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1、,A Comparative Overview of the Protection Level Concept for Augmented GNSS and LORAN,Stanford University GPS Laboratory Weekly Meeting 20 December 2002,Sam Pullen Stanford University spullenrelgyro.stanford.edu,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,2,Aviation Requirements Definitions,ACCURACY: Measure of navi

2、gation output deviation from truth, usually expressed as 1s (68%) or 2s (95%) error limits. INTEGRITY: Ability of a system to provide timely warnings when the system should not be used for navigation. INTEGRITY RISK is the probability of an undetected hazardous navigation system anomaly. CONTINUITY:

3、 Likelihood that the navigation signal-in-space supports accuracy and integrity requirements for the duration of the intended operation. CONTINUITY RISK is the probability of a detected but unscheduled navigation interruption after initiation of approach. AVAILABILITY: Fraction of time navigation sy

4、stem is usable (as determined by compliance with accuracy, integrity, and continuity requirements) before approach is initiated.,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,3,Summary of Aviation Requirements,Original Source: GPS Risk Assessment Study: Final Report. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laborator

5、y, VS-99-007, January 1999. http:/www.jhuapl.edu/transportation/aviation/gps/,Being reconsi-dered by RTCA,WAAS,LAAS (LAAS satisfies WAAS ops., within VDB coverage),SPS/RAIM + INS,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,4,Precision Approach Alert Limits,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,5,Protection Level Objectives,T

6、o establish integrity, augmented GNSS systems must provide means to validate in real time that integrity probabilities and alert limits are met This cannot be done offline or solely within GNSS augmentation systems because: Achievable error bounds vary with GNSS SV geometry Ground-based systems cann

7、ot know which SVs a given user is tracking Protecting all possible sets of SVs in user position calculations is numerically difficult Protection level concept translates augmentation system integrity verification in range domain into user position bounds in position domain,20 December 2002,Sam Pulle

8、n,6,Key Assumptions in Existing Protection Level Calculations,Distributions of range and position-domain errors are assumed to be Gaussian in the tails “K-values” used to convert one-sigma errors to rare-event errors are computed from the standard Normal distribution Under nominal conditions, error

9、distributions have zero mean (for WAAS and LAAS) Under faulted conditions, a known bias (due to failure of a single SV or RR) is added to a zero-mean distribution with the same sigma Weighted-least-squares is used to translate range-domain errors into position domain Broadcast sigmas are used in wei

10、ghting matrix, but these are not the same as truly “nominal” sigmas,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,7,LAAS Protection Level Calculation (1),Protection levels represent upper confidence limits on position error (out to desired integrity risk probability): H0 case: H1 case: Ephemeris:,Nominal range error

11、variance,Geom. conversion: range to vertical position ( VDOP),Nominal UCL multiplier (for Gaussian dist.),Vert. pos. error std. dev. under H1,H1 UCL multiplier (computed for Normal dist.),B-value conver-ted to Vertical position error,(S index “3” = vertical axis),(nominal conditions),(single-referen

12、ce-receiver fault),(single-satellite ephemeris fault),20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,8,Fault-mode VPL equations (VPLH1 and VPLe) have the form:VPLfault = + LAAS users compute VPLH0 (one equation), VPLH1 (one equation per SV), and VPLe (one equation per SV) in real-time operation is aborted if maximum V

13、PL over all equations exceeds VAL absent a fault, VPLH0 is usually the largest Fault modes that do not have VPLs must: be detected and excluded such that VPLH0 bounds residual probability that VPLH0 does not bound must fall within the “H2” (“not covered”) LAAS integrity sub-allocation,LAAS Protectio

14、n Level Calculation (2),Mean impact of fault on vertical position error,Impact of nominal errors, de-weighted by prior probability of fault,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,9,Top-Level LAAS Signal-in-Space Fault Tree,Loss of Integrity (LOI),Nominal conditions (bounded by PLH0),Single LGF receiver failure

15、 (bounded by PLH1),All other conditions (H2),2 10-7 per approach (Cat. I PA),1.5 10-7,2.5 10-8,2.5 10-8,Single-SV failures,All other failures (not bounded by any PL),1.4 10-7,1 10-8,Ephemeris failures (bounded by PLe),2.3 10-8,Other single-SV failures (not bounded by any PL),1.17 10-7,Allocations to

16、 be chosen by LGF manufacturer (not in MASPS or LGF Spec.),20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,10,WAAS Protection Level Calculation,Message Types 2-6, 24,Message Types 10 & 28,MOPS Definition,Message Type 26,MOPS Definition,MOPS Definition,User Supplied,User Supplied,This “VPLH0” is the only protection leve

17、l defined for WAAS. Errors not bounded by it must be excluded within time to alert, or s must be increased until this VPL is a valid bound.,Courtesy: Todd Walter, SU WAAS Lab,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,11,Top-Level WAAS Signal-in-Space Fault Tree,Courtesy: Todd Walter, SU WAAS Lab,90% of total 10-7

18、 integrity risk reqt. falls within domain of “H0” (actually “H_all”) protection level calculation Remaining 10% allocated to WAAS hardware faults not covered by PL UDRE and GIVE set based on the maximum of bounding sigmas for nominal and faulted conditions (after SP monitoring) Fault cases not repre

