1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1224Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1224a71 Lesson Date: 1998-09-11a71 Submitting Organization: JSCa71 Submitted by: Shawn R. Salge/ Ronald A. MontagueSubject: “Deconfiguration“ Prevention Description of Driving Event: During processing of flight 2A element at the KSC SSPF, har
2、dware that had previously been configured for test or closed out for flight was inadvertently deconfigured / disassembled by teams working parallel tasks on the same system or hardware.An assembly or test team working to an approved work authorization document (WAD) would configure a system or hardw
3、are for an upcoming test or for flight. Later, a different assembly or test team, also working to a valid work document, would dissemble or reconfigure that hardware for a different task. This at times caused a loss of known configuration, which necessitated the release of unplanned event paperwork
4、to document the restoration of the hardware to its original state of completion, and caused delays to already tight schedules.Example: Inter-module ventilation (IMV) port caps had been configured for flight (installed and leak tested). The team testing the IMV/ECLSS system, needing to connect air du
5、cting to these ports, removed the caps and proceeded with their tasks, negating the previously certified hardware configuration.Root cause: Element processing schedule compression and overlapping assembly and test activities resulted in procedural and schedule disconnects.Lesson(s) Learned: Integrat
6、ed coordination of tasks involving common hardware used by different teams / groups for test, close-out, and inspection will minimize the need for repeated activities caused by unexpected configuration changesProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from I
7、HS-,-,-Recommendation(s): Team instruction No. 2A-CET-065 was implemented by the flight 2A team by requiring: 1. procedural coordination between assembly and checkout (A2. application and removal of tags identifying element hardware and systems configured for test or flight; and3. sensitizing floor
8、operations monitors, task leaders, and all personnel with access to the flight element to the criticality of maintaining awareness of hardware and systems processing status. Key to this initiative was the highly visible tags, the application and removal of which could only be accomplished under auth
9、ority of approved WADs and with the concurrence of Quality Assurance representatives. The team instruction referenced above can be viewed and obtained at the Flight 2A FE&S web site at http:/www-ss.ksc.nasa.gov/flight2a/ACE/administrative/Team_Instructions/Released/. Recommend that this or a similar
10、 procedure be used during all ISS element processing. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: See recommendationsDocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): N/AAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Administration/Organizationa71 Configuration Managementa71 Ground Operationsa71 Policy & Pla
11、nninga71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 Test & VerificationAdditional Info: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2002-06-27a71 Approval Name: Ronald A. Montaguea71 Approval Organization: JSCa71 Approval Phone Number: 281-483-8576Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-
