1、 ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02)Technical Report Telecommunications and Internet converged Services andProtocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN);eSecurity;User Guide to eTVRA web-databaseETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 2Reference DTR/TISPAN-07020-NGN-R2 Keywords data, security ETSI 650 Route
2、 des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N 7803/88 Important notice Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded f
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5、e at http:/portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services: http:/portal.etsi.org/chaircor/ETSI_support.asp Copyright Notification No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. The copy
6、right and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2009. All rights reserved. DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTM, TIPHONTM, the TIPHON logo and the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM is a
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8、sociation. ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 3Contents Intellectual Property Rights 4g3Foreword . 4g31 Scope 5g32 References 5g32.1 Normative references . 5g32.2 Informative references 5g33 Definitions and abbreviations . 6g33.1 Definitions 6g33.2 Abbreviations . 6g34 Overview of eTVRA web appli
9、cation structure . 6g35 User guide 8g35.1 Access to the eTVRA home page . 8g35.1.1 Access restrictions 8g35.2 eTVRA step 1 . 9g35.2.1 Creation and editing systems 9g35.2.2 Creation and editing of objectives 10g35.2.3 Creation and editing of unwanted incidents 12g35.3 eTVRA step 2 . 14g35.4 eTVRA ste
10、p 3 . 15g35.5 eTVRA steps 4, 5, 6 and 7 16g35.6 Risk reporting . 21g3History 22g3ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 4Intellectual Property Rights IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if
11、any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect of ETSI standards“, which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available
12、 on the ETSI Web server (http:/webapp.etsi.org/IPR/home.asp). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server)
13、 which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document. Foreword This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN). ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 51 Scope
14、 The present document is a guide to the use of the ETSI eTVRA web-application. NOTE: The eTVRA web-application acts as a tool for entering analysis results following completion of an analysis using the ETSI TVRA method defined in TS 102 165-1 i.1. 2 References References are either specific (identif
15、ied by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. Non-specific reference may be made only to a complete document or a part thereof and only in the following cases: - if it is accepted that it will be poss
16、ible to use all future changes of the referenced document for the purposes of the referring document; - for informative references. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http:/docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any hyperlinks
17、 included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. 2.1 Normative references The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of the present document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For non-spec
18、ific references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Not applicable. 2.2 Informative references The following referenced documents are not essential to the use of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. For
19、 non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. i.1 ETSI TS 102 165-1: “Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Methods and protocols; Part 1: Method and proforma for Threat, Risk,
20、Vulnerability Analysis“. i.2 ETSI TR 187 011: “Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Security; Application of ISO-15408-2 requirements to ETSI standards - guide, method and application with examples“. i.3 ISO/IEC 15408-2: “ Information
21、 technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 2: Security functional components“. i.4 ISO/IEC 15408-1: “Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 1: Introduction and general model“. i.5 ISO/IEC 15408-3: “Information tec
22、hnology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 3: Security assurance components“. ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 63 Definitions and abbreviations 3.1 Definitions For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 102 165-1 i.1 and TR 18
23、7 011 i.2 apply. 3.2 Abbreviations For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EOL ETSI On Line account TVRA Threat Vulnerability and Risk Analysis UML Unified Modelling Language URL Uniform Resource Locator 4 Overview of eTVRA web appl
24、ication structure The eTVRA web application is structured as shown in figure 1. Figure 1: eTVRA web application structure The web page design is aligned to the “look and feel“ of the ETSI Web-application suite and any change to the overall ETSI look will be reflected in the eTVRA site. The eTVRA too
25、l and website populates a database, as defined in annex E of TS 102 165-1 i.1 but modified for practical implementation on the ETSI server platform. The eTVRA site and database allow cataloguing of the results of the analysis but does not present any shortcut in the analysis (although it may be poss
26、ible to modify entries and their associated risk to view the impact of adding countermeasures to the system). ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 7Unwanted IncidentsPK,I1 IDI2 UnwantedIncidentabstractCountermeasuresPK,I1 iddescriptionVulnerablityPK IDPK,FK1 AssetIDPK,FK2,I2 WeaknessIDPK,FK3,I1 Thr
27、eatAgentAssetPK,I2 IDAsset typeAsset subtypeAsset groupI1 NameDescriptionImpact when breachedWeaknessPK IDNameDescriptionAttackSystemKnowledgeFK1 UnwantedIncidentSecurity ObjectivePK,FK1 SecurityObjectiveSystemPK,I1 IDNameFK1 rootAssetIDAsset AggregatorPK Container AssetPK,FK1 AssetImpact when breac
28、hedsystem countermeasuresPK,FK3,I1 System IDPK,FK2,I2 countermeasurePK,FK1 in assetprotecting assetThreatPK,I1 IDFK2 Threat FamilyThreatAgentAttackExpertiseAttackEquipmentAttackTimeFK1 AutomationClassAttackAccessIntensityAutomatedThreatsPK IDNameExpertiseAccessknowledgeEquipmentTimeIntensityThreat F
29、amilyPK,I1 IDI2 Threat familySecurity ObjectiveconcreteCountermeasuresPK,I2 idI1 NameFK2 weaknessFK1 abstractCountermeasuremethodeffectTimeeffectExpertiseeffectKnowledgeeffectAccesseffectEquipmenteffectImpactFigure 2: Database structure extracted from MS-Access TVRA test database ETSI ETSI TR 187 01
