYHUWRVXSHUYLVHWKHVVWHPVperformance of the dynamic driving task (DDT) throughout the p
15、eriod that it is engaged, this behavior constitutes abuse. SAE INTERNATIONAL J3114DEC2016 Page 4 of 60 4.2 Eutactic Behavior The intentional use of a driving automation system feature in a manner inconsistent with its design intent, but which is perceived by the user to be safe and practical based o
16、n experience. NOTE: Eutactic behavior is different from forms of abuse such as risk-taking or negligence in that the driver is intentionally acting to balance the risks versus the perceived benefits associated with using the system in a manner that is inconsistent with its design intent. EXAMPLE: Th
17、e driver of a vehicle equipped with and engaged SAE level 2 driving automation system feature that is explicitly not designed to be used in poor weather may continue to use it in poor weather even if it periodically fails to detect lead vehicles and/or lane markings because it still provides some su
18、pport to the driver in performing the DDT. 4.3 Driving Automation Misuse The unintentional use of a driving automation system feature in a manner contrary to tKHPDQXIDFWXUHUVLQVWUXFWLRQV NOTE: This comprehends instances when instructed use from or by the manufacturer is not available to the user, or
19、 when the user does not access the provided instructions. EXAMPLE: The fallback-ready user (FRU) of a vehicle equipped with and engaged SAE level 3 Automated Driving System (ADS) feature that performs the complete DDT in congested traffic on fully access-controlled IUHHZDVIDOOVDVOHHSZKLFKLVQRWSHUPLW
20、WHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHPDQXIDFWXUHUVL QVWUXFWLRQVVLQFHWKH)58must be able to perform the DDT fallback on short notice when needed. 4.4 Driving Automation Disuse The intentional non-use of a driving automation system feature. NOTE: $XWRPDWLRQGLVXVHLVXVXDOOWKHUHVXOWRIFRPSOHWHODFNRIWUXVWLQWKHVVWHPVFDSDELOLWLH
21、V 4.5 Inappropriate Reliance 4.5.1 Over-Reliance The situation in which, despite apparently degraded driving automation system performance, the user does not intervene because the system has not issued a warning or otherwise seems to be performing adequately. NOTE 1: Over-reliance results in errors
22、of omission. NOTE 2: Over-reliance is distinct from over-compliance, in which compliance refers to the situation in which the operator acts in response to a warning or a command from the automation that leads to an error of commission (cf. Skitka, Mosier, such overconfidence may lead to over-relianc
23、e. .H5HIHUHQFH$GULYHUVEHOLHIWKDWPDUHVXOWLQDODFNRIYLJLODQFHEDVHGR QDQXQMXVWLILHGDVVXPSWLRQRIVDWLVIDFWRUsystem state (Billings et al., 1976). Reference: Billing, C.E., Lauber, J.K., Funkhouser, H., Lyman, G., Automation Bias is rather a type of complacency. Complacency is typically associated with the
24、 types of misuse or abuse that have safety implications. EXAMPLE 1: The driver of a vehicle equipped with and engaged level 2 driving automation system feature that automatically changes lanes when requested by the driver fails to supervise the maneuver as required and thus has a conflict with anoth
25、er vehicle that appears suddenly in the destination lane. EXAMPLE 2: A level 2 automated parking system is unable to recognize fire hydrants; an inattentive driver nevertheless accepts the illegal parking space suggestion. 4.5.1.2 Lack of Receptivity (Level 3) The user is not receptive to a vehicle
26、system failure or a request to intervene issued by a level 3 feature. Reference: Receptivity (see SAE J3016). EXAMPLE: The fallback-ready user of a vehicle equipped with an engaged level 3 ADS feature does not respond to a request to intervene due to having fallen asleep. 4.5.2 Under-Reliance The in
27、tentional skeptical use of a driving automation system feature. NOTE 1: A user under-relies on the driving automation system when s/he redundantly performs a role that the system is designed to do. NOTE 2: A potential consequence is not taking advantage of the systems may lead to automation disuse o
28、r misuse. SAE INTERNATIONAL J3114DEC2016 Page 6 of 60 EXAMPLE: A driver who has engaged a level 2 automated parallel parking feature constantly overrides it during the PDQHXYHUEHFDXVHKHGRHVQWWUXVWLW 5. TERMS RELATED TO USER PERCEPTIONS AND UNDERSTANDING OF DRIVING AUTOMATION 5.1 User Operating Mode
29、Awareness 7KHXVHUVFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIWKHFXUUHQWRSHUDWLQJPRGHRIWKHGULYLQJDXWRPDWLRQVVWHP and its ability to transition to another mode, as well as an understanding of the subtasks (or actions) that they as the driver are required to perform (if any) versus those the driving automation system is performin
