1、1,The Role of the Public and Private Sector in Transport Infrastructure : PPP OptionsSeminar: Public Private Partnership (PPP), in the Transport Sector in RussiaMoscow, Russia, March 3-4, 2005,2,Contents,Role of the Public and Private Sector The economics of Transport Infrastructure The Real Gap : C
2、ost Recovery and Affordability Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) Leveraging Public Money Basics Key Challenges for Success Risk Assessment and Risk Allocation The Value for Money Concept Leveraging Public Money : Traffic Minimum Revenue Guarantees Development of Local Capital Markets Chile and Kore
3、a (transport infrastructure bonds) Using Output Based Aid Mechanisms Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Upcoming Trends and Way Forward,3,The Role of the Private and Public Sector,The Economics of Transport Infrastructure Infrastructure investments are inherently “lumpy” (involve huge sunk costs an
4、d create assets that are long-lived and location-specific). Creation of Infrastructure has economics both of scale and scope (i.e., minimum size of facilities, inelastic adjustment of capacity to demand, long term project completion, etc.). Transport supply systems contain elements of natural monopo
5、ly. Demand is wide spread (difficult to target). Revenues are usually in local currency (mismatch if foreign debt financing). Services have an essentiality component that raise legitimate public policy concerns of affordability. However Transport has a great impact on poverty alleviation and MDGs. S
6、ound transport infrastructure allows countries to integrate to the global economy and increases competitiveness,4,The Role of the Private and Public Sector,There is limited affordability in the provision of most of the transport services (when including the costs of the required infrastructure facil
7、ities), specially when considering low income end-users. Affordability is determine by household income levels and the cost of delivering the transport service. Transport services has strong characteristics as a public good and creates major positive externalities. Full cost recovery is only possibl
8、e in some situations (i.e., air transport). Most of the public mass transportation system have strong limitations to reach full cost recovery even in developed markets.There is a role for the provision of “smart” subsidies to make possible the delivery of the service. The financing gap is a function
9、 of the gap between cost recovery and affordability.,Tariffs,Time,Affordability,Cost recovery,The Service Delivery Gap,The Service Delivery Gap,5,The Role of the Private and Public Sector,The Roles Away from ideology and “back” to pragmatism Public Sector driven by the optimization of public welfare
10、 (efficient provision of transport related services to the general public quality standards at lowest cost of provision) Private Sector driven by economic incentives Public Sector Role in the design, development and enforcement of transport sector policies. In particular in the definition of cost re
11、covery and affordability issues in the context of financial sustainability of the sector. Role in the establishment of smart regulation (I.e., rules of the game that creates level playing field for efficient provision of public services) Role in the provision of transport services where externalitie
12、s and sector constraints do not provide adequate incentives for full private sector engagement.Private Sector Capital Financing (i.e., equity and debt) Construction and Operations of Transport Facilities Operations of Transport Services,6,Private Public Partnerships : Leveraging Public Money,Need to
13、 reconcile transport infrastructure development needs with criteria for fiscal prudence (i.e., public sector resources available for infrastructure investments will be limited financing gap). Need to mobilize additional private capital to match the gap if infrastructure development is to keep its pa
14、ce sustaining economic growth. Need to maximize private capital mobilization per unit of public sector contribution (e.g., direct investment, subsidies, guarantees, etc.). Need to develop PPPs approaches as a procurement tool for better and efficient allocation of scarce public sector resources (the
