1、 ETSI TS 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05) Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the MME network product class (3GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 14) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ETSI ETSI TS 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05)13GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0
2、 Release 14Reference DTS/TSGS-0333116ve00 Keywords LTE,SECURITY,UMTS ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N 780
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9、 Association. ETSI ETSI TS 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05)23GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 14Intellectual Property Rights IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available
10、for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards“, which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (ht
11、tps:/ipr.etsi.org/). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, ess
12、ential to the present document. Foreword This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or GSM identities. These should be interp
13、reted as being references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables. The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http:/webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp. Modal verbs terminology In the present document “shall“, “shall not“, “should“, “should not“, “may“, “need not
14、“, “will“, “will not“, “can“ and “cannot“ are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions). “must“ and “must not“ are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation. ETSI ETSI TS 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05
15、)33GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 14Contents Intellectual Property Rights 2g3Foreword . 2g3Modal verbs terminology 2g3Foreword . 5g31 Scope 6g32 References 6g33 Definitions and abbreviations . 6g33.1 Definitions 6g33.2 Abbreviations . 7g34 MME-specific security requirements and related test ca
16、ses . 7g34.1 Introduction 7g34.2 MME-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases 7g34.2.1 Introduction. 7g34.2.2 Security functional requirements on the MME deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases 7g34.2.2.1 Security functional requirements on the
17、 MME deriving from 3GPP specifications general approach 7g34.2.2.2 Authentication and key agreement procedure . 7g34.2.2.2.1 Access with 2G SIM forbidden . 7g34.2.2.2.2 Re-synchronization 8g34.2.2.2.3 Integrity check of Attach message . 9g34.2.2.2.4 Not forwarding EPS authentication data to SGSN 9g3
18、4.2.2.2.5 Not forwarding unused EPS authentication data between different security domains 10g34.2.2.3 Security mode command procedure 10g34.2.2.3.1 Bidding down prevention 10g34.2.2.3.2 NAS integrity algorithm selection and use 11g34.2.2.3.3 NAS NULL integrity protection 11g34.2.2.3.4 NAS confident
19、iality protection 12g34.2.2.4 Security in intra-RAT mobility . 12g34.2.2.4.1 Bidding down prevention in X2-handovers . 12g34.2.2.4.2 NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in MME change . 13g34.2.2.5 Security in inter-RAT mobility . 13g34.2.2.5.1 No access with 2G SIM via idle mode mobility 13
20、g34.2.2.5.2 No access with 2G SIM via handover . 14g34.2.2.5.3 No access with 2G SIM via SRVCC . 14g34.2.2.6 Security Aspects of IMS Emergency Session Handling . 15g34.2.2.6.1 Release of non-emergency bearers 15g34.2.3 Technical Baseline 15g34.2.3.1 Introduction . 15g34.2.3.2 Protecting data and inf
21、ormation 15g34.2.3.2.1 Protecting data and information general . 15g34.2.3.2.2 Protecting data and information unauthorized viewing 15g34.2.3.2.3 Protecting data and information in storage 16g34.2.3.2.4 Protecting data and information in transfer . 16g34.2.3.2.5 Logging access to personal data 16g34
22、.2.3.3 Protecting availability and integrity . 16g34.2.3.4 Authentication and authorization 16g34.2.3.5 Protecting sessions 16g34.2.3.6 Logging . 16g34.2.4 Operating Systems 16g34.2.5 Web Servers 16g34.2.6 Network Devices 16g34.3 MME-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test ca
23、ses 16g34.3.1 Introduction. 16g3ETSI ETSI TS 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05)43GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 144.3.2 Technical Baseline 16g34.3.3 Operating Systems 16g34.3.4 Web Servers 17g34.3.5 Network Devices 17g34.4 MME-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related
24、 test cases . 17g3Annex A (informative): Change history . 18g3History 19g3ETSI ETSI TS 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05)53GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 14Foreword This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rdGeneration Partnership Project (3GPP). The contents of the present document are s
25、ubject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: Version x.y.z where: x the fir
26、st digit: 1 presented to TSG for information; 2 presented to TSG for approval; 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented w
27、hen editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. ETSI ETSI TS 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05)63GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 141 Scope The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the MME network product class. It refers to the Catalog
28、ue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the MME network product class. 2 References The following documents contain provisions which, through reference
29、in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. - References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. - For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. - For a non-specific reference, the latest version a
30、pplies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. 1 3GPP TR 21.905: “Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications“. 2 3GPP TR 41.001: “GSM Specificatio
