1、NOT MEASUREMENTSENSITIVEMIL-HDBK-515 (USAF)11 October 2002DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEHANDBOOKWEAPON SYSTEM INTEGRITY GUIDE (WSIG)This Handbook is for guidance only. Do not cite this document as a requirement.AMSC AREA SESSDISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.Pro
2、vided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-515 (USAF)iiFOREWORD1. This handbook is approved for use by the Department of the Air Force and isavailable for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department of Defense (DoD).2. This handb
3、ook is for guidance only. This handbook cannot be cited as arequirement. If it is, the contractor does not have to comply.3. This document provides guidance on how to integrate the existing integrityprocesses within systems engineering. This is accomplished through three basicthrusts:a. To integrate
4、 the efforts called out in the various integrity processes, namely: theAircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP), the Engine Structural Integrity Program(ENSIP), the Mechanical Equipment and Subsystems Integrity Program (MECSIP),and the Avionics/Electronics Integrity Process (AVIP).b. To synergis
5、tically integrate or coordinate specific integrity process efforts/taskswith related efforts in various other systems engineering disciplines (see table 1).c. To place increased emphasis on the sustainment portion of the life cycle.4. The integrity processes outlined for design and manufacturing alo
6、ng with soundrepeatable maintenance practices, resulting from accurate training systems andtechnical orders, are critical to the achievement, fielding, and sustainment of systemswhich meet the war fighters needs from delivery to retirement. 5. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletio
7、ns) and any pertinent datawhich may be of use in improving this document should be addressed to: ASC/ENOI,Bldg 560, 2530 Loop Road West, Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-7101 by using theStandardization Document Improvement Proposal (DD Form 1426) appearing at the endof this document, by letter, or by
8、e-mail to: Engineering.Standardswpafb.af.mil.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-515 (USAF)iiiCONTENTSPARAGRAPH PAGE1. SCOPE. 11.1 Scope. 11.2 Applicability. . 11.3 Introduction. 11.4 Responsibilities. . 32. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
9、. 32.1 General. 32.2 Government documents. 32.2.1 Specifications, standards, and handbooks. 32.2.2 Other Government documents, drawings, and publications. 42.3 Order of precedence. . 43. DEFINITIONS. 43.1 Acronyms used in this handbook: 44. WEAPON SYSTEM INTEGRITY PROCESS. 64.1 Planning and coordina
10、tion 114.2 Design criteria. . 124.3 Characterizing the environment. 124.4 Characterizing materials. 124.5 Characterizing production and quality 134.6 Identification and tracking of critical items 134.7 Analysis 144.8 Tests and demonstrations 154.9 Life management 154.9.1 Tracking 164.9.1.1 Tracking
11、defective product use. 174.9.1.2 Maintenance tracking 174.9.2 Lead the fleet 174.9.3 Force management and sustainment. 174.10 Application of integrity processes. 184.10.1 Application to new systems. . 184.10.2 Application to modifications. . 184.10.3 Application to COTS and modified use. 184.10.4 Ex
12、tending the service life of existing systems. . 195. SUMMARY. 196. NOTES. 206.1 Intended use. 206.2 Subject term (key word) listing. 20FIGURE 1. OSSb. To synergistically integrate or coordinate specific integrity process efforts/tasks withrelated efforts in various other systems engineering discipli
13、nes; andc. To place increased emphasis on the sustainment portion of the life cycle.This handbook does not supersede the integrity process documents referenced. This handbookis for guidance only and cannot be cited as a requirement.1.2 Applicability.Application of the WSIG to the design, production,
14、 and sustainment of systems is virtuallyunlimited. It applies to all elements of the weapon system (e.g., airframe, subsystems, avionics,engines, support, and training equipment) in all phases of life. Weapon system integrity appliesto more than just new developments: it applies to system modificati
15、ons (MODS), commercialoff-the-shelf (COTS) equipment, use of form, fit, and functional interface (F3I) (interchangeable),changes in use, service life extension, and all of the corresponding changes in sustainmentneeded to maintain the integrity of performance. Each integrity process document referen
16、cedherein details specific activities to be accomplished during the various phases within a program.This guide integrates the integrity processes within systems engineering and provides a singlecontractual reference.Each of the integrity process documents, as well as other referenced documents, prov
