1、| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BRITISH STANDARD BS ISO 15668:1999 ICS 35.
2、040: 35.240.40 NO COPYING WITHOUT BSI PERMISSION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW Banking Secure file transfer (retail)This British Standard, having been prepared under the direction of the DISC Board, was published under the authority of the Standards Committee and comes into effect on 15 April
3、 2000 BSI 04-2000 ISBN 0 580 34742 7 BS ISO 15668:1999 Amendments issued since publication Amd. No. Date Comments National foreword This British Standard reproduces verbatim ISO 15668:1999 and implements it as the UK national standard. The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to Technic
4、al Committee IST/12, Banking, securities and other financial services, which has the responsibility to: aid enquirers to understand the text; present to the responsible international/European committee any enquiries on the interpretation, or proposals for change, and keep the UK interests informed;
5、monitor related international and European developments and promulgate them in the UK. A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary. Cross-references The British Standards which implement international publications referred to in this document may
6、 be found in the BSI Standards Catalogue under the section entitled “International Standards Correspondence Index”, or by using the “Find” facility of the BSI Standards Electronic Catalogue. A British Standard does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Users of British S
7、tandards are responsible for their correct application. Compliance with a British Standard does not of itself confer immunity from legal obligations. Summary of pages This document comprises a front cover, an inside front cover, the ISO title page, pages ii to v, a blank page, pages 1 to 33 and a ba
8、ck cover. The BSI copyright notice displayed in this document indicates when the document was last issued.Referencenumber ISO15668:1999(E) INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 15668 Firstedition 1999-12-01 BankingSecurefiletransfer(retail) Banque Transfert de fichier de scurit (services aux particuliers)ISO15
9、668:1999(E) ii ISO15668:1999(E)iii Contents Page Foreword.iv Introduction.v 1 Scope1 2 Normativereferences3 3 Termsanddefinitions.4 4 Principles5 5 Application.6 6 Authenticationmechanisms.14 AnnexA(informative)Mechanismexamples.15 AnnexB(informative)Anexampleofimplementation23 AnnexC(informative)An
10、exampleforensuringfiletransferintegrityvalidation28 AnnexD(informative)Graphicsoverviewofsecurityserviceswithreferences33ISO15668:1999(E) iv Foreword ISO(theInternationalOrganizationforStandardization)isaworldwidefederationofnationalstandardsbodies(ISO memberbodies).TheworkofpreparingInternationalSt
11、andardsisnormallycarriedoutthroughISOtechnical committees.Eachmemberbodyinterestedinasubjectforwhichatechnicalcommitteehasbeenestablishedhas therighttoberepresentedonthatcommittee.Internationalorganizations,governmentalandnon-governmental,in liaisonwithISO,alsotakepartinthework.ISOcollaboratesclosel
12、ywiththeInternationalElectrotechnical Commission(IEC)onallmattersofelectrotechnicalstandardization. InternationalStandardsaredraftedinaccordancewiththerulesgivenintheISO/IECDirectives,Part3. DraftInternationalStandardsadoptedbythetechnicalcommitteesarecirculatedtothememberbodiesforvoting. Publicatio
13、nasanInternationalStandardrequiresapprovalbyatleast75%ofthememberbodiescastingavote. AttentionisdrawntothepossibilitythatsomeoftheelementsofthisInternationalStandardmaybethesubjectof patentrights.ISOshallnotbeheldresponsibleforidentifyinganyorallsuchpatentrights. InternationalStandardISO15668wasprep
