1、6 I 400 COMMONWEALTH DRIVE, WARRENDALE, PA 15096 REPORT I Submitted for recognition as an American National Standard Issued: 9-87 I REPORT ON AIRCRAFT ENGINE CONTAINMENT PAGE NO. - 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 3 1.1 Purpose, Scope, Committee Representation . 3 1.2 Committee Mehership and Activity
2、4 1.3 Aerospace Information Report (AIR 1537) Sumnary . 4 2. DEFINITIONS . 5 2.1 Definition of Non-Containment 5 2.2 Definition of Aircraft Damage 6 3. SUINARY OF RESULTS. 8 4. CONCLUSIONS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 10 5. DATASUFMARIES . 17 5.1 Data Organization . 17 5.2 Commercial Transpor
3、t Engine Data . Tables and Figures 19 5.3 General Aviation Engine Data . Tables and Figures 25 5.4 Rotorcraft Engine Data . Tables and Figures . 28 6. POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVEMENTS 35 6.1 Aircraft Damage Data . Flight Safety Record . 35 6.2 Engine Design 36 6.3 Aircraft Design . 39 6.4 Other Considerat
4、ions . 40 SAETechnical Board Rules provide that: “This report is published by CAE to advance the state of technical and engineering sciences. The use of this report is entirely voluntary, and its applicability and suitability for any particular use, including any patent infringement arising therefro
5、m, is the sole responsibility of the user.“ SAE reviews each technical report at least every five years at which time it may be reaffirmed, revised, or cancelled. SAE invites your written comments and suggestions. Copyright 1987 Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. Printed in U.S.A. All tijhts rese
6、rved. SAE AIR811003 87 83573LiO 00073bL 7 M 1 J -2- CONTENTS (Cont I d. ) PAGE NO . - 7. REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 FAA Regulations and Certification Procedures . . . . 7.2 Containment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Transport Category Aircraft Powerplant
7、Installation 9.4 General Aviation Powerplant Installation . , , . . . 7.5 Aircraft Design and Certification . . . . . . . . . 8. TABULATION OF NON-CONTAINED ROTOR FAILURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 . . . . . . . . . 41 -. 44 . 44 . . . . . . . . . 45 .Ob*. 44 . . . . . . . . . 46 O O I SAE AIR*
8、qO03 87 83573qO 00073b2 9 -3- 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND: 1.1 Purpose, Scope, Committee Representation: On August 2, 1983; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requested an update of the previous SAE technical study (AIR 1537) covering aircraft gas turbine engine non-containment. The FAA re
9、quest also asked for expansion of the data base to include helicopter operation. This request was reviewed by the Aerospace Counci 1, and the Propulsion Division was subsequently directed to establish an Ad-Hoc Committee. The Committee was established and held its first meeting March 22, 1984. A pre
10、liminary work statement was drafted as fol lows: A. 8. C. D. Pur ose: -%- tur me engine rotating part non-containment failures on record, assess the resulting aircraft damage, and determine the rate of past occurrences based on these data. In addition, to classify incidents by cause and consequence,
11、 to identify areas of greatest concern, and to recomiiiend areas for greatest potential improvemen t. To gather and analyze service data on aircraft propulsion Scope: The study shall be directed to include all certified turbine engine experience in civil aircraft service covering the time period fro
12、m January 1976 through December 1583. Committee. Representation: individuals competent and authoritative in the fields of airline operation, airframe and engine design, and able to make significant contributions to this study. The Committee shall be composed of Committee Report: The Committee is to
13、release the results of the study to the SAE Aerospace Council after approval of the Aerospace Propulsion Division. Propulsion Division. An extension may be granted by the Propulsion Division if required. The Committee shall submit its report June 1, 1985 to the While the previous SAE Committee repor
14、t, AIR 1537, focused solely on fixed wing comercial engine experience, the current Committee decided that the scope should b expanded to collect the data relating to helicopter and general aviation operations. The inclusion of helicopter experience was prompted by the FAA request to anticipate the p
15、rojected substantial increase in cormercial use of helicopters within the next decade. general aviation experience, including commuter airlines, was considered signigicant enough to include in the current committees activities. At the direction of the Aerospace Council, all three classes of engines
16、have been treated in a single report. It is expected that the data, conclusions and recommendations of this report will be accepted as a standard reference by anyone dealing with turbine engine rotor non-containment. For completeness, -4- 1.2 Committee Membership and Activity: The individuals formin