15、 concept of value for money). Need to develop an adequate risk management framework to manage contingent liabilities arising for public money support to PPPs development.,“PPP hold the promise of increasing the supply of infrastructure without overburdening a countrys public finances. An infusion of
16、 private capital and management can ease fiscal constraints and boost efficiency ” IMF, Finance & Develoment, December 2004,7,Public Private Partnerships: Basics,PPPs are contractual arrangements between the public sector and a private sector party for the private delivery of public infrastructure s
17、ervices or other basic services. PPPs are complex structures, involving different parties, long and demanding negotiations and relatively high transaction costs. PPPs are a procurement tool where the focus is payment for delivery of services rendered (outputs outcomes). Transfer of the performance r
18、isk. Project related risks (i.e., technical, performance, market and financial risks are transferred (to a great extent) to the private entity. Political, regulatory and macro-economic risks should be allocated to the party best suited to deal with them (government, international financial instituti
19、on, private insurers). Contract payments are usually structured in such a way that the public authority and / or users pay only for services rendered satisfactorily and not for assets, which are inputs to service provision. Revenues are generated via: (i) user fees, (ii) government payments (subsidi
20、es) and (iii) multilateral / donor grant funding and or (iv) a combination of all of the above.,8,PPPs : Spectrum of Options,9,PPPs : Key Challenges for Success,Policy Framework Clarity of objectives (i.e., efficient and cost-effective delivery of services, optimization of impact of public spending,
21、 efficient risk allocation ) PPP legislation and rules of the game Economic regulation (i.e., reduction of infrastructure related risk as perceived by the private sector and adequate and efficient measurement of the PPP outputs - performance) Institutional Capacity (centralized coordinating capaciti
22、es with decentralized execution) Communication Program (PPP marketing to key constituencies) Transaction Design Market structure Users fees “ tolerance” levels (willingness to pay) and public sector fiscal capacities (subsidies) Investment Needs and type of assets to be generated Nature of the servi
23、ce to be provided (i.e., local vs regional, network or individual, etc.),10,PPPs: Key Challenges for Success,Financiability Adequate risk allocation and mitigation mechanisms (i.e., commercial risk, performance risk vis-a-vis regulatory and political risk). Project finance structuring. Access to pri
24、vate financial markets at adequate terms and conditions (Sustainability of such access). Optimize mobilization of private capital per unit of public spending (i.e., direct investment, subsidies, guarantees). Procurement rules (transparency & accountability) Public Sector Risk Management Valuation an
25、d Monitoring systems of public sector commitments under PPP arrangements (i.e., direct investment, subsidies, guarantees). Develop efficient public administration tools for effcient use of fiscal space targeting of infrastructure investments (Public Sector Risk Management Framework). Evaluation and
26、decision making analysis for different options to commit public sector fiscal support to PPPs.,11,PPPs in Transport Infrastructure Financing : Risk Assessment,Project Related Risks (relatively manageable by sponsors and lenders)Completion Risk (engineering & construction cost / time cost control) Op
27、erational Performance Risk (technical & operational know-how) Market Risk (Traffic and Tariff) Financial Risk (Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Fluctuations) Environmental Risk (past and future liabilities, project delays, costs overruns),Non-Project Related Risks (non-manageable by sponsors and lend
28、ers)Political Risk (expropriation, political violence, currency convertibility & transfer) Contractual Risk Regulatory Risks. (Governments default on contractual obligations, i.e., pricing formulas ) Macroeconomics Environment - Volatility Risk (changes in macro balance in relatively short periods,
29、i.e., exchange rate, inflation, etc.) Legal Environment (rule of law, i.e., judicial system, regulatory procedures and arbitration),Best possible mitigation is to Match local revenue generation With local currency financing,key role in the availability and pricing of transport concession finance (i.