14、aredbyTechnicalCommitteeISO/TC68, Banking, securities and other financial services, Subcommittee SC 6, Retail financial services. AnnexesAtoDofthisInternationalStandardareforinformationonly.ISO15668:1999(E)v Introduction ThisInternationalStandarddescribeshowtosecurefiletransfersinaretailbankingenvir
15、onment.Typicaluseof suchfiletransfersarethosebetweenacardacceptingdeviceandanacquirer,orbetweenanacquirerandacard issuer.INTERNATIONALSTANDARD ISO15668:1999(E)1 BankingSecurefiletransfer(retail) 1 Scope Incontrasttofiletransfersinawholesalebankingenvironmentcharacterisedbyexchangesoflargevolume, bet
16、weenmainframes,inarelativelyhigh-securityenvironment(“bulkfiletransfers“);thoseinaretailbanking environmentarecharacterisedbylowvolumesandalowerdegreeofreliabilityofenvironmentinwhich downloadeddevicesareoperated.Suchdevicesmaybe,butnotlimitedto,anelectronicpointofsaleterminal (EPOS),anautomatedvend
17、ingmachine(AVM),anautomatedtellermachine(ATM),oramerchantserverin communicationwithpaymentgateways. Itisassumedthatapre-establishedrelationshipexistsbetweentheentitiesinvolvedinthesecurefiletransfer, especiallytocoverthelegalandcommercialaspectsrelatedtothefiletransferliabilities. ThisInternationalS
18、tandardappliestothedifferentkindsoffiletransferusedinretailbankingenvironment,butdoes notcovertransactionmessagesidentifiedinISO8583. Thetransfermayrequiretimeliness,andrequiresatleastoneofthefollowingsecurityservices: messageoriginauthentication; receiverauthentication; integrity; confidentiality;
19、nonrepudiationoforigin; nonrepudiationofdelivery; auditability. Itisassumedthatalldataforwardedbytheoriginatorshallhavebeenconfirmedaslegitimateandcorrectpriorto thetransfer. Thedifferenttypesoffilestobetransferredcouldcontain: software; theretailtransactionswhichhavebeenperformedandregistered,(uplo
20、ading); technicaldatarelatedtoanacquirer(accessparameters.),(downloading); applicationdatarelatedtoanacquirer(BINlist,hotlist,.),(downloading).ISO15668:1999(E) 2 Characteristicsofsuchfiletransfersarethefollowing: a)thetypeofdatatobetransferredcanbe non-secretdata(collectionofretailtransactions,techn
21、icaldataandapplicationdata);or secretdata. b) thenumberofentitiestoreceivethedatacanbe: one; morethanone(broadcastwitheventhousandsofreceivers). c) thecommunicationchannelscanconsistofoneorbothofthefollowingexamples: telecommunication:publicnetwork,privatenetwork; d) thenatureofthetransfercanbe: dir
22、ect-connect,real-timetransfer(alsoknownascircuitswitching);or store-and-forwardtransfer(alsoknownasmessageswitching). NOTE ThisInternationalStandardconsidersthesecurityserviceduringthetransfer.Requirementstoensurethat transferredfileshavenotbeenalteredaftertransferachievementareoutsidethescopeofthis
23、InternationalStandard. PermissibleformsofSecureFileTransfer TransferofSecuredFiles Thetransferfunctiondoesnotprovideanysecurityservicesbutincludesonlycommunicationservices.Inthiscase thefileshallbesecuredpriortothetransfer.Securityismanagedbytheoriginatorandthereceiverthemselves. Theyneednottrustthe
24、lowerlevels.Thereisnosecurityaddedbythecommunicationlevel(senderandreceiver). SFT=SecureFileTransfer Securedtransferoffiles Inthiscase,thesecurityistakenintoaccountonlyfromthesendertothereceiverandtheoriginatorfullytruststhe sender.Oneexampleiswheretheoriginatoristhesenderandthesecurityisdelegatedto
25、thetransferlevel.Thisis notendtoendsecurityasthereisnosecurityaddedbytheoriginator.Inthiscase,thetransferfunctionfully includesthesecurityservices.Thefileneednotbesecuredpriortothesecuredtransfertakingplace.ISO15668:1999(E)3 Securedtransferofsecuredfiles Thesecurityfunctionscanbesplitupbetweenthesec
