1、Safety Regulation Group CAP 641 Report of the Review of Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survival www.caa.co.uk Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Safety Regulation Group CAP 641 Re
2、port of the Review of Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survival Important Note The CAA has made many of the documents that it publishes available electronically (in addition to traditional printed format). The contents of this document are unchanged from the previsously printed version. For consistenc
3、y with other CAA documents new cover pages have been added. Further information about these changes and the latest version of documents can be found at www.caa.co.uk. February 1995 Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking pe
4、rmitted without license from IHS-,-,-CAP 641 Report of the Review of Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survival O Civil Aviation Authority 1995 ISBN O 86039 608 8 First published February 1995 Reprinted September 1997 Reprinted May 2002 (incorporating new house style cover) Enquiries regarding the cont
5、ent of this publication should be addressed to: Aircrafts Projects Department, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 OYR. The latest version of this document is available in electronic format at www.caa.co.uk, where you may also re
6、gister for e-mail notification of amendments. Printed copies and amendment services are available from: Documedia Solutions Ltd., 37 Windsor Street, Cheltenham, Glos., GL52 2DG. Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permi
7、tted without license from IHS-,-,-Con tents Page Glossary Executive Summary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Background The Regulatory Framework Analysis of Accident Data Basic Principles The Safety and Survival System Pre-Flight (Phase 1) Passenger Acceptance Passenger Briefing Personal Safety Equipment Pas
8、senger Boarding Departure Criteria Post-Flight (Phase 2) Passenger Disembarkation Safety Equipment - Continued Airworthiness Before Ditching or Crash (Phase 3) Communications Pre-Ditch/Crash Actions - Crew Pre-Ditch/Crash Actions - Passengers Ditching (Phase 4) Flotation Crew Actions Evacuation Gene
9、ral Comment Crash (Phase 5) Survivability Flotation/Stability Escape FAA Study Sea Survival (Phase 6) Liferaft LSJ Immersion Suit LSJ/Immersion Suit Relationship V vii 1 2 4 6 8 9 9 10 11 13 13 14 14 14 15 15 16 17 18 18 19 20 20 20 20 21 22 24 25 25 25 26 27 iii Copyright Civil Aviation Authority P
10、rovided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Page 12 Rescue (Phase 7) Rescue Time v Survival Time Detection and Location of Survivors Retrieval of Survivors Post Survival Debriefing 13 Assessment of the Overall System 14 Reco
11、mmendations ANNEXES A B C D E F G H J K L M Terms of Reference Composition of Steering and Working Groups Respondents, Contributors and Organisations Visited Evidence from Cormorant Alpha Survivors Other Committees and Groups Fatal Offshore Accidents Group A Multi Engine Helicopter Event Rates Revie
12、w of Relevant Accident Data Event Tree Safety and Survival System Table Breathing Aids for Underwater Escape from Helicopters Weather Criteria 28 28 29 29 30 31 34 37 39 41 43 47 49 51 53 59 61 73 75 iv Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reprodu
13、ction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Glossary AAIB ADELT AFDS AIL ANO AOC AOGBO BCAR BHAB BROA BMT CAA CAP DOT DRA FAA FRC HARP HMLC HSC HSE HSMRC HSSG HSW HUZUP IADC IAL ICA0 IFE JAA JAR LSJ NATS OHOSG OPITO PA RAF IAM RGIT RHOSS RNAs SAR SARBE SBAC SBV UKOOA UTR Note * Air Ac
14、cidents Investigation Branch Automatically Deployed Emergency Location Transponder Automatic Flotation Deployment System Airworthiness Information Leaflet Air Navigation Order Air Operators Certificate Application Outside Great Britain Order British Civil Airworthiness Requirement British Helicopter
15、 Advisory Board British Rig Owners Association British Maritime Technology Civil Aviation Authority Civil Aviation Publication Department of Transport Defence Research Agency Federal Aviation Administration Fast Rescue Craft Helicopter Airworthiness Review Panel Helicopter Management Liaison Committ
16、ee (See Note *) Health and Safety Commission Health and Safety Executive Helicopter Safety Research Management Committee (See Note *) Helicopter Safety Steering Group (See Note *) Health and Safety at Work Hood Up - Zip Up International Association of Drilling Contractors International Aeradio Ltd I
17、nternational Civil Aviation Organisation In Flight Entertainment Joint Aviation Authorities Joint Aviation Requirements Life Saving Jacket National Air Traffic Services Offshore Helideck Operations Steering Group (See Note *) Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation Public Address Royal Air