30、e. (economic regulation),12,PPPs: The Value for Money Concept,PPP projects should be able to provide equivalent or better value for money than a public sector project approach develop base case with which to assess incremental benefits of the PPP approach Incremental Benefits may accrue from: speedi
31、er Implementation (fiscal constraints) total long-term costs (life costs) of the operation Better service (cost & efficiency) and coverageAdequate distribution of risks :,Too little: no Value For Money,Too much: project failure,Risk Transfer,Optimal: efficient sharing of risks,13,Leveraging Public M
32、oney : Case of Toll Roads,Consider a case, in which the privately financed firms sells to end users, not the government or SOE, and, to simplify, consider three types of risk. Construction, operating, and maintenance cost risks: private sector normally has most influence over these costs, so governm
33、ent does not benefit from bearing them. Price risk: if government controls the toll, it probably benefits from bearing price risk (that is, from agreeing to compensate if it doesnt increase toll according to concession contract). Demand risk (given price): appropriate policy is less clear. Neither f
34、irm nor government may have much influence. Decision needs to consider other aspects of “managing” risk: who can best forecast and anticipate demand to determine whether to build road? Who can best absorb the risk?,14,Demand risk in toll road,Whether government should bear demand risk in toll roads
35、is therefore controversial Chile, Colombia, Korea, and Spain, for example, have provided revenue guarantees (often in return for upside risk sharing). (Italy and Turkey gave revenue guarantees for privately financed railways in the nineteenth century: “PPPs” are not new.) Australia, Canada, United S
36、tates have not. Target any guarantee to the real problem: Is total demand risk the issue or is it whether government will build a competing road or complete a planned complementary road or port? Is risk the problem, or is it just that government doesnt want to set tolls high enough to consider costs
37、? If so, a subsidy may be better.,15,Valuing revenue guarantees,Step 1. Develop model of traffic revenue that allows for random fluctuation (that is, risk) as well as trend rates of growth. Step 2. For the trend, take forecasts traffic-revenue growth developed for tendering the toll road. Step 3. Es
38、timate the expected size of traffic revenue fluctuation (risk), from previous Indonesian or international experience. Step 4. Estimate consequent expected payments by government (see next slides). Step 5. Discount those expected payments at the risk-free rate to get the value of the guarantee. (Poss
39、ible addition to Step 4: adjust expected cash flows for an estimate of risk, using the capital-asset-pricing model).,16,Forecast and guaranteed revenue on hypothetical toll road,17,A possible good outcome,18,A possible bad outcome,19,Valuation: Frequency distribution of government payments in 2016 (
40、10,000 possible outcomes),Average payment in 2016 is $4.19 million Assume risk free rate is 5% Approximate value of 2016 component of guarantee is4.19/(1.05)11 = $2.45 million Repeat for all years.This calculation will allow providing a value to the Fiscal impact of this option. This is a necessary
41、first step In the decision-making process for public sector options For infrastructure development.,20,Transport Infrastructure: Developing Local Capital Markets,There is no best substitute for foreign exchange risk mitigation than matching the currency revenue generation with the currency of debt p
42、ayment services (matching assets and liabilities). Financing transport facilities and services (local currency based) in the foreign debt markets adds substantial risk to the structuring of adequate PPPs creating the need for additional public money support. Local institutional investors (I.e., pens
43、ion funds, insurance companies, life annuities, etc.) have a natural demand for long-term local currency debt instruments to match their liabilities. In most cases, local capital markets initiate their development via the creation of a sovereign bond market (long-term yield curve). After the establi
44、shment of such market, investors develop a need to diversify the risk profile of their investments and the return mix, providing the incentives for the development of a private bond market, creating the opportunity for the introduction of infrastructure or utilities bonds (long-term annuities). It i
45、s in the governments best interest to stimulate, via adequate securities regulation and institutional investors overseeing, the development of local capital markets as a source of long-term local currency funding for needed PPPs infrastructure projects.,21,Developing Local Capital Markets : Chile So
46、urce: IMF, Fiscal Affairs Dept.,January 2005,By the early 1990s, a sizable infrastructure gap had emerged in Chile, and significant investment was needed to prevent transportation and other bottlenecks from becoming a major obstacle to future growth A challenge for the government was to close this g
47、ap while maintaining fiscal discipline that had placed public debt on a rapidly declining path. The solution lay in promoting private sector involvement in the provision of public infrastructure through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Chile thus embarked on an ambitious concessions program in 19
48、94, centered around a number of projects to develop the highway network. The concessions program in Chile covers 44 contracted projects with a total value of US$5.7 billion (about 6 percent of 2004 GDP). These include: 8 projects to rehabilitate and upgrade the Route 5 highway which runs the length
49、of Chile, with financing from tolls (US$2 billion); 11 other highway projects for connecting roads to Route 5 (US$1.3 billion); 10 airport projects (US$240 million); 6 urban road projects (US$1.8 billion); and 9 other projects (including prisons, public buildings, a reservoir, for US$360 million). A
50、pproximately 75% was funded in the local capital markets via local currency infrastructure bonds.The government provides guarantees to concession operators. A minimum revenue guarantee is provided for highway and airport concessions, under which concession firms are compensated when traffic or traffic revenue falls below an annual threshold. In return for the minimum revenue guarantee, the concession firm enters into a revenue sharing agreement in which it shares a percentage of revenue with the government once a threshold is exceeded.,