17、g the Committee were selected from companies in the field of airline operation (Delta Air Lines), airframe design (Bell, Boeing, Lockheed, Sikorsky), engine design (All ison, AVCO-Lycoming, Garrett, General Electric, Pratt i Whitney, Pratt iation Report (AIR 1537) Summary: As indicated above, a prev
18、ious Ad H oc Conimittee had studied the subject of gas turbine engine non-containment, Their report, AIR 1537, was issued in October, 1977, In that report, data were presented relative to non-containment of commercial fixed wing aircraft gas turbine engines between the time period of January 1962 th
19、rough December 1975. niillion engine hours of turboprop, turbojet, and turbofan engine operation. More than half the experience was generated by low bypass turbofan engines, and only the initial service experience of high bypass turbofan engines was covered by this time period. included. The study i
20、ncluded experience covering 417 No rotorcraft or general aviation engine was Overall, the non-containment failure rate in that time period was 0.66 failures per niillion engine hours. Of these failures, less than 20% resulted in significant or severe aircraft damage. Engine non-containrient was a fa
21、ctor in 0,22% of all fatalities, 2.62% of all accidents, and 1.05% of all hull losses which occurred in commercial aircraft service from all causes in that time period, one-quarter of the total non-contained failures, although high cycle fatigue, low cycle fatigue, and material defects together acco
22、unted for one-half the total number of disk and spacer failures. No single cause contributed to more than Penalties imposed on aircraft system to achieve greater levels of containment were evaluated in terms of weight. The Committee concluded that the majority of non-containment occurrences which in
23、volved significant or severe damage to the aircraft were due to release of fragments of such size and energy as to make the additional mass required for containment impractical within the then current state of the art. occurrence of aircraft accidents caused by non-containment failures is infrequent
24、, non-containment must be considered an important element of overall aircraft system safety, and the Committee therefore recommended continued efforts to reduce this hazard. reduction of significant damage to the aircraft caused by non-containment rotor failures was considered to be the continued ma
25、jor efforts by the engine manufacturers to improve engine design, manufacturing, and quality control to reduce the number of rotor bursts, and by the airframe manufacturer to minimize the hazard to the aircraft caused by non-containtvent engine fragments , Although the The greatest potential for SAE
26、 AIR*1(003 87 83573VO 00073b3 O U * e a e -5- 2, DEFINITIONS: Fixed wing aircraft engines have been treated in two classes; engines powering an aircraft with a maximum passenger capacity not in excess of li persons or a cargo capacity not greater than 6000 lbs, have been classified as general aviati
27、on engines. All other engines are considered commercial transport eng ines. In this report the following conventions are observed: a) Use of “hours1 refers to engine operating hours, unless otherwise specified. Use of Iicycle“ refers to a flight initiated by engine start-up and concluded at engine s
28、hutdown. b) Where an “overall“ failure rate is stated, the cumulative rate at the end of the 8-year (1976 - 1983) report period applies. Yearly rates are also presented and some comparisons are made between the “overall AIR 1537“ (i.e., cumulative 1962 - 1975) and the “current period overall“ or cum
29、ulative 1976 - 1583 data. For general aviation and rotorcraft, there were no data from tfie prior period. 2.1 Definition of Non-Containment: 2.1.1 2.1.2 Conimercial Transport and General Aviation Engines: Non-contained failure of a fixed wing aircraft turbine engine was defined for the purpose of th
30、is study to be the same as in AIR 1537, i.e., any failure which results in the esca e of rotor fragments through the nacelle cowling or through panels whicR isolate the powerpiant installation from the remainder of the aircraft structure, disks, spacers and blades. The term rotor includes rotating c
31、omponents such as Rotor failures of primary importance in this study are those which release fragments of sufficient energy to constitute a potential hazard to the aircraft through damage to other systems or structure outside the affected propulsion system. aircraft are capable of continued safe ope
32、ration after loss of power/thrust from one engine during any phase of flight. In addition, this distinction is drawn because fragments contained within the propulsion system, even when engine cases are penetrated, do not represent a hazard to personnel, airframe structures or systems. The powerpiant
33、 installation is designed to confine the fire or damage which might result from such a failure. This is based on the fact that multi-turbine powered Rotorcraft: rotorcraft engine was defined as any rotor failure which resulted in the escape of rotor fragments through the engine casing or the inlet s
