1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1832Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1832a71 Lesson Date: 2008-1-15a71 Submitting Organization: JPLa71 Submitted by: David Oberhettingera71 POC Name: Philip Zuluetaa71 POC Email: Phillip.J.Zuluetajpl.nasa.gova71 POC Phone: 818-354-1566Subject: Counteracting the Threat of Counter
2、feit Components Abstract: The increasing world trade in counterfeit electronic components poses a significant risk that a potentially mission-critical component procured for use in a flight system may be counterfeit, and it is often difficult to determine whether a part is bogus. This lesson learned
3、 suggests a set of awareness, prevention, detection, and response strategies that may help mitigate the risk of counterfeit electronic parts being used in flight hardware or other critical equipment.Description of Driving Event: Reference (1) describes the pervasive and increasing problem of counter
4、feit electronic components and the countermeasures being employed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the aerospace industry. According to the JPL article, counterfeit parts include: a71 Components with original component manufacturer (OCM) markings that were stolen and are being sold without
5、 testing. a71 Dummy components with no die or wires inside, but marked as authentic. (Figure 1). a71 Scrap stolen from the manufacturer, but marked as good product and sold at the normal price. a71 Re-branded parts from a low-quality manufacturer, marked with the logo of a high-quality manufacturer
6、and sold at a premium price. a71 Recycled component sold as new. a71 Blacktopped and re-marked integrated circuit (IC) (Figure 2), with a: a72 Newer date code, a72 Bogus part number, a72 Commercial part re-marked as up-rated or up-screened without any assessment or testing, or a72 Recycled, reclaime
7、d, pulled, or salvaged piece part marked as new.a71 Obsolete product pulled from stock of old boards and sold as new. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Figure 1 is an X-ray, a shadowy grayscale image, of a rectangular package with 4 lea
8、ds extending from the top and 4 leads extending from the bottom. Within the rectangular package itself, there are no features visible at all no wires or subcomponents. The package appears to be empty.Figure 2 is a close-up photo of the portion of a piece part that contains product markings. (Because
9、 it is a close-up shot, it is not clear what type of part it is, but the blocky outline and the visible contacts suggest an integrated circuit.) Visible on the part is the manufacturers logo and a portion of three lines of product identification characters. However, a quadrant of the product identif
10、ication characters have been removed by erasure, revealing a logo of another manufacturer that lies beneath the characters.Figure 1. X-ray image of dummy component with no die inside and no wires, although outside markings appear authentic.Figure 2. Device made by one manufacturer was blacktopped an
11、d overprinted with the markings of another manufacturer.Counterfeit goods represent approximately 5 to 7 percent of world trade; since 1982, the value of bogus goods traded globally has increased from $5.5 billion to approximately $600 billion annually (Reference (2). Several factors contribute to t
12、he targeting of the electronic component market by counterfeiters: a71 Device obsolescence has caused an increase in the scarcity and price of critical components used in military and civil aerospace systems. a71 The flow of information through internet product search engines (IPSEs) facilitates fin
13、ding obsolete or hard-to-find devices, and obtaining delivery overnight or within a few days. But internet purchases may provide no traceability or complex part sourcing history, minimal warranties, and no certainty of replacements or refunds. a71 With the increasing sophistication and complexity of
14、 component technology, it may be more difficult to detect fakes. Testing of incoming items has decreased over the years, resulting in a reliance on the suppliers Certificate of Compliance as proof of authenticity and compliance. a71 Unauthorized gray market channels for legitimate products can facil
15、itate distribution by counterfeiters. Gray market distributors cannot determine whether a high volume influx of a product is a counterfeit or a legitimate OCM product that has been redirected from the source. a71 Subcontract assemblers and manufacturers may not report suspect devices in order to pro
16、tect their reputation for quality. The best practice for obtaining legitimate electronic components designated for flight hardware is to buy them directly from OCMs (first-tier suppliers) or their authorized distributors (second-tier suppliers). Because this option may require the purchase of large
17、quantities (minimum buys) or long lead times, projects may resort to independent distributors (i.e., gray market third-tier suppliers) for non-flight hardware- breadboards, prototypes and engineering models. For schedule or cost-constrained projects, the rapid delivery of smaller quantities may offs
18、et the risk from limited or missing component traceability data. However, purchase from a third-tier supplier will increase the risk of receiving counterfeits, and it may not be feasible to mitigate this risk if the engineering model is later upgraded to a flight unit. JPL has formed a working group
19、, with representation from the procurement, quality assurance, parts engineering, and technical infrastructure organizations, to address and mitigate the threat of counterfeit electronic components populating hardware assemblies. An action plan based on current industry best practices includes the J
20、PL-wide measures for counterfeit awareness, prevention, detection, and response listed in the Recommendations section below. References: 1. Philip Zulueta, “Counteracting the Threat of Counterfeit Components,“ Assurance Technology Program Office (ATPO) Newsletter, NASA/Caltech Jet Propulsion Laborat