30、g. NOTE 1: 0RGHDZDUHQHVVLQFOXGHVDSUHGLFWLYHDELOLW$ZDUHQHVVUHIHUVWRWKH DELOLW RIWKHXVHUWRWUDFNDQG WRanticipate the behavior of a given driving automation system feature (Sarter this could also be considered as a lack of Operating State Knowledge. 5.7 Situation Awareness $GULYHUVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHGULY
31、LQJHQYLURQPHQWDVLWSHUWDLQVWRSHUIRUPDQFHRI 7VXEWDVNVLQFOXGLQJWKHGULYHUVperception of the elements of the environment, the comprehension of their meaning, and the prediction of their near-future status (Endsley, 1995B; this includes Operating Mode Awareness). NOTE: (OHPHQWV RI WKH HQYLURQPHQW FRXOG UH
32、IHU WRRWKHU YHKLFOes, pedestrians, objects, signage, roadway type, or weather conditions, any of which may affect the current or predicted state of the vehicle as it travels through its environment. 5.8 Trust in Driving Automation The human propensity for relying on driving automation technology. NO
33、TE: Inappropriate trust in driving automation may lead to over reliance (3.4.1). 5.9 First Failure Effect The behavioral and attitudinal adjustment that a user undergoes upon occurrence of a driving automation system failure after having implicitly trusted the system for some period of time without
34、failure, thus resulting in recalibration to an appropriate level of trust. NOTE: This term is also used to describe the phenomenon where error rates when handling the first driving automation system failure experienced are expected to be higher than the error rates while handling subsequent failures
35、 due to the initial inappropriate trust in the system. 6. TERMS RELATED TO DRIVING AUTOMATION STATUS AND BEHAVIOUR 6.1 Reliability of a Driving Automation System The relative frequency of failures and performance limitations for a given driving automation system feature that impede users from having
36、 full utility of the system. NOTE: Because this document aims to specify and define terms related to the Human Machine Interface (HMI) aspects of driving automation, this definition defines system reliability from the perspective of the user, rather than from the perspective of the system designer.
37、Thus, it does not distinguish between actual system failures and system performance limitations that users often perceive as system failures. It should be noted that from the perspective of the system designer, only actual system failures count in assessing system reliability. 6.1.1 Failure of a dri
38、ving automation system (see SAE J3016 DDT performance relevant system failure). SAE INTERNATIONAL J3114DEC2016 Page 8 of 60 6.1.2 Performance limitation of a level 1 or 2 driving automation system. $OHYHORUGULYLQJDXWRPDWLRQVVWHPRSHUDWLQJVWDWHLQZKLFKWKHVVWHPVP DQQHURIEHKDYLRULVXQGHVLUDEOHIURPDXVHUVVW
39、DQGSRL nt due to transient lapses in performance that are inherent in the system as designed and specified, rather than due to a system failure. NOTE 1: To a user who experiences it, a driving automation system performance limitation may be indistinguishable from a driving automation system failure.
40、 NOTE 2: A driving automation system feature may or may not be capable of diagnosing a given performance limitation that adversely affects driving automation system performance, and therefore may or may not alert the user of its imminent or actual occurrence. EXAMPLE 1: Due to limitations in image p
41、rocessing software, the camera system used to track lane lines for a level 1 lane centering feature mistakes partially erased lane lines as currently applicable lane lines and wrongly steers the vehicle into an adjacent lane, requiring the driver to manually steer the vehicle to avoid the mistaken l
42、ane change. EXAMPLE 2: Due to sensor specification, mounting height and programming, the level 1 ACC radar on a given vehicle undershoots the heavy-duty truck in front of the vehicle and instead picks up a car in front of the heavy-duty truck. As a result, the driver has to apply the brakes to avoid
43、 colliding with the heavy-duty truck. 6.2 Operating Mode A system condition defined by the distribution of DDT subtasks and/or DDT fallback between the user and a given driving automation system feature ensuring completion of the DDT and DDT fallback. Figure 1 describes the distribution of roles. Fi
44、gure 1 Operating mode roles NOTE 1: This definition refers to how the user perceives the operating mode(s) of the driving automation system and the consequent subtasks of the DDT that the user is required to perform versus those of the driving automation system. NOTE 2: The DDT fallback is allocated to the driver in level 3 and allocated to the ADS in levels 4 through 5 (se