17、ide moredetailed guidance for application of pertinent integrity efforts in the design and sustainmentprocess. The application of guidance must be tailored to the equipment in question and thefunction provided. The WSIG integrates these practices and policies into a cohesive approachthat fills in th
18、e gaps, reduces overlap, and addresses sustainment of integrity of the system/itemthroughout its lifetime.1.3 Introduction.Weapon system integrity is an overarching set of tools and processes which enables theintegration of sound engineering practices at the systems level: the impetus being thesusta
19、inment of safety, suitability, and effectiveness for the life of the system. This includes theability to return systems to specification level performance after repair/overhaul activities.Weapon system integrity is an integral process through which operational safety, suitability, andeffectiveness (
20、OSS i.e. the applicable processes foran avionics upgrade to an existing platform will certainly differ from a new start program.Weapon system integrity helps to ensure the proper integrity processes are applied, whether aprogram is in development, undergoing a modification, or in a sustainment phase
21、.Weapon system integrity establishes overall guidance for an aircraft level integrity process. Itdoes not replace the existing integrity processes but points to them for the detailedimplementation related to a specific application. This methodology is shown on figure 1.FIGURE 1. OSS the technologica
22、l maturity of the design underProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-515 (USAF)7consideration, production process controllability, quality control; degree of systems integration;risk associated with wrong decisions; and the effort r
23、equired to gain that data still needed.Depending on the scope of the effort involved, different elements within a system will start andend this information gathering and decision process at different times within a program. For thisreason, system integrity, in terms of the tasks delineated, cannot b
24、e completely tied tomilestones for all systems or subsystems within any given program. Rather, theappropriateness of efforts and schedules must both support OSS validating analyses;increasing the understanding of the variability associated with manufacturing andcontrol; providing information regardi
25、ng the behavior of materials under stress; verifyingthe manufactured design meets requirements and can maintain that level ofperformance and safety for life. Through various phases of the integrity processes,these tests become more representative of the stress to be accumulated during theservice lif
26、e. Results of these tests, in terms of failures that occur, are analyzed andfolded back into the design, manufacturing process controls, parts procurement, andquality assurance, as appropriate.4.9 Life management.The purpose of life management is to ensure safe, sustainable, and reliable originalequ
27、ipment manufacturer (OEM) specification level performance that is readilymaintainable throughout life. When technology and materials are incapable of providinga solution that meets all requirements, or when a system is kept in use beyond theOther known stressing cyclesGround time/CyclesFlight time/C
28、ycles2 x lifeMission Reliability is the probability of failure for one missionduring the most “unreliable” portion of the service lifeService LifeWear OutRandomInfant MortalityFlight Time/CyclesProblems eliminated from field byEnvironmental Stress Screening,Inspections, etc.Example Design Life of 2
29、ormore life times based on“average manufacturing quality”MTBM can be derived fromprobability of failure over lifeDesign life varies based on:a. criticalityb. ability to detect before failure, andc. redundancyFailure FrequencyProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted withou
30、t license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-515 (USAF)16intended design service life, compensating provisions must be implemented. While lifemanagement is required for all systems, the extent to which it will affect the field varies.With aging aircraft, performance and health is an essential ingredient in field
31、maintenance, programmed depot maintenance, and overhaul processes. Theperformance and health of items must be monitored and compared to the timedreplacement/overhaul plan and the initial design criteria. Of greatest importance, theperformance and health must be continually assessed to ensure the saf
32、ety of theaircrew, maintenance crew, and especially for unmanned aircraft the inhabitants of thoseareas to be over flown.Economic life, as with criticality, is another life management consideration. Simply put,the economic life of a system is reached when it becomes cheaper to replace the unitthan t
33、o continue maintaining it. In a sense, durable critical items are those which mustbe economically maintainable, that is, repair or replacement of the item is moreeconomically feasible then developing a new system. This requires a well-defined wearout curve before economic decisions can be justified.