26、urityfunctionandthetransferfunction.Oneexampleis wheretheoriginatorcreatesafile,signsitwiththeprivatesignaturekey,andenciphersthefilewithakeyknown onlybytheenduser(thereceiver). Theconcerninthisexampleistopreventanyonewithinthesendersorganisationfromseeingthecontentofthe originatorsfile.However,theo
27、riginatortrustsitsagent(s)toprocessthetransferandtotakeintoaccountthe authentication,integrity,betweenthesenderandthereceiver. 2 Normativereferences Thefollowingnormativedocumentscontainprovisionswhich,throughreferenceinthistext,constituteprovisionsof thisInternationalStandard.Fordatedreferences,sub
28、sequentamendmentsto,orrevisionsof,anyofthese publicationsdonotapply.However,partiestoagreementsbasedonthisInternationalStandardareencouragedto investigatethepossibilityofapplyingthemostrecenteditionsofthenormativedocumentsindicatedbelow.For undatedreferences,thelatesteditionofthenormativedocumentref
29、erredtoapplies.MembersofISOandIEC maintainregistersofcurrentlyvalidInternationalStandards. ISO8372:1987, Information processing Modes of operation for a 64-bit block cipher algorithm. ISO8583:1993, Financial transaction card originated messages Interchange message specifications. ISO8731-1:1987, Ban
30、king Approved algorithms for message authentication Part 1: DEA. ISO9564-1:1991, Banking Personal Identification Number management and security Part 1: PIN protection principles and techniques. ISO/IEC9796:1991, Information technology Security techniques Digital signature scheme giving message recov
31、ery. ISO/IEC9796-2:1997, Information technology Security techniques Digital signature schemes giving message recovery Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function. ISO/IEC9797:1994, Information technology Security techniques Data integrity mechanism using a cryptographic check function employing a block
32、 cipher algorithm. ISO/IEC9798-1:1991, Information technology Security techniques Entity authentication mechanisms Part 1: General model. ISO/IEC9798-2:1994, Information technology Security techniques Entity authentication Part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric encipherment algorithms. ISO/IEC9798-3:199
33、3, Information technology Security techniques Entity authentication mechanisms Part 3: Entity authentication using a public key algorithm. ISO/IEC9798-4:1995, Information technology Security techniques Entity authentication Part 4: Mechanisms using a cryptographic check function. ISO9807:1991, Banki
34、ng and related financial services Requirements for message authentication (retail). ISO/IEC10116:1993, Information technology Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm. ISO/IEC10118-1:1994, Information technology Security techniques Hash-functions Part 1: General.ISO15668:1999(E) 4 ISO/
35、IEC10118-2:1994, Information technology Security techniques Hash-functions Part 2: Hash-functions using an n-bit block cipher algorithm. ISO11568(allparts), Banking Key management (retail). ISO/IEC13888-2:1998, Information technology Security techniques Non-repudiation Part 2: Mechanisms using symme
36、tric techniques. ISO/IEC13888-3:1997, Information technology Security techniques Non-repudiation Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques. NISTFIPSPUB180-1, Secure Hash Standard (Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-1). 3 Termsanddefinitions ForthepurposesofthisInternationalStandard,thefollowingtermsandd
37、efinitionsapply. 3.1 hotlist alistofPrimaryAccountNumbers(PAN)whicharearrangedaccordingtothecardissueroritsagent,notvalidfor transactionuse 3.2 digitalsignature dataappendedto,oracryptographicformationof,adataunitthatallowsarecipientofthedataunittoprovethe sourceandintegrityofthedataunitandprotectag