34、tructure. proximity to other critical aircraft systems such as power shafting, electrical systems, flammable fluid lines and, in many twin engine rotorcraft, the second engine, powerplant system is usually integral with the helicopter as opposed to an“ isolated system contained in a nacelle. For the
35、se reasons, the definition- of a non-contained failure for rotorcraft engines differs from that for fixed wing aircraft. For the purpose of this study, a non-contained failure for a In rotorcraft installations, engines are mounted in close Un1 ike most fixed wing installations, the SAE AIR*q003 87 m
36、 83573qO 0007365 4 m 1 -6- 2.1.3 Exclusions: For commercial transport and general aviation engines where rotor fragments were released and did not penetrate the powerplant installation, i,e, inlet or exhaust nacelle outer skin, but did pass out of the exhaust or were propelled forward out of the air
37、 intake entry, the events were not included because in most cases added containment would be of no benefit and retaining devices are not practical. As pointed out earlier, this study addresses rotor failure where high energy fragments are released. Not considered are secondary failures such as conta
38、ined failures producing imbalance resulting in vibratory failure of bolts or exhaust cone attachwnts, liberating exhaust cones or portions thereof, or where the vibratory imbalance caused separation of bolted joints leading to the release of pressurized gases/air resultin9 in the liberation/separati
39、on of cowl access panels or cowl doors. 2.2 Definition of Aircraft Damage: 2.2.7 ConimerciaJ Transport and General Aviation: engine failure results when damage occurs to critical aircraft structure or systems other than the affected nacelle or when there are personal injuries. To assess the resultin
40、g aircraft damage and to determine the areas of greatest concern, the same severity classification as was defined in AIR 1537 has been maintained. The severity of aircraft damage, as judged from a relative standpoint, is based on the consequences and the damage that actual1 occurred. For example, fu
41、el tank puncture events on the actual consequences. aircraft being exposed to circumstances outside its certified limits, then it was considered serious enough to be classified as significant aircraft damage. The four damage severity classifications are defined as fol lows: A hazard from a non-conta
42、ined were not judge .-a-+ y what could have occurred, i.e., fire, but were judged If, however, an event resulted in the Category 1. Nacelle Damage, where damage froni escaping fragments was confined to the affected nacelle. Category 2. Minor Aircraft Damage, defined as damage that has little effect
43、on aircraft performance, such as: a. b. Slow depressurization. c. Controlled fires. Nicks, dents and small penetrations in aircraft structure. Category 3. Siqnificant Aircraft Damage, as listed below, with the aircraft continuing flight and making a safe landing, a. Damage to primary structure or sy
44、stems. b. Iincontrol led fire. c. Rapid depressurization. d. Loss of thrust on an additional engine. e, Minor injuries. 2-2.2 -7- Category 4. Severe Aircraft Damage, as listed below: a. Crash landing. b. Loss of the aircraft. c. Critical in juries. d. Fatalities. It is apparent from these definition
45、s that Categories 1 and 2 present no hazard to the welfare and safety of the aircraft passenger. analyzing the service data, Categories 3 and 4 were emphasized in order to determine the areas of greatest concern. Thus, in Definition of Rotorcraft Damage: failure results when damage occurs to aircraf
46、t structure or systems or there are personal injuries. To assess the resulting damage and to determine the areas of greatest concern, a means of classifying the severity of damage was developed. The severity of rotorcraft damage, as judged from a relative standpoint, is based upon the consequence an
47、d the damage that actual!y occurred. Consideration was given to the fact that rotorcraft are designed to autorotate to the ground safely in a power-off s i tu at i on. Hazard from a non-contained engine Damage severity was classified into four categories and is defined as follows: Category 1 . Damag
48、e 1 imited to affected. engine, such as: a. Continued safe flight. b. Successf u1 power-off or reduced power landing. Category 2. Minor aircraft damage, defined as damage that has little effect on aircraft performance, such as: a. Nicks, dents and small penetrations in aircraft structure. b. Slow de
49、pressurization. c. Controlled -fires. d. Successful power-off or reduced power landing. Category 3. Significant aircraft damage, as listed below, with the . rotorcraft making a safe landing. a. b. Uncontrolled fire. c. Rapid depressurization. d. e. Minor injuries. Damage to primary structure or systems. Loss of power on an additional engine. Category 4. Severe aircraft damage, as listed below: a. Crash landing. b. Loss of the aircraft. c. CriticaT in juries. d. Fatalities. SAE AIR*Ll003 87 W 8357340 0007367 8 i 3. 3, -8- SUMMARY OF RESULTS: The current study involved collating data f