18、 Force Institute of Aviation Medicine Robert Gordon Institute of Technology Review of Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survival Royal Naval Air Station Search and Rescue Search and Rescue Beacon Equipment Society of British Aerospace Companies Standby Vessel United Kingdom Offshore Operators Associati
19、on Upper Torso Restraint Further details of these committees/groups are at Annex E V Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-vi Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under
20、 license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Executive Summary This Review was commissioned by the Civil Aviation Authority following recommendations made after the helicopter crash at the Cormorant Alpha platform in 1992. It addresses all aspec
21、ts of offshore helicopter safety and survival in the context of an integrated system, with the intention of maximising the prospects of occupants surviving a helicopter accident at sea. It does not address the causes or prevention of helicopter accidents. The Review is based upon an Event Tree, whic
22、h is a diagrammatic representation of an offshore helicopter flight, depicting a number of significant points (or nodes) where something might go wrong. The Event Tree thus illustrates all the major possibilities including a safe flight, a ditching, a crash (with or without warning), the subsequent
23、flotation or sinking of the aircraft, the availability or otherwise of liferafts, the functioning of personal safety equipment and the rescue process. The Event Tree is depicted at Annex J. The Event Tree is then developed into a System Table, which is a tabular listing of all the significant events
24、 in the history of a helicopter accident, grouped into seven phases commencing with departure from base and ending with rescue from the sea. A number of elements are identified within each event, and each is analysed in turn in Sections 6 to 12 of the report, where specific deficiencies and possible
25、 remedies are discussed. The System Table appears in full at Annex K. The penultimate section of the report contains an overall assessment of the present safety and survival system. It points to the 100% success record of survival after ditchings and the inevitably less favourable record of crash su
26、rvival; it suggests the need for greater emphasis on safety measures related to heavy impacts as opposed to ditchings, but cautions against prejudicing ditching survival in an unrealistic attempt to help the victims of non-survivable crashes. The report concludes with 17 recommendations. There are f
27、ew, if any, radical proposals. For the most part, the report endorses work which is already in hand or nearing completion; however, it identifies a number of areas where further studies need to be initiated or where existing work needs to be coordinated or given more urgency. Conversely, it consider
28、s and dismisses as impracticable two proposals which have gained currency - the provision of underwater breathing apparatus and the prohibition of offshore flights in weather unsuitable for ditching. The report does, however, make a positive proposal for a more methodical way of ensuring that offsho
29、re managers appreciate the relationship between the time it would take to rescue survivors of a crash and the time they could be expected to survive in the water in the prevailing conditions. vii Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction o
30、r networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-viii Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-1 BACKGROUND 1.1 The Review of Helicopter Offshore Safety and Survival (RHOSS) arose fr
31、om recommendations made by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) and the Sheriff of Grampian, Highlands and Islands following the crash of an AS 332L Super Puma helicopter at the Cormorant Alpha platform in the East Shetland Basin of the North Sea on 14 March 1992. 1.2 In both the AAIB repor
32、t (No.2/93) and the Sheriffs Fatal Accident Inquiry determination, it was suggested that the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) should carry out a review of the safety and survival aspects of offshore helicopter flights. Specifically, in paragraph 38.9 of his report, the Sheriff referred to an integrate
33、d review of all safety features, while in paragraph 4.9 of its report the AAIB recommended a re-assessment of passenger safety and survivability using the concept of an integrated escape and survival system. In its response to the AAIB report, the CAA accepted this recommendation and undertook to se