38、ainstforgerye.g.bytherecipient 3.3 FileValidationValue(FVV) aderivedvalueusedforfilevalidationpurposes 3.4 hashcode theresultofapplyinghash-functiontodatabits 3.5 hash-function a(mathematical)functionwhichmapsvaluesfroma(possiblyvery)largesetofvaluesintosmallerrangeofvalues, satisfyingthefollowingtw
39、opropertieswithinthisInternationalStandard: itiscomputationallyinfeasibletofindforagivenoutputaninputwhichmapstothisoutput; itiscomputationallyinfeasibletofindforagiveninputasecondinputwhichmapstothesameoutput. 3.6 applicationmanager thepartofthesoftwareofaterminalwhichisinchargeofverifyingthesecure
40、downloadingoftheintended executableobject 3.7 MessageAuthenticationCode(MAC) acodeinamessagebetweentheoriginatorandthereceiverusedtovalidatethesourceandpartorallofthetext ofthemessage NOTE Thecodeistheresultofanagreedcalculation.ISO15668:1999(E)5 3.8 originator theentitythatcreatesthefilethathastobe
41、transferredtothereceiverandisresponsibleforitssecurity 3.9 receiver theentitythatreceivesthefile 3.10 sender theentitythatsendsthefile 3.11 sponsor theentitythatevaluatestheriskofthefiletransfer 4Principles 4.1 MessageOriginAuthentication Thepurposeofmessageoriginauthenticationistoprovideassuranceto
42、thereceiverthattheallegedoriginatoris thelegitimateoriginator.Itmayalsoprovideassurancetothereceiverthattheallegedfileistheactualfile,inthe eventthatthereceiverisauthorisedtoreceivecertainfilesfromonlyasubsetofitsauthorisedoriginators. Messageoriginauthenticationmayoccurconcurrentwiththefiletransfer
43、,thoughitmayalsooccurbeforethe transferinaconnectionmode.Ifastoreandforwardtransferisused,themessageoriginauthenticationshalloccur afterthetransfer,whenthefileisretrievedbythereceiver.(Note:transferofsecuredfilesinthemodel). Techniquesthatprovidecontentauthenticationmayprovidemessageoriginauthentica
44、tion,butthesetechniques requirethetransferoftheentirefilebeforetheauthenticationcanbeverified.Theremaybesituationsinwhichitis desirabletoperformmessageoriginauthenticationpriortoinitiatingtheactualtransfer.Asanexample,itmaybe desirabletopreventanimpostorfrommasqueradingasalegitimatefile-providerandt
45、yingupacommunications channelforanextendedtimeintransferringalongfile,eventhoughtheillegitimacyoftheoriginatorwould eventuallybedetectedandthetransferredfilerejected. 4.2 Receiverauthentication Thissecurityserviceauthenticatestheidentityofthereceiverpriortoinitiatingthetransfer,sothatthetransferwill
46、 notoccurunlessthereceiversidentityhasbeenverified. Somereceivers(POSterminals)areallowedtoreceiveonlysometypesoffiles.Partoftheauthenticationprocess isthecontrolbytheoriginatoroftherightsforthereceivertoreceivesomefile-type. Anotherpossiblereasonforusing“receiverauthentication”istopreventanunauthor
47、isedpartyfromimpersonating alegitimatereceiverandtyinguptheoriginatorscommunicationscapabilitieswhiletheoriginatortransfersa perhaps-lengthyfiletotheimpersonator. Receiverauthenticationdoesnotpreventanunauthorisedpartyfromascertainingthefilecontents(by“listening in”).Withoutthissecurityservice,andwi
48、thoutthesecurityserviceofconfidentiality,anyonecouldeasily impersonatethelegitimatereceiverandthusobtainthefile.Ifitisessentialthatonlytheauthorisedreceiver(s)ofa fileactuallyreceivethefile,thenthesecurityserviceofconfidentialitymustbeused.Onlyinthiswaycanitbe ensuredthatanunauthorisedpartyhasnot“li
49、stenedin”onthecommunicationschannelandthusobtainedacopy ofthefile. Notethatthereisarelatedsecurityservice,nonrepudiationofdelivery,thatconfirms,afterthecompletionofthe transfer,thattheauthorisedpartyhassuccessfullyreceivedthefile.ISO15668:1999(E) 6 4.3 Integrity Accidentalorunauthorisedalterationofthetransferredfile,or,ataminimum,selectedportionsofthetransferred file,shallbedetectedduringandafterthetransferprocess.Integrityservicesmaycontroltheentirefileinas