19、sented in tree must have negligible probability,Hardware faults (not covered by PL) 1e-8,Based on maximum of nominal and faulted conditions,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,12,LORAN Horizontal Protection Level,Provide user with a guarantee on position Horizontal Protection Level Horizontal Position Error

20、ai is the standard deviation of the normal distribution that overbounds the randomly distributed errorsbi an overbound for the correlated bias termsgi an overbound for the uncorrelated bias terms,= Biases are to be treated as part of the nominal error distribution,Courtesy: Sherman Lo, SU LORAN Proj

21、ect,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,13,LORAN Integrity Fault Tree,Phase Error,Cycle Error,Courtesy: Sherman Lo, SU LORAN Project,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,14,Threshold and MDE Definitions,Test Statistic Response (no. of sigmas),Failures causing test statistic to exceed Minimum Detectable Error (MDE) a

22、re mitigated such that both integrity and continuity requirements are met.,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,15,MDE Relationship to Range Domain Errors,Courtesy: R. Eric Phelts, SU GPS Lab,MDE in test domain corresponds to a given PRE in user range domain depending on differential impact of failure source

23、 If resulting PRE MERR (required range error bound), system meets requirement with margin If not, MDE must be lowered (better test) or MERR increased (higher sigmas loss of availability),20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,16,Reasons for Sigma Inflation,We cannot prove that the tails of LAAS/WAAS error dist

24、ributions are Gaussian Theoretical error analyses suggest Gaussian (noise, diffuse multipath) or truncated (specular multipath) distributions, but analysis alone cannot be relied upon to validate a 10-7 or lower probability. Some degree of “mixing” is unavoidable in practice Error distribution mean,

25、 sigma, and correlation estimates have statistical noise due to limited number of independent samples. Inflating sigma inputs to PL is a convenient way to account for integrity monitor limitations when no PL is defined for a particular fault case.,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,17,Theoretical Impact of

26、 Sampling “Mixtures” on Tails of Gaussian Distributions,Normalize by theoretical sigma,Normalize by actual sigmas,Normalize by imperfect sigmas,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,18,Error Estimates from LAAS Test Prototype (9.5 10.5 degree SV elevation angle bin),70+ days of data: June 1999 June 2000 200 s

27、econds between samples,Significant tail inflation observed,Source: John Warburton, FAA Technical Center (ACT-360),20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,19,Error Estimates from LAAS Test Prototype (29.5 30.5 degree SV elevation angle bin),70+ days of data: June 1999 June 2000 200 seconds between samples,Tail i

28、nflation is less pronounced, most likely due to reduced multipath variation within this bin (i.e., less “mixing”),Source: John Warburton, FAA Technical Center (ACT-360),20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,20,Potential for Excessive Conservatism,Each error/anomaly source that contributes to sigmas in PL calc

29、ulations has some degree of magnitude and/or distribution uncertainty Traditional approach of “upper bounding” each uncertainty element may lead to excessive conservatism in the final sigma once conservative sigmas for each error source are convolved Avoiding this by creating less conservative bound

30、s on each sigma element means giving up on the idea of protection levels “proving” system safety Clear trade-off exists between degree of conservatism/“provability” and system availability, which has its own safety impact,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,21,Solution: “Keep Two Sets of Books”,Uncertain Pa

31、rameters,Detailed Study and Probability Modeling,TEP (primary due to engineer and DM acceptance),PRA/DA (backup less detailed),Compare and Contrast,Alert DM if Significant Discrepancy,(Add detail and re-compare),Uncertainty Bounding,Deterministic Assessment / Sensitivity Studies,Optimal Action (risk

32、 avoidance within tech./cost/schedule constraints),DA Utility Modeling,Probabilistic Risk Assessment,Decision Tree Resolution Optimal Action,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,22,WAAS Vertical Performance at Queens, NY WRS Site,Note that VPLs imply much larger errors than are actually observed significant

33、sigma inflation is evident.,For Phase 1 WAAS, GIVE (Grid Ionosphere Vertical Error) is the dominant contributor to VPL.,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,23,Impact of Sigma Inflation on Category I LAAS Availability,Category I PA Availability Simulation: 10 user locations (6 US, 4 Europe), 5o mask angle Cy

34、cle through all 22-of-24 GPS SV Outage Cases (276),Service Availability,Maximum Service Outage,Maximum Service Outage (min),Normalized s Inflation Factor (1 = AD curve value),Best location,Worst location,Mean,Normalized s Inflation Factor (1 = AD curve value),Availability,Worst location,Best locatio

35、n,Mean,B3/B,C3/B,1,1.2,1.4,1.6,1.8,2,2.2,2.4,2.6,B3/B,C3/B,Best location,Worst location,Mean,20 December 2002,Sam Pullen,24,Summary,Protection Levels provide the means for users to translate range-domain integrity assurance from WAAS/LAAS/etc. into real-time safety assessments Protection Levels are

36、defined to bound errors due to nominal conditions and specific failure modes Failure modes not covered by specific PLs must be overbounded by nominal PL or assigned a separate P(HMI) allocation within system level fault tree Broadcast sigma inputs to PLs are a key design parameter and will be conservative in practice Protection levels are very useful but should not be misconstrued as an inherent safety guarantee PLs are highly dependent on assumptions on inputs Try to avoid excessive conservatism in pursuit of a “provable” overbound,

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