30、4 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 85 User guide 5.1 Access to the eTVRA home page The ETSI TVRA homepage is accessed via the following URL: http:/portal.etsi.org/eTVRA/ NOTE: The eTVRA site is noted as under construction and the present document is a guide to the current version of the site. Feedback garnered thro
31、ugh its operation will be used to improve and modify the site in a future release. Figure 3: eTVRA website welcome page 5.1.1 Access restrictions Access to the eTVRA application is restricted in the following way: Table 1 Role Access EOL account holders Read only access to database content eTVRA adm
32、inistrator Full access to the database ETSI support Access to update webpages On entering the eTVRA site the user will be directed to enter the EOL account user-name and password. If a TVRA user does not have such credentials they have to be requested from ETSI. EOL accounts may be applied for onlin
33、e from the following URL: http:/webapp.etsi.org/createaccount/ ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 95.2 eTVRA step 1 5.2.1 Creation and editing systems The first step defined for the eTVRA is identifying the objectives. As a pre-requisite it is essential to first define the system itself. Figure 4
34、: Screen shot for entering a system Figure 5: Screen shot for editing a system ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 105.2.2 Creation and editing of objectives As stated in TS 102 165-1 i.1 the objectives for security are the essential starting point of the design. Should these objectives be unclear
35、 or unconsciously changing during the design process the system becomes more difficult (and hence expensive) to secure. Alternatively, if the objectives are not clear from the outset of the design important security aspects may be left unaddressed that may lead to costly incidents and/or repair oper
36、ations. Objectives package TVRA 1/1SystemObjectivesSecurityObjectivesAssuranceObjectivesFigure 6: Hierarchy of objectives in a system design As shown in figure 6 assurance objectives and security objectives are specializations of system objectives. Those characteristics of an objective that mark it
37、out as a security objective are those that refer to one or more of the following system attributes: Authenticity. Confidentiality. Availability. Integrity. Within the context of standardization there are a number of objectives for security that are intended to ensure availability of the network and
38、customer confidence. These objectives break down to the following technical security issues for most telecommunications services: charging fraud; protection of privacy; and ensuring availability of the offered services. The goals for telecommunications services should therefore aim to reduce these r
39、isks by reducing the ability to mount attacks that prevent the achievement of these objectives. ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 11The following technical objectives for telecommunications services security hold: Prevention of masquerade: - being able to determine that a user claiming to be Ali
40、ce is always Alice, Bob is always Bob, and Bob cannot pretend to be Alice; - applies to both masquerade of the user and of the system or service. Ensure availability of the telecommunications services: - the service must be accessible and usable on demand by an authorized entity. NOTE: In general, a
41、 user expects to be able to place a call, and complete the call without being cut off in the middle. Maintain privacy of communication: - where the parties to a call communicate across public networks mechanisms should exist to prevent eavesdropping; - the only delivery points for communication have
42、 to be the legitimate parties to the call. Figure 7: Screen shot for entering an objective ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 12Figure 8: Screen shot for editing an objective 5.2.3 Creation and editing of unwanted incidents Unwanted incidents are the corollary of objectives, whereas an objective
43、is stated as an intent, an unwanted incident is stated as something the designer explicitly does not want the system to do. Figure 9: Screen shot for inserting an unwanted incident ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 13Figure 10: Screen shot for editing an unwanted incident ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2
44、.1.1 (2009-02) 145.3 eTVRA step 2 The system requirements are dependent on the system objectives identified in step 1 and have two specialisms shown in figure 11 identifying security and assurance requirement specialisms. Requirements package TVRA 2/2SystemRequirementsSecurityRequirementsAssuranceRe
45、quirementsSystemObjectivesFigure 11: Dependency relationship between requirements and objectives Following the guidance given in TR 187 011 i.2 security functional requirements should be defined using the model specified in ISO/IEC 15408-2 i.3 and should be specified for both the asset and, where ap
46、plicable, its environment. The asset security functional requirements should be classified into the following groups: asset security functional requirements: - an identification the security functional requirements as specified by reference to the functional components defined in ISO/IEC 15408-2 i.3
47、 where the assignments and/or selections required have been made for the system under evaluation; asset security assurance requirements: - an indication of the Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) as described in ISO/IEC 15408-1 i.4 that an implementation of the base security standard could be expected
48、to meet. As there are likely to be many implementations in a number of different application areas, the EAL requirement could be expressed as a range (e.g. EAL3 - EAL5); - where possible, an identification of any specific assurance components from ISO/IEC 15408-3 i.5 which will apply to an implement
49、ation; and - where necessary, a specification of any essential assurance requirements which are not included in ISO/IEC 15408-3 i.5. ETSI ETSI TR 187 014 V2.1.1 (2009-02) 15When building systems the use of ISO/IEC 15408-2 i.3 functional capabilities offer a means to unambiguously state requirements. Requirements are modelled further in the system as specific assets although this may be revisited. NOTE: The eTVRA tool and method in its current form does not allow a simple guided means of linking system assets