31、n set“. 3 3GPP TR 33.117: “Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements“. 4 3GPP TR 33.916: “Security assurance scheme for 3GPP network products for 3GPP network product classes“. 5 3GPP TS 33.401: “3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture“. 6 void. 7 3GPP TS 23.401: “
32、General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access“. 8 3GPP TS 33.102: “3G security; Security architecture“. 3 Definitions and abbreviations 3.1 Definitions For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given
33、 in 3GPP TR 21.905 1 and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 1. MME Application: The running processes (typically more than one) executing the software package for the MME functions and OAM funct
34、ions of the MME network product model. ETSI ETSI TS 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05)73GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 143.2 Abbreviations For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 1 and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes
35、 precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 1. 4 MME-specific security requirements and related test cases 4.1 Introduction The structure of the present TS 33.116 is aligned with TS 33.117 such that the MME-specific adaptation of a generic requirement in 33.sa
36、s, clause 4.a.b.c.d, can be always found in TS 33.116, clause 4.a.b.c.d. The text on pre-requisites for testing in clause 4.1.2 of TS 33.117 3 applies also to the present document. 4.2 MME-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases 4.2.1 Introduction 4.2.2 Securi
37、ty functional requirements on the MME deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases 4.2.2.1 Security functional requirements on the MME deriving from 3GPP specifications general approach In addition to the requirements and test cases in TS 33.117, clause 4.2.2, an MME shall satisfy the fo
38、llowing: It is assumed for the purpose of the present SCAS that an MME conforms to all mandatory security-related provisions pertaining to an MME in: - 3GPP TS 33.401: “EPS security architecture“; - other 3GPP specifications that make reference to TS 33.401 or are referred to from TS 33.401 (e.g. TS
39、 23.401 7). Security procedures pertaining to an MME are typically embedded in mobility management procedures and are hence assumed to be tested together with them. Examples include: - AKA authentication is embedded in an Attach procedure or a TAU procedure. - Security Mode Control is embedded in an
40、 Attach procedure or a TAU procedure. - The derivation of a mapped security context is embedded in inter-RAT mobility procedures. 4.2.2.2 Authentication and key agreement procedure 4.2.2.2.1 Access with 2G SIM forbidden Requirement Name: 2G SIM access forbidden Requirement Reference: TBA ETSI ETSI T
41、S 133 116 V14.0.0 (2017-05)83GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 14Requirement Description: “Access to E-UTRAN with a 2G SIM or a SIM application on a UICC shall not be granted.“ as specified in TS 33.401, clause 6.1.1. Threat References: TBA Security Objective References: TBA Test Case: Purpose: V
42、erify that access to EPS with a 2G SIM is not possible. Pre-Conditions: Test environment with HSS. HSS may be simulated. Execution Steps Include 2G authentication vector in authentication data response from HSS. Expected Results: MME rejects UE authentication when receiving 2G authentication vector
43、from HSS. NOTE: When both MME and HSS function correctly 2G authentication vector are never included in authentication data response from HSS to MME. 4.2.2.2.2 Re-synchronization Requirement Name: Inclusion of RAND, AUTS Requirement Reference: TBA Requirement Description: “In the case of a synchroni
44、zation failure, the MME shall also include RAND and AUTS.“ as specified in TS 33.401, clause 6.1.2. Threat References: TBA Security Objective References: TBA Test Case: Purpose: Verify that Re-synchronization procedure works correctly. Pre-Conditions: Test environment with UE and HSS. UE and HSS may
45、 be simulated. Execution Steps The MME receives an AUTHENTICATION FAILURE message, with the EMM cause #21 “synch failure“ and a re-synchronization token AUTS. Expected Results: The MME includes the stored RAND and the received AUTS in the authentication data request to the HSS. ETSI ETSI TS 133 116
46、V14.0.0 (2017-05)93GPP TS 33.116 version 14.0.0 Release 14NOTE: When RAND and AUTS are not included in the authentication data request to the HSS then the HSS will return a new authentication vector (AV) based on its current value of the sequence number SQNHE(cf. TS 33.102, clause 6.3.5) A new authe
47、ntication procedure between MME and UE using this new AV will be successful just the same if the cause of the synchronisation failure was the sending of a “stale“ challenge, i.e. one that the UE had seen before or deemed to be too old. But if the cause of the synchronisation failure was a problem wi
48、th the sequence number SQNHEin the HSS (which should be very rare), and the RAND and AUTS are not included in the authentication data request to the HSS, then an update of SQNHEbased on AUTS will not occur in the HSS, and the new authentication procedure between MME and UE using the new AV will fail
49、 again. This can be considered a security-relevant failure case as it may lead to a subscriber being shut out from the system permanently. 4.2.2.2.3 Integrity check of Attach message Requirement Name: Integrity check of Attach message Requirement Reference: TBA Requirement Description: “If the user cannot be identified or the integrity check fails, then the MME shall send a response indicating that the user identity cannot be retrieved.“ as specified in TS 33.401, clause 6.1.4. Threat References: TBA Security Objective References: TBA Test