21、ory (JPL), Issue 4, October 2007. 2. “Get Real- The Truth About Counterfeiting,“ International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC), http:/www.iacc.org/. 3. “The NASA ASIC Guide: Assuring ASICs for Space,“ Section Two, Vendor Evaluation and Section 4, Part Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproductio
22、n or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Acceptance, http:/parts.jpl.nasa.gov/asic/title.page.html#A0. Lesson(s) Learned: There is an increasing likelihood that a potentially mission-critical component procured for use in a flight system may be counterfeit, and it is often difficult to
23、 determine whether the part is bogus. The best practice for obtaining legitimate electronic components designated for flight hardware is to know your supplier and to avoid buying parts other than directly from OCMs or their authorized distributors. In addition, this lesson suggests implementation of
24、 awareness, prevention, detection, and response strategies to mitigate the risk of incorporating counterfeit parts. Although electronic components are a particular concern to NASA, materials and mechanical parts may also be subject to misrepresentation.Recommendation(s): For mission-critical compone
25、nts used in flight hardware and in JPL Critical Items (JCI): 1. Assure Awareness of Counterfeiting.Charter an internal anti-counterfeiting task force with representation from key procurement, engineering, manufacturing, and legal organizations. Develop and deploy anti-counterfeit education and train
26、ing programs for internal and external stakeholders. Benchmark other companies and suppliers, share best practices, and pool information on anti-counterfeiting strategies.2. Implement Prevention Strategies. The following preventive strategies have proven effective: a. Designers must proactively mana
27、ge the product lifecycle against the component lifecycle and update a design when products are hard-to-find or unavailable. b. Know your source: build a relationship with suppliers, conducting surveys of their inspection and testing capabilities and audits of their counterfeit prevention programs. c
28、. Institute an approved vendor list policy for independent distributors, ascertaining that they are certified to ISO 9000 and have not had previous problems with counterfeit parts. d. Require a documented trail identifying the source of the material, and work with the OCM to obtain photos of the par
29、ts or labels for validation. e. Procurement should buy direct from original manufacturers or their authorized distributors, verify that manufacturers have guaranteed methods to destroy scrapped parts, and buy adequate stock of last time buys. When buying from third-party independent distributors, re
30、quire proof of traceability to the original component manufacturer and be aware that pursuing the lowest possible price can lead to sourcing problems. Make purchases contingent upon the outcome of evaluation, testing, or after verification of authenticity. 3. Institute Detection Strategies- Inspect,
31、 Test, and Evaluate. The following detection strategies may minimize the risk of counterfeits: a. Require rigorous quality assurance on all parts. Do not substitute paperwork for testing and visual inspection. b. Upgrade inspection training and procedures for identifying counterfeit components. Exam
32、ine labels for misspellings, omissions (missing sales order number, missing lot numbers), date codes on the label that do not match the date code on the part, inconsistent formatting, etc. c. Establish and maintain a package and die pedigree photo collection to help identify counterfeits. d. Verify
33、the part markings with the manufacturer when buying from independent suppliers. Maintain a reference library of manufacturer data books on obsolete components. e. Electrically test any material from questionable sources. Employ Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) to deconstruct sample parts. Impleme
34、nt Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) methods where applicable.4. Respond to Disclosures. Participate in reporting and cooperate in investigation programs for suspect devices; respond to reports, including those from the Government/Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) and the Electronic Resellers As
35、sociation International (ERAI). Cooperate with the NASA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in any action against suspected counterfeiters.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: JPL has referen
36、ced this lesson learned as additional rationale and guidance supporting Paragraph 7.5 (“Safety and Mission Assurance Practices: Electronic Parts Reliability, Application, and Acquisition“) in the Jet Propulsion Laboratory standard “Flight Project Practices, Rev. 6,“ JPL DocID 58032, March 6, 2006.Do
37、cuments Related to Lesson: a71 IDEA-STD-1010-A, Acceptability of Electronic Components Distributed in the Open Market, http:/www.idofea.org/index.php?option=content Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition”Mission Directorate(s): a71 Sciencea71 Exploration Systemsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdd
38、itional Key Phrase(s): a71 Program Management.a71 Program Management.Acquisition / procurement strategy and planninga71 Program Management.Risk managementa71 Safety and Mission Assurance.a71 Safety and Mission Assurance.Product Assurancea71 Safety and Mission Assurance.Qualitya71 Safety and Mission
39、Assurance.Reliabilitya71 Additional Categories.a71 Additional Categories.Flight Equipmenta71 Additional Categories.Ground Equipmenta71 Additional Categories.Hardwarea71 Additional Categories.Logisticsa71 Additional Categories.Payloadsa71 Additional Categories.Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Additional
40、 Categories.SpacecraftAdditional Info: a71 Project: variousProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2008-02-23a71 Approval Name: mbella71 Approval Organization: HQProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-