34、 It therefore follows that costeffective life management must also address issues such as diminishing manufacturingresources and technology refresh cycles.In general, there are several points that must be considered during life management:a. Monitoring aging aircraft to ensure OSS&E compliance.b. Th
35、e gathering of stress related environmental data.c. The gathering of maintenance and repair/overhaul data to ensure OEMspecification compliance through maintenance and repair/overhaul actions.d. Integrity analysis to determine the life used, tied to appropriate response(s) (TOs).Diminishing manufact
36、uring resources and technology refresh.Diminishing manufacturing resources (DMR) have become a fact of life: fewer sourcesare available and components are dropped, as they become economically infeasible.The use of commercial equipment in military environments requires the implementationof the integr
37、ity processes. As with COTS, the use of commercial parts in place of MILSTD parts requires similar scrutiny. To ensure the long-term integrity of the system, notonly design but parts procurement as well should require engineering concurrence tomaintain continued design specification performance.Tech
38、nology refresh programs (in effect a modification) occur for various reasons:everything from reducing maintenance and cost burdens to increasing capabilities andavailability. Technology refresh applications package new technology in existingsystems (also a modification). Consistent with OSS&E, modif
39、ications require the sameintegrity efforts that would be imparted on a new system.4.9.1 Tracking.Configuration management is a major constituent within life management as well asOSS&E. The ability to track individual items during use plays a direct role in the fidelityof life management. Moreover, i
40、t provides the additional flexibility needed to accomplishtrend analysis (useful in updating life estimates), identification/elimination of “bad actors”,and the understanding needed to allow the field use of “less than specification compliantitems” where advantageous.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo
41、reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-HDBK-515 (USAF)174.9.1.1 Tracking defective product use.Optimal use of programmatic assets often results in the use of “less than specificationcompliant” or “defective” items (generally handled through waiver, deviation, materialr
42、eview boards) to maintain testing schedules, deliveries, etc. Defective in this sensemeans “not within specification limits”. The presence of these defects may be related tolife (determined through integrity analysis) possibly affecting scheduled maintenance,removal, or inspection intervals. Life ma
43、nagement and in turn TOs for such items mustbe adjusted accordingly. The criticality of the function provided by the item(s) and thedegree to which individual item(s) can be tracked is fundamental in determining whethera “defective” item should be considered for use.4.9.1.2 Maintenance tracking.Main
44、tenance tracking supports inspection and repair of all equipment at all levels ofmaintenance. The TO and data system must ensure that sufficient information isgathered, preferably on a noninterference basis, to verify that actions have beenappropriately executed. Changes to TOs must consider the imp
45、acts to integrity. The TOsystem must ensure error free software. This implies control of configurations of bothsystems supported and TO content. TO logic changes and manual fault isolationprocedures must be evaluated against FMECA and SSHA to ensure consistency ofdesign, manufacturing, and maintenan
46、ce. This also necessitates that the TO content becontrolled at all points from development through implementation, with updates duringfield service (similar to software control procedures).4.9.2 Lead the fleet.Progress in electronics and data compression now allow for the tracking of stressingevents
47、 on virtually all life limited items (on systems with this capability). But even withthis capability, there is a defensible need for lead-the-fleet programs. Lead the fleetdoes more than assess the “average” wear or fatigue associated with “general” use oflife-limited items: it provides a substantia
48、l buffer. With each system having its ownunique signature of use, the need for generalizing can be overcome. However, lead thefleet provides a buffer, a time to react, between the highly used lead-the-fleet systemsand the rest of the fleet (as exposed to the future operational environment). Highlych
49、aracterized systems with refined analysis and well understood environmental stressgenerally could not justify the expense of lead the fleet, but less well understood usagemight find it beneficial. Lead the fleet is not limited to flying alone. It may be achieved ina laboratory through stress via actuated movements, deflections, loads, etc. that reflectfielded experience. In the long run this may prove to be more cost effective than afielded effort.4.9.3 Force management and sustainment.A