34、t up a review body which would include representatives of government agencies, medical institutions, research organisations and offshore operators. 1.3 In accordance with this undertaking, RHOSS was established in October 1993 with a remit to complete its work by the end of 1994. Its Terms of Refere
35、nce, which have been interpreted as applying only to UK-registered aircraft operating over the sea areas around the United Kingdom, are at Annex A. Throughout this report, the expressions offshore operations and offshore passengers are used in the context of flights in support of or in connection wi
36、th the offshore exploitation or exploration of mineral resources (including gas). For simplicity, the expression oil company has been used to describe any organisation which engages the services of a helicopter operator for the purposes described above. 1.4 The work of RHOSS hinged upon a Steering G
37、roup of nine members (three from the CAA and six from other organisations) with an independent chairman and with a secretary provided by the CAA. The Steering Group met at least once each month, and delegated detailed studies to a number of Working Groups, each of which was chaired by a Steering Gro
38、up member and included both CAA and non-CAA representation. The composition of the Steering and Working Groups is listed at Annex B. 1.5 The formation of RHOSS was promulgated in the Official Record and advertised in the aviation press and the Scottish local media. Participation was invited from int
39、erested parties and a number of written submissions were received; these are listed at Annex C. In addition to considering these written responses, the Steering Group arranged to have presentations from and/or discussions with certain individuals and organisations, including a Principal Inspector fr
40、om the AAIB, a team from the Aviation Study Group based at Linacre College, and two survivors from the Cormorant Alpha accident; the first-hand experience of these two survivors was especially valuable to RHOSS, and is summarised at Annex D. The Steering Group spent two days at Aberdeen viewing vari
41、ous aspects of offshore operations, including survival training and the development, production and maintenance of safety equipment. Those members of the Steering Group who had not previously done so flew as passengers to an offshore platform. 1.6 Our Terms of Reference required us to take account o
42、f the activities of other committees and working groups engaged in similar or parallel studies in order to 1 Copyright Civil Aviation Authority Provided by IHS under license with CAANot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-avoid duplication or omission. An i
43、nitial investigation revealed a large number of formal bodies with an interest in offshore safety but, on closer scrutiny, it became evident that many of them were peripheral to the topics which we needed to address or were channels of communication rather than active participants in safety research
44、. Five committees and groups, briefly described at Annex E, were considered to be directly concerned with topics central to our work. In certain instances, their involvement and expertise were found to be far deeper than we could expect to achieve within the time and resources available, and as a co
45、nsequence this report will be found, in places, to do no more than comment upon, and where appropriate endorse, work that has already been done or is under way. 2 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Civil Aviation Legislation 2.1 Civil aviation safety in the United Kingdom is governed by the Civil Aviation Act
46、 and related subordinate legislation, the principal instrument of which is the Air Navigation Order (ANO). The ANO provides the legal basis for airworthiness requirements (the design and technical standards that must be met by aircraft registered and certificated in the United Kingdom) and requireme
47、nts for the issue of an Air Operators Certificate (AOC) (which must be held by any person conducting public transport operations). 2.2 Airworthiness requirements have hitherto been expressed in the form of British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCARs), while operational requirements have been set
48、 out in the ANO itself and in associated Regulations and publications. Following the establishment of the European Joint Aviation Authorities UAA), of which the United Kingdom was a founder member, national requirements for both airworthiness and operational matters are in the process of replacement
49、 by Joint Aviation Requirements OARS), the adoption of which should be substantially completed in 1995. JARS will be binding upon all members of the JAA and any new safety regulations that the United Kingdom wishes to introduce (including any proposed changes to requirements stemming from this report) will need to be considered by the JAA and accepted or rejected on a Europe-wide basi
